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INTRODUCTION
The number of investment arbitration cases from the energy sector is increasing, accompanied 
by a rise in a more frequent invocation of the Energy Charter Treaty�1 Statistics show that 
the most frequently alleged breach by the claimants is the breach of article 10(1) of the 
Energy Charter Treaty, which makes provision for the obligation to fair and equitable 
treatment (FET) of investments of investors in the host state�2 Based on various investor-
state arbitration decisions, the fair and equitable standard is usually associated with the 
(sub-)standard of the investor’s legitimate expectations� Therefore, this work examines the 
requirements of the fair and equitable treatment and the legitimate expectations doctrines 
as interpretated by arbitral tribunals in the Energy Charter Treaty related arbitral practice�
The first part of the work introduces the reader to the concept of the fair and equitable 
treatment standard and its sub-standard, the legitimate expectations� The legitimate 
expectations is a sub-standard that Tribunals have become increasingly reliant on in finding 
a state liable for a breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard� This is followed by 
brief presentation of the Energy Charter Treaty as the relevant international convention, 
and a subsequent presentation of institutions and arbitration rules, to provide the required 
basic information on these institutions and procedural rules�
The Energy Charter Treaty is important for two reasons: first, it provides the legal 
base for investment arbitration, and second, it provides basic substantive law� Besides the 
Energy Charter Treaty, other institutions and rules are also addressed briefly, because in 
accordance with article 26(2) of the Energy Charter Treaty, the investor party to the dispute 
may submit the dispute for resolution to the judiciary of the host country, to a special 
dispute settlement procedure as per prior agreement, or may choose among: (i) ICSID 
arbitration, which provides a forum for investment arbitration and procedural rules, (ii) ad 
hoc arbitration with UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, which are only procedural rules, (iii) 
Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) or (iv) Permanent 
Court of Arbitration (PCA) both of which provide forum and procedural rules�
The second part of the work examines the relevant arbitral practice� There is a relatively 
large number of cases which were initiated based on the Energy Charter Treaty, more 
than 130�3 In the majority of these cases the final award has already been delivered. As 
we have already mentioned, the majority of these awards deal with the issue of fair and 
equitable treatment (and the legitimate expectations of the investor), meaning that there 
is a body of cases suitable for research� This makes possible drawing of conclusions 
and even finding trends. There is a group of cases within the case law related to green 
1 Sydney Thurman-Baldwin, ‘Modernizing the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standards in the ds in the Energy 
Charter Treaty’ (2020) 28 U� Miami Bus� L� Rev� 296, 297 <https://repository�law�miami�edu/umblr/vol28/
iss2/4> accessed 23 February 2021�
2 ‘IIA Issues Note, Special Update on Investor–State Dispute Settlement: Facts and Figures’ (UNCTAD 2017) 
5 <https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-documents/uncitral/en/isds_settlement_facts_and_
figures.pdf> accessed 23 February 2021; Investment arbitration became the standard for the settlement of 
investment disputes, see Csongor István Nagy, ‘The Lesson of a Short-Lived Mutiny: The Rise and Fall of 
Hungary’s Controversial Arbitration Regime in Cases Involving National Assets’ (2016) 27(2) The American 
Review of International Arbitration 239-246�
3 ‘List of cases’ (Energy Charter Treaty) <https://www�energychartertreaty�org/cases/list-of-cases/> accessed 
3 September 2020�
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energy investments within the European Union� We examine them separately, due to their 
common characteristics� However, we do not examine cases related to the infamous Yukos 
dispute, as that subject is specific and distinct enough that it could serve as the basis of an 
independent monograph, and its unique specialties render it not too suitable for a general 
analysis like what this book intends to provide� The examination of the case law is closed 
with a conclusion, which contains the most important findings of the book.
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PART I
1. Protection of foreign investment
Before we start with the discussion of the fair and equitable treatment standard, we would like 
to give a short and very basic introduction to international investment protection law� First of 
all, let us see the types of foreign investment� They can be so-called foreign direct investment 
(FDI), where the investor keeps direct management of the foreign investment� This can 
be in the form of greenfield investment or investing into an already existing enterprise. 
The host state may require that domestic investors also participate in the investment, this 
is the so-called joint venture requirement (this was typical for investments to China in 
the eighties and nineties)� The other type is indirect or portfolio investment (e.g. buying 
foreign shares, bonds), however, this is regulated by other set of laws�4
Foreign direct investments are important, because they bring capital, modernization, 
new technologies, more efficient management technics to the host country, and besides 
provide the chance for the labor force to get new skills and access to foreign markets� 
However, there are disadvantages as well� For example, when foreign investors invest 
into service sector and sell mostly imported goods in the host country� This was the case 
during the nineties in most Eastern European states� Or when they invest into ore extraction 
business, get cheaply the ore, and leave huge environmental damage� Or when causing 
the same damage by operating landfill sites. This leads us to the motivation factors of 
foreign investors. These are usually securing resources, market, efficiency, and long-term 
competitiveness�5
Foreign investors frequently face different risks related to their investments. These 
risks can be divided into two groups. Into first fall commercial risks. This is basically 
about making bad business decisions� The other group, non-commercial risks, are more 
important for us, as international investment law deals with these, that is to say, tries to 
protect foreign investors if such risks arise� These are among others expropriation, currency 
inconvertibility, profit repatriation limitations, devaluation, political instability, deterioration 
of the investment environment�6 We can say that the most important aspect of international 
investment law is investment protection�
There are different legal instruments for the protection of foreign investments. These are:
(i) Domestic legislation, like national investment protection laws� They were 
widespread in developing countries, especially in Eastern Europe during the 
nineties of the last century� However, there is a serious problem with these laws: 
the host country can unilaterally amend or repeal them�
(ii) Individual agreement between the host state and an individual investor� If well 
drafted, such agreement can provide security for the investor, especially if it 
4 Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (Cambridge University 
Press 2010) 8�
5 Zoltán Víg, ‘A külföldi befektetők motivációi’ in Erzsébet Csányi (ed), A Tudás Fája: Az I. Vajdasági Magyar 
Tudományos Diákköri Konferencia dolgozatai (VMFK 2003) 370, 370�
6 Zoltan Vig, Taking in international law (Patrocinium 2019) 13�
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contains international arbitration clause� However, for small and middle size 
investors it is difficult to acquire such agreements.
(iii) Bilateral investment treaty (BIT)� This is investment protection agreement 
concluded between the host state and the state of the investor� They usually cover 
all the investors from the other state, not only large investors, like individual 
agreements. There are thousands of such agreements between different states, with 
very similar provisions� They usually contain (i) the host state’s duty to provide 
fair and equitable treatment to the investor, (ii) prohibition of discrimination, 
(iii) conditions for expropriation of foreign investment, and (iv) the possibility 
for international dispute resolution�7
(iv) Multilateral investment treaties (like the Energy Charter Treaty)� There are only 
few such treaties for special economic sectors� They contain similar provisions 
to bilateral investment treaties� We should mention here that the tendency is 
to include investment protection provisions into free trade agreements, good 
example for this is the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between 
the European Union and Canada (CETA)�
(v) Investment insurance� Investors can take out insurance for their investments with 
private insurance companies, however, it is usually very expensive (about one 
percent of the investment’s value per annum) and not available for all countries� 
There is also the so-called Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) 
which provides investment insurance to the investors of member countries if they 
invest into another member country� However, there are special requirements 
for this, as the main goal of the Agency is to stimulate investment into certain 
developing countries and sectors�8
As the most serious risk for a foreign investor is the taking of property (investment), 
we should discuss shortly the issue of taking of foreign property. There are different 
types of such taking� If the taking of foreign investment is an individual measure, it is 
called expropriation. However, if the taking is a general measure, affecting the whole 
economy of the host country, or all foreign investors, or a whole economic sector, it is called 
nationalization (this happened in socialist countries after the war)� Nowadays, countries 
usually try to avoid open expropriation of foreign property, and they resort to so-called 
creeping expropriation (taking de facto control over property rights), like hindering the 
operation of the foreign investor with denying permits, frequent tax inspections, till the 
foreign investor sells off the investment cheaply to a local enterprise.
In international law there are certain conditions required for lawful expropriation: (i) 
the expropriation should be for public purpose, (ii) it should be non-discriminatory, (iii) 
appropriate compensation should be paid to the foreign investor, and (iv) the due process of 
law should be respected� The most contested condition is compensation� There are several 
standards you can read about (like “just” compensation in the Norwegian Shipowners’ case, 
or „fair” compensation in the Chorzów Factory case, or the Hull doctrine, which provides 
for „prompt, adequate, effective” compensation). However, the majority of investment 
7 For the genesis of BITs see: Csongor István Nagy, ’’There is Nothing in a Caterpillar That Tells You It Is 
Going to Be a Butterfly’: Proposal for a Reconceptualization of International Investment Protection Law’ 
(2020) 51(4) Georgetown Journal of International Law 899, 899-905 <https://ssrn�com/abstract=3729175> 
accessed 22 May 2021�
8 Imre Vörös, A nemzetközi gazdasági kapcsolatok joga I (Krim Bt� 2004) 133-149�
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protection agreements accept the “prompt, adequate and effective” standard, which means, 
that the compensation should be paid out to the investor promptly, in hard currency and 
based on the market value (this is the “adequate” requirement) of the investment immediately 
before the expropriation�
2. The fair and equitable treatment standard
The fair and equitable treatment (FET) standard is provisioned for in most investment 
treaties, and successfully invoked by the claimant in the majority of investment arbitration 
cases�9 At the same time, researching the fair and equitable treatment standard related case 
law is the most challenging task� Particularly in case law of the Energy Charter Treaty, 
because there is no uniform interpretation by arbitral tribunals, and its exact normative 
content is contested�10
Before we discuss the legal nature of the fair and equitable treatment standard, 
it is worth noting a definition by a scholar Yannick Radi� He defines the fair and 
equitable treatment standard as “a normative outcome of a balancing legislative process 
aiming at the protection of foreign investors against discriminatory and arbitrary 
state conducts”�11
There are several theories regarding the standard’s legal nature� According to one of 
them, fair and equitable treatment covers all other standards related to investment protection� 
And if any of these is infringed, fair and equitable treatment is concurrently violated�12 
Palombino, an Italian scholar, distinguishes the fair and equitable treatment standard from 
other standards, such as the non-discriminatory treatment,13 or the full protection and security 
standard� However, he states that arbitration practice is not very clear on this issue�14 He 
also separates it from expropriation, as there are lot of cases when expropriation is not 
established, in contrast to the finding of a breach of fair and equitable treatment. However, 
in the event of (uncompensated) expropriation of foreign property, the violation of fair and 
equitable treatment is almost always established by tribunals�15
9 IIA Issues Note (2017) 5�
10 ‘UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II’ (United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development Fair and Equitable Treatment 2012) 3 <https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/
unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf> accessed 25 May 2021.
11 Yannick Radi, The ‘Human Nature’ of International Investment Law’ (2013) Grotius Centre Working Paper 
2013/006-IEL 8� Also published in: (2013) 10(1) Transnational Dispute Management�
12 Francis A� Mann was one of the representatives of this theory� Fulvio Maria Palombino, Fair and Equitable 
Treatment and the Fabric of General Principles (T�M�C� Asser Press 2018) 22� According to Palombino, 
Energy Charter Treaty article 10(1) supports this theory� Strictly based on the text of this article we would say 
that the fair and equitable treatment standard is not above the other standards but only one of the standards� 
There are several arbitral decisions which found close connection among these standards, but at the same 
time also emphasised the autonomy of these standards� For example, see infra awards in Plama or Petrobart 
cases�
13 In the infra discussed Saluka case the Tribunal several times emphasized the importance of the non-
discriminatory treatment of the investor, also in relation to its legitimate expectations (it will be discussed 
infra)� Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v The Czech Republic, PCA Case No� 2001-04 (Partial 
Award) para 307, 309�
14 Palombino (2018) 25�
15 ibid 27�
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According to the authors of the UNCTAD (2012) study, the fair and equitable treatment 
standard came into existence as an expression of the minimum standard of protection�16 It is 
seen as going beyond a specific instance of the international minimum standard treatment 
that is required by international customary law� However, the study admits that there are 
several and contradicting awards regarding this issue� For example, in the frequently 
cited Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v The Czech Republic17 case the Tribunal 
interpreted the fair and equitable treatment as an autonomous treaty standard�18 However, 
there are some scholars who still claim that it cannot be considered for an autonomous 
custom�19 The UNCTAD study also admits that there are several and contradicting awards 
regarding this issue� Based on some of the awards, it can be said that, although international 
minimum standard is factually not different from the obligation to provide fair and equitable 
treatment,20 the two standards should not blindly be equated�21
Along with the majority, in the Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v The Czech 
Republic case the Tribunal found that:
The “fair and equitable treatment” standard in Article 3�1 of the Treaty is an autono-
mous Treaty standard and must be interpreted, in light of the object and purpose of 
the Treaty�22
The Tribunal stated that when there is no reference to the customary minimum standard, 
fair and equitable treatment requirement can be interpreted only in the light of the relevant 
treaty� In this case, namely the Agreement on encouragement and reciprocal protection of 
investments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Czech and Slovak Federal 
Republic�23
16 ‘United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Fair and Equitable Treatment’ (United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development 2012) XIV�
17 PCA Case No. 2001-04 (<https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0740.pdf> accessed 
16 May 2021)� To summarize the facts of the case: the Japanese Nomura Group invested into the shares of the 
Czech bank IPB through a shell company Saluka, a company registered in the Netherlands� They acquired a 
controlling share� Following this, at the end of the nineties, the Czech Government provided state aid to four 
other large Czech banks which similarly to the IPB inherited “bad debts”. Beginning of 2000 IPB had to file for 
bankruptcy� Saluka (the Nomura Group) initiated arbitration under the Netherlands-Czech Republic Bilateral 
Investment Treaty, among others for “failing to accord Saluka’s investment fair and equitable treatment”� 
Saluka (Partial Award) para 165; See also: George Stephanov Georgiev, ‘The Award in Saluka Investments 
v� Czech Republic’ in llermo Alvarez, W�M� Reisman (eds�) The Reasons Requirement in International 
Investment Arbitration (Brill/Nijhoff 2008) 149–190 <http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSIDBLOBS/
OnlineAwards/C3004/CLA-062_Eng.pdf> accessed 25 May 2021.
18 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2012) XIV�
19 Palombino (2018) 37�
20 E.g. Deutsche Bank AG v Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka ICSID Case No� ARB/09/2�
21 Palombino (2018) 30-31� Crystallex International Corporation v Venezuela ICSID Case No� ARB (AF)/11/2, 
Award para 530: “the tribunal is of the opinion that the FET standard embodied in the Treaty cannot […] be 
equated to the ‘international minimum standard’ under customary international law, but rather constitute an 
autonomous treaty standard�”� At the same time, the Bilcon tribunal found that “In light of the FTC Notes 
and in the specific context of NAFTA Chapter Eleven in which this Tribunal operates, “fair and equitable 
treatment” and “full protection and security” cannot be regarded as “autonomous” treaty norms that impose 
additional requirements above and beyond what the minimum standard requires�” Bilcon v Canada (Award on 
jurisdiction and liability) para 432 (<https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4212.
pdf> accessed 28 May 2021)�
22 Saluka (Partial Award) para 309� Here the referred Treaty was Agreement on encouragement and reciprocal 
protection of investments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic�
23 ibid para 294�
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We can agree with Palombino, who comes to the conclusion that the fair and equitable 
treatment standard “is undoubtedly part of the category of general principles specific to a 
certain field of international law”, includes among others due process of law, legitimate 
expectations and proportionality�24
In defining the content of the fair and equitable treaty standard, general international 
law, and more specifically the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties interpretation 
standards can help us�25 There is an increasing reference to this legal instrument� It is 
regularly interpreted by arbitral tribunals in investment arbitrations, purely based on the 
content of the standard but also dependent on the specific facts of the case.26 Some authors 
even argue that it is intentionally vague and not defined in the majority of the treaties, so 
as to leave its definition to the arbitrators in the specific case.27 Yannick Radi argues that 
arbitrators frequently use the teleological method of interpretation� That is to say, they take 
the purpose and object of the particular investment agreement into consideration when 
considering the facts of the given case�28
Some bilateral and multilateral investment treaties even define the fair and equitable 
treatment standard� The United States’ 2012 U�S� Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, 
although not very detailed, still gives its definition. It “only” requires access to justice 
and due process:
1� Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment in accordance with 
customary international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protec-
tion and security�
2� For greater certainty, paragraph 1 prescribes the customary international law mini-
mum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be 
afforded to covered investments. The concepts of “fair and equitable treatment” and 
“full protection and security” do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that 
which is required by that standard, and do not create additional substantive rights� The 
“fair and equitable treatment” includes the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, 
civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the principle of 
due process embodied in the principal legal systems of the world;29
The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), concluded between 
the European Union and Canada, provides concrete cases for the breach of the fair and 
equitable treatment obligation in its article 8�10(2):
[…] if a measure or series of measures constitutes: (a) denial of justice in criminal, 
civil or administrative proceedings; (b) fundamental breach of due process, including 
24 Palombino (2018) 52�
25 Palombino (2018) 14; See also Saluka (Partial Award) para 296� However, the Saluka Tribunal did not deny 
the importance of the facts of the relevant case� (Saluka (Partial Award) para 285�)
26 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2012) 2; We agree with Palombino that “FET has 
been progressively shaped by arbitral tribunals, going so far as to embody a (composite) general principle 
specific to international investment law.” Palombino (2018) 15�
27 C� H� Brower, ‘Structure, Legitimacy and NAFTA’s Investment Chapter’ (2003) 36 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 37, 63.; “The manner in which FET clauses are drafted vary significantly. In effect, three 
main forms of drafting may be identified: (1) FET as a freestanding obligation;45 (2) FET as an obligation 
included in a clause referring to a number of standards of treatment;46 (3) FET as an obligation that is required 
by international law�” Palombino (2018) 12-13�
28 Radi (2013) 6�
29 ‘2012 U�S� Model Bilateral Investment Treaty’ (United States Government 2012) Art� 5(2)(a) <https://ustr�
gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf> accessed 29 May 2021.
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a fundamental breach of transparency, in judicial and administrative proceedings; (c) 
manifest arbitrariness; (d) targeted discrimination on manifestly wrongful grounds, 
such as gender, race or religious belief; (e) abusive treatment of investors, such as 
coercion, duress and harassment;30
The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement even realizes that the law is under 
constant change and development� The next paragraph provides the regular review of this 
list in article 8�10(2), which may be requested by one of the parties to the Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement�31
Conditions of the fair and equitable treatment in the Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement are basically the synopsis of years of mainstream arbitral practice and 
sub-standards developed by international investment tribunals� As already mentioned, the 
vast majority of investment protection agreements do not define the fair and equitable 
treatment. Instead, it is the role of the arbitral tribunal to define it based on the facts of the 
specific case. Firstly, the basic principle is that host states should act in good faith, when 
treating foreign investors. And tribunals have also developed specific sub-standards of fair 
and equitable treatment, such as, no denial of justice for the foreign investor, due process 
rights should be respected, no arbitrary treatment, no discrimination, and nor should the 
foreign investor be coerced or harassed�
Furthermore, the host state should not frustrate representations made to the investor, 
upon which the investor relied when making the investment, which were taken over by the 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement as stated in art� 8�10(4):
When applying the above fair and equitable treatment obligation, a Tribunal may 
take into account whether a Party made a specific representation to an investor to 
induce a covered investment, that created a legitimate expectation, and upon which 
the investor relied in deciding to make or maintain the covered investment, but that 
the Party subsequently frustrated�32
30 ‘Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)’ (EU 2014) <http://trade�ec�europa�eu/doclib/
docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf> accessed 29 May 2021; Such sub-standards can be also found 
in article 13 of the Institut de Droit International Session de Tokyo – 2013 Eighteenth Commission Legal 
Aspects of Recourse to Arbitration by an Investor Against the Authorities of the Host State under Inter-State 
Treaties, Rapporteur: M. Andrea Giardina Resolution; These are based on the concepts of the UNCTAD 
Study, however, that list includes also the frustration of the “legitimate expectations” of the investor� P� 
xvi United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Fair and Equitable Treatment (2012); “Fair and 
equitable treatment, which is a key standard of investment protection, must accord investors and investments, 
in particular: (i) due process, (ii) non-discrimination and non-arbitrary treatment, (iii) due diligence, and (iv) 
respect of legitimate expectations� The notion of legitimate expectations, as applied to the investor, shall 
not be construed to include mere expectations of profit, in the absence of specific engagements undertaken 
towards them by competent State organs� Compensation due to an investor for violation of the FET standard 
shall be assessed without regard to compensation that could be allocated in case of an expropriation, in 
accordance with the damage suffered by the investor.” ‘2013 Eighteenth Commission Legal Aspects of 
Recourse to Arbitration by an Investor Against the Authorities of the Host State under Inter-State Treaties’ 
(Institut de Droit International 2013) <https://www.idi-iil.org/app/uploads/2017/06/2013_tokyo_en.pdf> 
accessed 29 May 2021�
31 ‘Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)’ art� 8�10(3)�
32 ibid art� 8�10(4)�
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3. Legitimate expectations
Investment decisions of investors are affected by their legitimate expectations as they desire 
legal certainty and a predictable legal environment� Legitimate expectations, as a sub-
standard of fair and equitable treatment, is not mentioned in treaties� It is mentioned only in 
arbitration practice and scholarly writings�33 Notwithstanding, during the last decade, it has 
become one of the major components of the fair and equitable treatment standard�34 Some 
authors even claim that legitimate expectations may be regarded as a “general principle of 
international law that prescribes a direction to be followed and, alongside, vests the judge 
[arbitrator] with the power of inferring [from the principle] the rules applicable to a given 
case”�35 Yannick Radi considers legitimate expectations as a balancing method used by the 
dispute settlement bodies, with which they justify and legitimize their rulings�36 Regarding 
its relation to the fair and equitable treatment, he goes so far as to state that legitimate 
expectations is not a sub-category, but a category replacing the fair and equitable treatment�37
One of the first awards which referred to the protection of legitimate expectations (or 
only “expectations”) as a sub-standard of fair and equitable treatment was the Tecnicas 
Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v The United Mexican States38 case� Tecmed, a Spanish 
company, requested arbitration against Mexico based on the bilateral investment treaty 
concluded between Spain and Mexico�39 Tecmed, among others, claimed that the Mexican 
authorities had in fact expropriated its investment by denying the renewal of the license 
to operate Tecmed’s landfill, as well as violated the fair and equitable treatment standard 
of the respective bilateral investment treaty�40
33 However, there are also tribunals which did not find that the breach of legitimate expectation does not violate 
in itself the fair and equitable standard (see Mesa Power Group, Llc v Government of Canada, PCA Case No� 
2012-17)�
34 Michele Potestà, ‘Legitimate expectations in investment treaty law: Understanding the roots and the limits 
of a controversial concept’ (2013) 28 ICSID Review 88, 103; Palombino (2018) 86; See also Saluka (Partial 
Award) para 302�
35 Palombino (2018) 89�
36 Radi (2013) 8�
37 Radi (2013) 10�
38 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v The United Mexican States, Case No� Arb (Af)/00/2 (<https://
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0854.pdf> accessed 15 June 2021). Tecmed (Award) 
paras 41, 88, 122�
39 In an earlier NAFTA case, there was already a reference to the expectations of the investor: in the Metalclad 
Corporation v The United Mexican States case, Case No� ARB(AF)/97/1 (<https://www�italaw�com/sites/
default/files/case-documents/ita0510.pdf> accessed 14 May 2021), a U.S. waste disposal company, Metalclad 
Corporation, initiated arbitration proceedings against Mexico alleging, among others, breach of NAFTA article 
1110� Its notice of arbitration asserted that Mexico wrongfully refused to permit Metalclad’s subsidiary to 
open and operate a hazardous waste facility that the company had built in La Pedrera, despite the fact that the 
project was allegedly executed in response to the invitation of certain Mexican officials and allegedly met all 
Mexican legal requirements� Metalclad sought damages of USD 43,125,000 and damages for the value of the 
enterprise taken� In this case, the ICSID Arbitral Tribunal interpreted expropriation as including: “also covert 
or incidental interference with the use of property which has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in 
significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of property even if not necessarily 
to the obvious benefit of the host state.” The tribunal also found that Mexico breached the fair and equitable 
standard, because despite the federal Government’s promises the company did not get the necessary licenses�
40 The claimant also argued that not granting the permit deprived the investment of its market value� The respondent 
argued that it had the discretionary powers for not granting the permit, as it was regulatory measure within 
the state’s police power� The Tribunal concluded that such denial was in fact expropriation of the investment 
and awarded damages of USD 5�5 million to the claimant� Tecmed (Award) paras 35-44; See also: Carlos 
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The Tribunal defined very clearly the concept of legitimate expectations in the award:
The Arbitral Tribunal considers that this [the fair and equitable treatment] provision 
of the Agreement, in light of the good faith principle established by international 
law, requires the Contracting Parties to provide to international investments treat-
ment that does not affect the basic expectations that were taken into account by the 
foreign investor to make the investment� The foreign investor expects the host State 
to act in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally transparently in its 
relations with the foreign investor, so that it may know beforehand any and all rules 
and regulations that will govern its investments, as well as the goals of the relevant 
policies and administrative practices or directives, to be able to plan its investment 
and comply with such regulations�41
Several awards later referred to this case regarding the legitimate expectations standard�42 
The award is criticized because the Tribunal bound the fair and equitable treatment standard 
to the good faith principle, even though the latter cannot be the source of obligation in itself�43
In International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v The United Mexican States44, 
the Tribunal even defined the concept of legitimate expectations (although, only under 
the NAFTA):
[…] a situation where a Contracting Party’s conduct creates reasonable and justifi-
able expectations on the part of an investor (or investment) to act in reliance on said 
conduct, such that a failure by the NAFTA Party to honor those expectations could 
cause the investor (or investment) to suffer damages.45
In case law, we can distinguish among three types of situations which can generate 
legitimate expectation: (i) specific commitments, (ii) unilateral representation or promise 
and (iii) regulatory framework�
In the first situation, the host state makes specific commitments in the individual 
investment agreement concluded with the investor, which the investor claims created 
legitimate expectations� For example, suppose a Government concludes an investment 
agreement that promises ten years tax exemption� However, after a few years, a change 
in Government leadership imposes tax despite the investment agreement that established 
the foreign investor’s expectations� A good example for an award, supporting such a 
view from the investor, is the EDF (Services) Limited v Romania46 case� The Tribunal 
found that:
The idea that legitimate expectations, and therefore FET, imply the stability of the 
legal and business framework, may not be correct if stated in an overly broad and 
Jiménez Piernas (ed�), The Legal Practice in International Law and European Community Law (Brill 2006) 
218-22�
41 Tecmed (Award) para 154�
42 For example, the already mentioned, and frequently cited Saluka (Partial Award) para 302�
43 Potestà (2013) 5; See also Tecmed (Award) para 154�
44 In this case the foreign investor, who wanted to invest into operating skill machines (“for purposes of enjoyment 
and entertainment”), asked for official opinion regarding the legality of operating these machines in Mexico. 
Following the positive written answer, they invested money and started the operations� Shortly after this 
the Mexican Government shut down the business declaring it illegal� International Thunderbird Gaming 
Corporation v The United Mexican States, NAFTA arbitration under UNCITRAL Rules, 2006 (<https://
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0431.pdf> accessed June 17 2021).
45 Thunderbird (Award) para 147�
46 EDF (Services) Limited v Romania, ICSID Case No� ARB/05/13�
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unqualified formulation. The FET might then mean the virtual freezing of the legal 
regulation of economic activities, in contrast with the State’s normal regulatory power 
and the evolutionary character of economic life. Except where specific promises 
or representations are made by the State to the investor, the latter may not rely on 
a bilateral investment treaty as a kind of insurance policy against the risk of any 
changes in the host State’s legal and economic framework� Such expectation would 
be neither legitimate nor reasonable�47
More so, several tribunals have differentiated between legitimate expectations protected 
under international law and purely contractual expectations�48 To claim a host state’s breach 
of fair and equitable treatment standard, more than a simple breach of contractual obligations 
(i.e. not merely fulfilling the contract) is needed. An investor would have to prove bad faith, 
substantial breach, abuse of Government authority or similar�49 Furthermore, it is questionable 
whether the investor can invoke the legitimate expectation argument successfully, if it is 
known or should have known (i.e. such as through due diligence) that the Government 
promises are contrary to legislation�
The second situation, which can generate legitimate expectation, is a unilateral 
representation or promise� That is, when the host state makes unilateral, informal promises to 
the investor (i.e. comfort letter, official opinion, promise made publicly by the representative 
of the Government, etc�), on which the investor relies when making the investment� The 
Metalclad case, a NAFTA case that precedes the Tecmed case that we have discussed earlier, 
is a good example of such a situation� The Thunderbird case would have also been a good 
example were it not for the investor not disclosing all the facts, when asking for the official 
opinion of the Mexican authority� To base the breach of fair and equitable treatment standard 
on the unilateral representation, the investor must firstly provide proper information to the 
host state’s representatives� There is also the requirement that the Government promises have 
to be addressed to a specific investor and be specific, regarding its object in investment.50 
General political statements of the representatives of the Government are not considered 
as specific commitments (except if made in bad faith).51 But, there is still no clear cut and 
uniform practice regarding this issue�
The third situation is when the investor relies on the general regulatory framework 
(i.e. legislation) of the host state at the time of making the investment, and the host state 
changes the regulation. So, in this case, the legislation is general and not directed specifically 
to a particular investor and its investment�52 Regarding this issue, tribunals are divided� 
There are several cases, in which the Tribunal established that the stability of the legal 
47 EDF (Award) para 217�
48 E.g. Parkerings-Compagniet AS v Republic Of Lithuania, ICSID Arbitration Case No� ARB/05/8 (<https://
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0619.pdf> accessed 24 June 2021), or Duke Energy 
Electroquil Partners SA v Ecuador, ICSID Case No� ARB/04/19, Gustav F W Hamester GmbH and Co KG 
v Ghana, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/24; Potestà (2013) 17�
49 Potestà (2013) 18; Christoph Schreuer, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment in Arbitral Practice’ (2005) 6(3) 
Journal of World Investment & Trade 357, 380�
50 Potestà (2013) 21�
51 El Paso Energy International Company v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No� ARB/03/15 (<https://www�
italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0270.pdf> accessed 3 June 2021) (Award) para 395 states: 
“… declaration made by the President of the Republic clearly must be viewed by everyone as a political 
statement, and this Tribunal is aware, as is every individual, of the limited confidence that can be given to 
such political statements�”�
52 Potestà (2013) 2�
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environment is essential element of the fair and equitable treatment standard�53 However, 
there is a constant evolution both in economy and law� And increasingly, more awards 
find that there should be a balance between the legitimate expectations of the investor and 
the host state’s public interest (i.e. legitimate regulatory interest)�54 Recently, tribunals 
are increasingly of the opinion that it would be unreasonable to expect the host country 
not to change its legislation in the public interest (in a non-discriminatory manner)�55 
This would be especially detrimental for developing countries, who usually have lower 
labor and environmental protection standards� And raising these standards has hit hard on 
foreign investors, who are usually attracted to the low standards in developing countries� 
Although, theoretically, there is still the so-called stabilization clause as a legal instrument 
to avoid such situations� Even if the investors do not receive an automatic exemption 
from the application of new legislation, they may be granted an exemption through the 
stabilization clause� Therefore, the threshold for claiming a host state’s breach of the fair 
and equitable treatment is high�
At the same time, the majority of authors and arbitral jurisprudence agree that the 
expectations of the investor have to be reasonable and objective�56 Meaning that, the investor 
has to exercise due diligence when making the investment, and take into consideration all 
the circumstances which might affect the investment in the host country.57 Some awards 
even suggest that diligent investors would ask for a stabilization clause from the host state 
when investing�58 The problem with such findings is that it is usually the host state that is 
the stronger party in the investment contract� In the case of smaller investors, there is even 
greater uncertainty of attaining a stabilization clause�
4. Relevant international treaties, institutions and rules
Before examining the requirements of the fair and equitable treatment and the legitimate 
expectation doctrine, as interpretated by arbitral tribunals in the Energy Charter Treaty 
(ECT) related case law, this section provides a short presentation of the relevant international 
treaties, institutions and rules�
53 E.g. Occidental Exploration and Production Company v The Republic of Ecuador, London Court of International 
Arbitration Administered Case No. UN 3467 (<https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
ita0571�pdf> accessed 17 June 2021) (Award) para 183� Or the supra mentioned Tecmed case�
54 See: Gábor Hajdu, ‘Investment Arbitration and the Public Interest’(2020) 8 Hungarian Yearbook of International 
Law and European Law 75�
55 El Paso (Award) para 352; There are also special situations, like economic crisis and similar. In the El Paso 
Energy International Company case the tribunal stated that: “… a balance should be established between the 
legitimate expectation of the foreign investor to make a fair return on its investment and the right of the host 
State to regulate its economy in the public interest�” (El Paso (Award) para 358)�
56 The Tribunal found in the Saluka case that “[…] the scope of the [Agreement on encouragement and reciprocal 
protection of investments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic] 
Treaty’s protection of foreign investment against unfair and inequitable treatment cannot exclusively be 
determined by foreign investors’ subjective motivations and considerations� Their expectations, in order for 
them to be protected, must rise to the level of legitimacy and reasonableness in light of the circumstances�” 
(Saluka (Partial Award) para 304)�
57 Radi (2013) 11�
58 Parkerings (Award) paras 332, 336�
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4.1. The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT)
The Energy Charter Treaty is good example of a functioning multilateral investment 
protection treaty containing substantive law� It was launched in the early 90’s, when the 
energy sector offered an excellent opportunity for cooperation between the West (that 
had the necessary money and increased need for energy) and the post-Soviet and Eastern 
European states (having energy, but with no money to invest into its exploitation)� The 
Energy Charter Treaty, besides creating a legal framework for striving towards open and 
secure energy markets, contains an entire chapter on investment promotion and protection 
(Part III)� After all, the fundamental objective of the West was to acquire natural resources 
related to energy production (and the infrastructure related to their transmission), but also 
to secure their investments� Among others, Part III of the Treaty contains provisions very 
similar to those contained in a standard bilateral investment treaty� Such as, the fair and 
equitable treatment of investors, expropriation of investment, transfers of profit, etc.59
Part III begins with article 10, which provides for fair and equitable and non-
discriminatory treatment of other contracting parties’ investors. The first paragraph of 
this article is crucial for this work� And besides, it also guarantees the minimum standard, 
national treatment, and most favored nations treatment for the investors� Therefore, we 
are going to quote it here:
Each Contracting Party shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, encour-
age and create stable, equitable, favorable and transparent conditions for Investors 
of other Contracting Parties to make Investments in its Area� Such conditions shall 
include a commitment to accord at all times to Investments of Investors of other 
Contracting Parties fair and equitable treatment� Such Investments shall also enjoy 
the most constant protection and security and no Contracting Party shall in any way 
impair by unreasonable or discriminatory measures their management, maintenance, 
use, enjoyment or disposal� In no case shall such Investments be accorded treatment 
less favorable than that required by international law, including treaty obligations� 
Each Contracting Party shall observe any obligations it has entered into with an 
Investor or an Investment of an Investor of any other Contracting Party�
Article 13 of Part III is also important as it deals with the issue of expropriation� The 
Energy Charter Treaty generally recognizes the right of the contracting parties to take 
property of foreign investors� However, article 13 ensures that nationalization, expropriation 
or “measure having effect equivalent to nationalization or expropriation” (namely, indirect 
or creeping expropriation) can take place only if internationally accepted standards of taking 
of foreign property are respected� That is to say, if such taking is in the public interest, 
non-discriminatory, accompanied by the payment of ‘prompt, adequate and effective’ 
compensation as defined by the classical Hull doctrine contained in the majority of bilateral 
investment treaties, and the taking of property is carried out under due process of law� 
The Energy Charter Treaty expressly requires the existence of public interest in case of 
expropriation. However, the Treaty does not give the definition of public interest. And it 
gives no indication of who should determine what public interest is, and on what grounds� 
Thus, it is on the dispute settlement bodies to define in each specific case what falls under 
59 ‘The International Energy Charter Consolidated Energy Charter Treaty’ (International Energy Charter 2016) 
<https://energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/Legal/ECTC-en.pdf> accessed 3 September 2020.
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public interest. But article 13 does, however, detail the requirements for compensation; that 
it should represent the “fair market value of the investment” taken, “at the time immediately 
before the expropriation or impending expropriation became known in such a way as to 
affect the value of the Investment”. This basically defines the “adequate” requirement, 
in line with the Hull doctrine. The “effective” condition is also detailed, providing that 
it should be paid in a freely convertible currency� And “promptness” of compensation is 
guaranteed by providing for interest at a commercial rate from the date of expropriation 
to the date of payment of the compensation�
Another relevant part of the Energy Charter Treaty is Part V, article 26 which deals 
with the dispute settlement between the investor and the host state� The Treaty requires 
the parties involved in the dispute, to firstly try to settle their dispute amicably. However, 
if they cannot reach an agreement within three months, the investor has the right to bring 
a claim in front of a national court (or administrative tribunal) of the host country, or to 
opt for international investment arbitration� In this latter case, the investor may choose 
amongst the three possibilities: International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
arbitration (ICSID), ad hoc arbitration under the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), or arbitration with the Arbitration 
Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC)�
4.2. The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and 
its Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings
The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) was created by 
the Washington Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States in 1956� Its goal was to create a forum and provide for procedural 
rules for resolving investment disputes between member states and other member states 
legal and natural persons, through conciliation and arbitration�60 This is the most often 
used dispute settlement forum by claimants, as every member state of the Convention 
recognizes the awards as binding, and will make due of the resulting financial obligations 
as if arising from a judgment of their own domestic court�61
The Convention also provides for setting up the two panels of conciliators and arbitrators, 
respectively� Each member state has the right to nominate four experts into each panel 
(which do not have to be citizens of the nominating state)� Furthermore, the Chairman of 
the Administrative Council of ICSID may nominate ten experts into each panel� These 
must have different nationalities and must possess recognized expertise in the field of law, 
trade, industry or finances, and must be able to make unbiased decisions. Knowledge of 
60 The Convention currently counts 162 members. The seat of the organization is in the central office of the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) in Washington, and the organization has 
international legal personality� Regarding its structure, the main decision-making body is the Administrative 
Council, into which each member state delegates one member� The President of the above-mentioned 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development acts as the Chairman of the Administrative Council 
ex officio. The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes also has a Secretariat, which deals 
with administrative matters, led by the Secretary-General who represents the Center� Zoltan Vig, ‘International 
Economic and Financial Organizations’ in Zsuzsanna Fejes, Márton Sulyok, Anikó Szalai (eds), Interstate 
relations (Iurisperitus Kiadó 2019) 134-136�
61 Vig (2019) 135�
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law is exceptionally important for those nominated into the panel of arbitrators� During 
nominations, the Chairman should also consider that the major legal systems of the world 
are represented in the panels� Members of the panel serve for 6 years, which can be renewed� 
The jurisdiction of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes extends 
to every legal dispute originating directly from investment, in which the parties in dispute 
are members (state, or any subordinate agency or body of the member state) and a natural 
or legal person of another member state, provided both parties give their written consent to 
taking the dispute before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes�62 
Once parties have given their consent, neither of them can revoke it unilaterally� Such 
consent is typically given by the host state in bilateral or multilateral (like the Energy 
Charter Treaty) investment treaties, or in individual investment contracts with the investor 
(typically in cases of larger, more significant investments). Unless stated otherwise, the 
consent to arbitration under the Convention excludes any other legal remedy (e.g. legal 
recourse to their respective domestic courts)� Two types of procedures can be initiated with 
the Center: conciliation and arbitration� Each procedure can be initiated by any member 
state, or any natural or legal person of a member state, in writing� The application must 
contain information concerning the issues of the legal dispute, the identification of the 
parties and their consent to conciliation�63
When initiating arbitration proceedings, the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes creates an arbitration panel� This panel consists of either one arbitrator, 
or an odd number of arbitrators (as per agreement of the parties)� If the parties could not 
agree regarding the number of arbitrators and their nomination, the panel consists of three 
arbitrators� The parties each choose one arbitrator, and the third one (who is the chairman 
of the panel) is selected based on the parties’ agreement� If they once again could not reach 
an agreement, and if 90 days have passed since the Secretary-General informed the other 
party about the recording of the claim, then the Chairman of the Center appoints the missing 
arbitrators, at either party’s request� The arbitrators examine their jurisdiction (i.e. whether 
they have the right to proceed) ex officio� Regarding substantive law (i.e. the body of law 
summarizing the rights and obligations of the parties), parties may freely make an agreement� 
In case there is no agreement regarding this, the arbitrators will use the host country’s law 
as the basis (including the private international law norms regarding conflict of laws), as 
well as the applicable norms of international law� The arbitration tribunal may decide the 
case based on equity, but only if the parties agree to it� The arbitral proceeding also has its 
own body of procedural rules, the Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings64 and 
the Additional Facility rules�65
62 Parties to the Energy Charter Treaty give their consent in article 26(3)(a) and according to the same article 
paragraph 5(a) this is considered a written consent for the purpose of International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes arbitration�
63 In case of conciliation, the Center sets up a conciliation committee after the arrival of the application, which 
consists of an odd number of conciliators, as per the agreement of the parties� Concerning the procedure itself, 
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes has a Rules of Procedure for Conciliation 
Proceedings, but the main essence of it is that the conciliation committee is obliged to clear up the questions 
of law in the dispute between the parties and to try to find an agreement between the parties, based on mutually 
agreeable conditions� It is also important to note that the parties involved in the conciliation proceedings may 
not refer to the views, comments, or settlement proposals of the other party� Vig (2019) 134-136�
64 ‘Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings’ (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) 
<http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/partF.htm> accessed 5 September 2020.
65 These rules are very similar to arbitration rules, but they are used between an ICSID Contracting State or its 
national, and a non-Contracting State or a national of a non-Contracting State�
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The award, presented in a written form, is signed by all arbitrators voting in favor� An 
award extends to all questions presented to the panel and includes the reasoning behind the 
answers� Accordingly, it is important that the panel decides the questions based on a majority 
vote of all members� And the Secretary-General should promptly send the authenticated 
copies of the award to the parties, which cannot be made public without their consent�66 If 
any dispute arises between the parties, regarding the interpretation of the award, either party 
can ask for official interpretation. Either party can request in writing from the Secretary-
General, the review of the award based on a new fact that could significantly influence 
the award� This is provided that the fact was not known to the arbitration tribunal and the 
plaintiff at the time of the award, and it was not a result of the applicant’s carelessness that 
they had no knowledge of this fact� This request must be submitted within 90 days of the 
disclosure of such fact, but no later than 3 years after the award has been rendered� Either 
party can request in writing from the Secretary-General to annul the award, based on the 
following possible reasons: (i) the Tribunal was not properly formed; (ii) the Tribunal has 
manifestly exceeded its powers; (iii) there was corruption on the part of a member of the 
Tribunal; (iv) there has been a serious breach of a fundamental rule of procedure; (v) the 
award does not contain due justification. The award is binding to the parties, and there is 
no place for any kind of appeal or other types of remedy, except for those listed above� As 
already mentioned above, every member state recognizes the awards as binding�67
4.3. The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
and its Arbitration Rules
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law is a subsidiary of the United 
Nations established with the aim to promote the harmonization, unification and modernization 
of international trade law�68 The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
has worked out two conventions related to international arbitration (the Convention on 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, New York, 1958, and the 
United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, 
New York, 2014), a model law (the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration, 1985) and arbitration rules (UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules)69�70
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Arbitration Rules apply if 
the parties agree on them� They contain all the necessary rules for an arbitration procedure, 
66 It is interesting to note that the average procedural cost of international arbitration reaches 8 million USD� 
This means that small and medium enterprises (SMEs) have very little chance of disputing with the host 
countries in front of the Center’s arbitral tribunal� A� Gebert, ‘Legal Protection for Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises through Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Status Quo, Impediments, and Potential Solutions’ in 
T� Rensmann (ed), Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in International Economic Law (Oxford University 
Press 2017) 294�
67 However, disputes may arise between the member states regarding the interpretation or application of the 
Convention� If these issues cannot be resolved through negotiation, they must be presented to the International 
Court of Justice in The Hague� Vig (2019) 134-136�
68 ‘United Nations Commission on International Trade Law’ (United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law) <https://uncitral�un�org> accessed 17 May 2021�
69 The latest revision is of 2010�
70 ‘International Commercial Arbitration’ (United Nations Commission on International Trade Law) <https://
uncitral�un�org/en/texts/arbitration> accessed 17 May 2021�
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such as on the composition of the arbitral tribunal, arbitral proceedings, award, and of 
course, a model arbitration clause to avoid later misunderstandings between the parties�71 
However, it should be noted, that the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law does not provide forum for the parties, nor is it an arbitral institution�
4.4. The Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) and 
its Arbitration Rules
Investor under the Energy Charter Treaty frequently choose the Arbitration Institute of 
the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) as forum, and it also provides procedural 
rules�72 However, this institution also administers investment arbitration based on bilateral 
investment treaties as well as international commercial arbitration�73
Contrary to ICSID arbitration, arbitral awards of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce are not automatically enforceable� First, they must be recognized 
in the country of enforcement, what is usually done under the New York Convention on 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards�
4.5. The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) and its Arbitration Rules
It was originally established with a seat in The Hague, to facilitate dispute resolution among 
sovereign states at the very end of the 19th century. However, nowadays it offers arbitration 
services for investor-state disputes as well� Out of the 136 arbitration cases under the 
Energy Charter Treaty 14 were administered by the Permanent Court of Arbitration under 
UNCITRAL Rules�74 Similarly to the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce awards, the awards of the Permanent Court of Arbitration are not automatically 
recognized by foreign countries�
71 ‘Arbitration Rules’ (United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 2010) <https://uncitral�un�org/
sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-documents/uncitral/en/arb-rules-revised-2010-e.pdf> accessed 17 May 2021.
72 Out of 136 Energy Charter Treaty cases, 25 were administered under the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 
Rules� ‘Statistics’ (International Energy Charter 2021) <https://www�energychartertreaty�org/cases/statistics/> 
accessed 22 May 2021�
73 ‘Arbitration Rules’ (Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce) <https://sccinstitute�com/
media/1407444/arbitrationrules_eng_2020.pdf> accessed 22 May 2021.
74 ‘Statistics’ (International Energy Charter 2021) <https://www�energychartertreaty�org/cases/statistics/> accessed 
22 May 2021�




1.1. AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erőmű Kft v the Republic of 
Hungary75
We are going to start the examination of the arbitral practice with a Hungary-related case, 
the AES v Hungary� The claimants were a company incorporated in the United Kingdom and 
its subsidiary incorporated and operating a power plant in Hungary� Arbitration proceedings 
were initiated because of the reintroduction of administrative prices for the electricity 
produced through the amendment of a 2001 Electricity Act in 2006, and the so-called Price 
Decrees in 2006 and 2007� The claimants claimed amongst others that in this manner the 
regulation was a violation of the Hungarian Government’s obligation to provide fair and 
equitable treatment and constant protection and security�76
In this case, the claimants presented for the alleged violation of the fair and equitable 
treatment standard four arguments� First, they claimed that fair and equitable treatment 
includes an obligation of honoring contractual obligations (ones that the investor reasonably 
relied on). In this particular case, the claimants accused Hungary of refusing to fulfill its 
own contractual obligations (set out in a 2001 settlement agreement between Hungary 
and the claimants, which came about as a result of an earlier investment arbitration) 
to claimants via the 2006 amendment of the Electricity Act and the introduction of the 
aforementioned Price Decrees, while also simultaneously encouraging the state-owned 
electricity company involved in the dispute to ignore its own contractual obligations to 
the claimants (established in a 2001 contract between the said company and the claimants) 
through the same amendment and Price Decrees� Second, the claimants advanced that 
fair and equitable treatment includes an obligation to act in good faith and to respect the 
investors’ legitimate expectations� They claimed that Hungary failed to act in good faith 
(with regards to the rationale behind the amendment and the Price Decrees, which were, 
according to the Claimants, chiefly designed to cut excessive profits for energy producers), 
and that Hungary violated the claimants’ legitimate expectations arising from the regulatory 
framework resulting from the 2001 settlement agreement and the afore-mentioned contract 
with the state-owned company� Thirdly, claimants took the view that the “stable, equitable, 
favorable and transparent conditions” sequence of Article 10(1) of the Energy Charter 
Treaty was part of the fair and equitable treatment standard, which Hungary also violated 
according to the claimants, as the promised stability was short term, given that, as opposed 
to the 2001 situation, Hungary effectively eviscerated the original regulatory framework 
by 2006� Finally, the claimants also argued that Hungary further violated the fair and 
equitable treatment standard by acting in a non-transparent, arbitrary, and discriminatory 
fashion that also lacked due process� Here, they referred to how the 2006 amendment of 
75 AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v the Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No� 
ARB/07/22 (Award), para 4�7� We should mention that there was an earlier arbitration based on the ECT 
between the parties in 2000 concluded with settlement�
76 ibid para 4�20�
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the 2001 Electricity Act was allegedly adopted out of political reasons, that specifically 
aimed at cutting perceived extra profits for electricity generators operating in the host state, 
such as the claimants� In a similar fashion, the claimants contended that the Price Decrees 
lacked transparency and due process, due to how they were issued, and in the claimants’ 
view, also demonstrated arbitrariness on the part of the Hungarian state, due to the afore-
mentioned alleged motivations� In particular, the claimants alleged that the Price Decrees 
relied on a maximum profit figure that was submitted by electricity distribution companies 
(whereas the Decrees concerned electricity generation companies), and that the prices set 
out in the Price Decrees were determined in an unclear manner� As for due process, the 
claimants posited that Hungary gave very short windows of time (four and one business 
days respectively) for the claimants to comment on the draft, then the final Price Decrees, 
alongside other alleged breaches of due process�77
Hungary’s own position on these fair and equitable treatment-related claims was, that the 
claimants could not have had legitimate expectations as they alleged� Principally, Hungary 
found problematic that the claimants relied on their 2001 expectations, whereas legitimate 
expectations as a concept can only arise when the investor makes the investment, which in 
this particular case was in 1996� In particular, the country posited that there are two necessary 
elements of legitimate expectations: Government representation and assurances, and the 
reliance of the investor on these assurances to make the investment� Hungary contended 
that neither element was present in this case� Thus, even if the 2001 expectations were not 
ruled out by the Tribunal due to their timing, they still would fail the legitimate expectation 
test by the lack of assurances and representations given by Hungary to the claimants that 
would attest to the notion that the pricing regime would never change again� Hungary then 
argued, that since no legitimate expectations existed on the part of the claimants, the only 
possible way for determining a violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard was 
that the host behaved in a manifestly arbitrary manner, or otherwise abused state power� 
Hungary argued that its own conduct was neither� Interestingly, with regards to the alleged 
political motivations, Hungary attempted to deflect to the European Union, noting that it 
had been under mounting pressure by the latter to minimize what the European Union 
considered unlawful state aid� As such, the new pricing regime was necessary, and the 
least drastic possible step to realize a European Union compatible market� Hungary also 
rejected the notions that its dealings with claimants were unreasonable or in bad faith� And 
finally, Hungary also dismissed the notion that it failed to act in a due process-compliant 
manner or that it lacked transparency� With regards to the latter, Hungary interestingly 
argued that the Energy Charter Treaty’s transparency requirement has to be interpreted 
in its own separate manner from national law, and that it did not posit a particularly high 
threshold for transparency, and even if the Tribunal were to find imperfections with regards 
to Hungary’s transparency, these were not sufficient in themselves to find a violation of the 
fair and equitable treatment standard� Hungary also posited that the general investment treaty 
arbitral practice does not require host states to obey so-called ideal notions of transparency, 
where every single consideration in policy shaping is publicly announced preemptively�78
With the positions of the parties thus established, there are findings of the Tribunal 
we would like to highlight� Firstly, with regards to the claims concerning the contractual 
obligations, the Tribunal established that even if said contractual obligations tie into the 
77 ibid paras 9�1�1-9�1�10�
78 ibid paras 9�2�1-9�2�24�
Vig.indd   25 2021. 08. 26.   9:35:09
26
fair and equitable treatment standard’s violation in the present case, it has no jurisdiction 
to actually adjudicate over breaches of contract� This was because Annex IA of the Energy 
Charter Treaty, which did not allow in present case for investors or contracting parties of 
the Energy Charter Treaty to submit disputes concerning contractual obligations (based on 
the last sentence of Article 10(1) of the Energy Charter Treaty)� Interestingly, the Tribunal 
noted that even so, the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to determine whether Hungary violated 
a specific Energy Charter Treaty obligation, even if said violation also simultaneously 
constitutes a breach of contractual obligations� The Tribunal was keen to stress that its 
actions in this regard should not be interpreted as analyzing contractual obligations and 
their performance�79
Then, the Tribunal moved on to legitimate expectations� First, it established that legitimate 
expectations can only be created at the moment of the investment, referring to several cases, 
such as Duke Energy v Ecuador, Tecmed v Mexico, and LG&E v Argentina� It noted that Duke 
Energy v Ecuador established “at the time of the investment” as a component of legitimate 
expectations, which was confirmed by Tecmed v Mexico, and also reiterated by LG&E v 
Argentina� However, the Tribunal nevertheless acknowledged that the concept of the “time 
of the investment” can be interpreted by arbitral tribunals in a variety of ways� It raised CMS 
v Argentina as an example, where the arbitral tribunal held that the time of the investment 
is when the investment was decided and made� The Tribunal utilized this interpretation and 
examined the time of the investment in this specific case from this perspective. First, it held 
that the claimants had made an investment in Hungary in 1996, so it had to determine whether 
legitimate expectations could have sprung up from that 1996 investment� The Tribunal reached 
the conclusion here that claimants at that time could have had no legitimate expectations 
regarding the future conduct of Hungary, beyond the general principle that electricity pricing 
would provide a reasonable return on investment (reasonable return as a principle plays a 
pivotal role in many investment disputes, see for example the cases concerning Spain’s 
renewable energy sector)� Thus, the Tribunal then turned to the year 2001, which was central to 
the dispute, as the claimants’ allegations, as we have seen, heavily relied on this year’s events� 
The Tribunal found that at this point in time, the claimants indeed made an investment (as 
defined by the Energy Charter Treaty), as they spent almost a hundred million Euros between 
2001 and 2005 to complete electricity generator retrofitting. The Tribunal also noted that it 
is clear that the decision to make an investment was re-confirmed when the 2001 settlement 
agreement was created� Thus, the question became whether there were any Government 
representations or assurances at the time on which the investors relied on, and whether Hungary 
later contradicted these representations and assurances in its conduct� The Tribunal found 
that the answer to the first question was negative. This also answered the second question in 
the process� It noted that no representation was made that could have assured the claimants 
that regulated electricity pricing would not again be introduced, and in general, rejected the 
claimants’ arguments that a 1999 letter (which in fact preceded the launch of an arbitration 
dispute), or the 2001 settlement agreement’s language, constituted sufficient assurances by 
Hungary� It also noted that said settlement agreement lacked a stabilization clause, and in 
fact, had a change in law provision that clearly implied potential future regulatory changes� 
As such, without express and specific commitments, such as through an afore-mentioned 
stabilization clause, the Tribunal did not find that the claimants had legitimate expectations.80
79 ibid paras 9�3�1-9�3�5�
80 ibid paras 9�3�8-9�3�26�
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The Tribunal then turned to the examination of the host state’s duty to provide a stable 
legal and business framework� It stated that article 10(1) of the Energy Charter Treaty 
(creating stable conditions) is not a stabilization clause� The Tribunal established that 
this is because legal frameworks are, by definition, “subject to change as it adapts to new 
circumstances day by day and a state has the sovereign right to exercise its powers which 
include legislative acts�”81 This means, that the Tribunal recognized that host states have 
the right to change their legislation in adapting to new circumstances when done on rational 
public policy grounds� Thus, the Tribunal noted that understanding the concept of stable 
conditions in this context is a complex task that necessitates taking into account various 
factors of the given case, such as the specific circumstances surrounding the investor’s 
decision to invest, or the public interest measures the host state has made� However, in this 
specific case, the Tribunal observed that there were no specific commitments by Hungary 
towards stability, or any other commitment that could have made the foreign investors 
legitimately believe that no change in the law could occur (thus consistent with regards to 
the above paragraphs, where the lack of commitments by Hungary was also discussed)� The 
Tribunal further stated that “any reasonably informed business person or investor knows 
that laws can evolve in accordance with the perceived political or policy dictates of the 
times�”82 Thus, it was clear to the Tribunal that no breach of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard occurred in relation to the stable conditions of the regulatory framework�83
The Tribunal then turned to the examination of claims relating to the breach of the fair 
and equitable treatment via lack of due process, arbitrariness and lack of transparency� 
First, it established that there was nothing sufficiently irrational or otherwise unreasonable 
in the motivation of Hungary when it reintroduced administrative electricity prices in 
2006, so as to constitute a breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard in the 
context of the Energy Charter Treaty� It also noted that with regards to actual conduct, for 
the infringement of fair and equitable treatment, simple imperfection of the state’s act or 
omission is not enough� These must be manifestly unfair or unreasonable or shocking� The 
Tribunal explicitly stressed this point: that the standard does not demand perfection, but as 
noted above, and also referred to in the Tecmed case, the imperfection must be manifestly 
unfair or unreasonable. For example, in this specific case, the Tribunal held that several 
procedural shortcomings in Hungary’s implementation of the legislation did not reach 
the level that would constitute unfair and inequitable treatment� 84 The Tribunal treated 
protection and security as a separate obligation of the state from the fair and equitable 
treatment obligation�85 The 2010 award in this case, which was also later upheld by an 
ICSID annulment committee, is frequently invoked in later Energy Charter Treaty cases�
81 ibid para 9�3�29�
82 ibid para 9�3�34�
83 ibid paras 9�3�27-9�3�35�
84 ibid paras 9�3�36-9�3�73�
85 ibid para 13�3�1�
Vig.indd   27 2021. 08. 26.   9:35:09
28
1.2. Petrobart Limited v Kyrgyz Republic86
The Petrobart case is one of the earliest and most exciting cases in the case law of the 
Energy Charter Treaty where the issue of fair and equitable treatment was raised� Besides, 
it is a textbook example of the complexity of foreign investment protection, as there were 
several procedures initiated related to the dispute, and of course, the host state tried in 
several ways to avoid liability�
The claimant, Petrobart, was a company registered in Gibraltar, that concluded a gas 
supply contract for one year with a Kyrgyz state-owned company KGM� There was a dispute 
settlement clause in the contract, which stipulated the Arbitration Court of the Kyrgyz 
Republic as the preferred forum and Kyrgyz law as substantive law� Petrobart delivered 
five consignments of gas based on the contract, and accordingly issued five invoices. The 
first two were paid by KGM. However, the last three invoices were not paid. KGM made 
promises to pay during the summer of 1998� In the meantime, in September 1998, the 
president of the Kyrgyz Republic issued a presidential decree to create a new state company 
based on KGM’s assets� In November 1998 Petrobart initiated arbitration proceedings 
before the Bishkek City Court of Arbitration, to recover KGM’s debts� It was awarded 
more than 1�5 million USD, and even a writ of execution was issued against KGM, and the 
property of KGM was seized in favor of Petrobart� The Kyrgyz Government intervened by 
requesting the Court to postpone the execution and promised a subsidy for KGM to fulfil 
its obligations towards the creditors� The court postponed the execution for three months�87 
In the meantime, some property (and no liabilities) of KGM was transferred to the newly 
created state company, while other property was rented to another state company� In April 
1999, KGM requested bankruptcy from the Bishkek Court, which was successfully granted� 
Petrobart subsequently requested payment of the debt from the bankruptcy administrator� 
However, its prospects were not too bright as it was placed into third priority group, and 
KGM no longer had valuable property�
Petrobart, first initiated international (under UNCITRAL Rules) arbitration in March 
2000 based on the provisions of the Kyrgyz Foreign investment law� Originally, foreign 
investment was defined in this law as “investments appearing as contributions of foreign 
investors into objects of economic activity in the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic to 
derive profit”. In May 2000 Kyrgyzstan enacted a new law on the interpretation of the 
Foreign investment law, which provided that “a civil law transaction between two business 
entities in respect of supplying goods (services), where the purchaser is obliged to pay for 
the supplied goods (services), does not fall under the definition of foreign investment”. 
Based on the request of the Kyrgyz Government, the Bishkek Court declared that the 
contract of Petrobart cannot be considered as a foreign investment under the Foreign 
investment law� In its award rendered in 2003, the UNCITRAL Arbitration more or 
less reached the same conclusion, and found that “Foreign investment involves a more 
permanent relationship between the foreign investor and the host state than is involved in the 
86 Petrobart Limited v Kyrgyz Republic, SCC case no� 126/2003�
87 It is interesting how smooth the cooperation between the three branches of Government was in the host 
country� The court complied with the Government’s request to halt the execution, the lawmaker within weeks 
promulgated the necessary law on the interpretation of the law on foreign investment� This lack of separation 
of powers was also noted by the Tribunal�
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transitory international sales transaction”� And the claim was dismissed due to lack of 
jurisdiction�88
Following the UNCITRAL arbitration proceedings, Petrobart initiated arbitration based 
on the Energy Charter Treaty, in front of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber 
of Commerce in September 2003� Based on article 10(1) of the Energy Charter Treaty, 
Petrobart had five separate claims. It claimed that Kyrgyzstan (i) failed to create stable, 
equitable, favorable and transparent conditions for its investment, (ii) failed to accord its 
investment a fair and equitable treatment and most constant protection, (iii) breached its 
obligation not to accord unreasonable impairment of use and enjoyment of the investment, 
(iv) breached its obligation to observe the obligation it has entered into with Petrobart, and 
(v) treated Petrobart’s investment less favorable than that required by international law�89 
Furthermore, Petrobart claimed that due to Kyrgyzstan’s interventions, the contract was 
frustrated, what amounted to expropriation and breach of article 13 of the Energy Charter 
Treaty� However, before turning to these issues, we give a brief review of the most important 
issues in this arbitration proceeding�
First, the Tribunal examined the applicability of the Energy Charter Treaty against which 
the Government of Krygyzstan raised three arguments� Kyrgyzstan claimed that Gibraltar, 
where the seat of Petrobart was, was not party to the Energy Charter Treaty� It is a fact 
that Great Britain had signed the treaty for Gibraltar as well and made a declaration on its 
provisional application according to article 45(1). However, when the Treaty was ratified two 
years later in 1996, Gibraltar was omitted from the ratification document. So, the Tribunal 
concluded that the Energy Charter Treaty was still provisionally applicable to Gibraltar, 
as Great Britain made no notification according to article 45(3)(a) to terminate the Treaty 
regarding Gibraltar� Thus, it was still in force regarding this territory� The next claim by 
Kyrgyzstan was that Petrobart had no substantial business in a contracting party as required 
by article 17(1) of the Energy Charter Treaty, as it was managed from London� The Tribunal 
dismissed this argument, stating that the conditions for the application of article 17(1) were 
not present in this case� Kyrgyzstan also brought up the res judicata issue, as the subject 
matter of the case had been adjudicated by both the Bishkek Court (not the Arbitration 
Court), as well as by the arbitral tribunal constituted under UNCITRAL Rules� Regarding 
the Bishkek Court argument, the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce Tribunal stated that 
that procedure was based on the domestic law and not on the Energy Charter Treaty, and 
also that that procedure was initiated by Kyrgyzstan and not by the investor, and the Energy 
Charter Treaty gives the right to initiate procedure only to investors�� Likewise, regarding 
the UNCITRAL arbitration, the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce Tribunal was of the 
opinion that proceedings were based on substantive Kyrgyz law and not on international 
rights granted by the Energy Charter Treaty� The Tribunal also established that Petrobart 
was a foreign investor in Kyrgyzstan with an investment under the Energy Charter Treaty�
Based on the facts of the case, the Tribunal decided that measures taken by Kyrgyzstan, 
in this case, did not amount to indirect expropriation�90 However, it found that Kyrgyzstan 
88 Petrobart (Award) page 8-10�
89 ibid page 73-74�
90 ibid page 77. The most surprising thing in relation to the issues of expropriation is the finding of the tribunal 
that it „cannot find it established that the Republic failed to ensure that KGM conducted its business in a 
manner consistent with Part III of the Treaty�” For an analysis, see Csongor István Nagy, ‘Central European 
Perspectives on Investor-State Arbitration: Practical Experiences and Theoretical Concerns’ (2016) Centre for 
International Governance Innovation, Investor-State Arbitration Series, Paper No. 16, 11-12; Csongor István 
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breached article 10(1) on fair and equitable treatment, and article 10(12) of the Energy 
Charter Treaty, ensuring effective means for the assertion of claims and the enforcement 
of rights in the domestic law of the host state� Regarding article 10(1) on fair and equitable 
treatment, the Tribunal did not go into an analysis of each of the five claims of Petrobart 
based on the article, but stated that this paragraph in its entirety is intended to ensure the 
fair and equitable treatment of investments�91 This means that the Tribunal interpreted 
10(1) and all the different standards contained in it as components or sub-standards of the 
fair and equitable treatment standard� The main arguments of the Tribunal for the above 
finding were the reorganization of KGM (i.e. the transfer of its assets to the detriment of 
the creditors) and the intervention in court proceedings by the Government� Regarding 
the latter, the court also found that such intervention is not in conformity with the rule of 
law� Based on the facts of the case, it can be clearly seen that the principle of separation of 
powers did not function: the Government influenced the judiciary, and it seems that also 
the lawmaker (see the Law on the interpretation of the foreign investment law)� Taking 
into consideration the “difficult economic situation” of KGM, the Tribunal did not award 
compensation for lost profit, but did finally awarded to Petrobart 75% of its original claim 
plus interest�92
1.3. Electrabel S.A. v Hungary93
This is also a frequently invoked case� A Belgian energy producer and trader company, 
Electrabel S�A�, invested in the energy sector in Hungary� After joining the European Union, 
Hungary had to, amongst other things, liberalize its energy market and terminate state 
aid paid to the claimant in congruence with competition rules of the Union�94 Therefore, 
Electrabel initiated international arbitration in 2007, requesting higher compensation for 
so-called ‘stranded costs’ than the amount offered by Hungary. The company claimed a 
breach of fair and equitable treatment obligation of Hungary, amongst other claims�95 Thus, 
the main issue was whether not paying the maximum compensation to the investor was 
a violation of the fair and equitable treatment. The Tribunal did not find a violation, but 
there are some findings worth noting.
Regarding legitimate expectations, as applied to this specific case, the Tribunal 
found no evidence that Hungary made representations to the claimant at the time of the 
investment� In the Tribunal’s view, this necessarily precluded the existence of any legitimate 
expectations on the claimant’s part� However, it acknowledged that with regards to the fair 
and equitable treatment standard as found in the Energy Charter Treaty, it is not necessarily 
indispensable to have a specific representation in order to advance a claim under the standard, 
as representations might only serve as a factor in assessing the investor’s knowledge, and 
his expectations’ reasonableness and legitimacy� But even in the absence of a concrete 
Nagy, ‘Hungarian Cases Before ICSID Tribunals: The Hungarian Experience with Investment Arbitration’ 
(2017) 58(3) Hungarian Journal of Legal Studies 291, 297-300�
91 Petrobart (Award) page 76�
92 ibid page 83�
93 Electrabel S.A. v Hungary, ICSID case no� ARB/07/19 (Award)�
94 ibid para 98�
95 ibid para 121�
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representation, the investor is expected to establish a relevant expectation that is based 
upon reasonable grounds� According to the Tribunal, the claimant failed to accomplish this 
in the present case� The Tribunal also pointed out that Electrabel could not have legitimate 
expectations relating to European Union law, for two reasons: Hungary, at all times, was 
seeking to comply with European Union law, and secondly the claimant itself did not base 
its claim on European Union law� Furthermore, the Tribunal was of the opinion that the 
claimant should have known that Hungary joining the European Union will necessarily lead 
to the former having to liberalize its market� In essence, the commercial risks of operation 
were obvious at the time, according to the Tribunal, given Hungary’s difficult transitional 
period towards membership in the European Union and related market liberalization, and 
the common knowledge that long-term power purchase agreements could not coexist in an 
unchanged form with deregulation�96 In general, the Tribunal found that the statements the 
claimant tried to present as representations from Hungary, which guaranteed reasonable 
profit or reasonable return, could not be assessed as representations or assurances within 
the specific context of legitimate expectations under the Energy Charter Treaty. This was 
because both the relevant power purchase agreement, and other statements made by the 
claimant, contradicted this interpretation�97
The Tribunal’s next step was to examine whether a legitimate expectations towards 
maximum compensation (as already mentioned at the beginning of the case analysis) in 
case the power purchase agreement is terminated could be sustained by the claimants, 
without the need for any specific representation.98 Relating to this, the arbitrators already 
found before the final award itself, that the fair and equitable treatment standard permits 
the host state to exercise legitimate regulatory interests under appropriate circumstances�99 
In doing this, the host state does not have to exclusively favor the interests of the foreign 
investor� The Tribunal referred to the Saluka v Czech Republic case, in which it was stated 
that: “The determination of a breach […] requires a weighing of the Claimant’s legitimate 
and reasonable expectations on the one hand and the Respondent’s legitimate regulatory 
interests on the other�”�100 Therefore, this so-called balancing factor in the Tribunal’s opinion 
precluded a legitimate expectation towards maximum compensation� In the Tribunal’s 
view, such an expectation, once sufficiently balanced or weighed against Hungary’s right 
to pass public interest regulation, ceases to be reasonable or legitimate�101
96 ibid paras 155, 156�
97 ibid para 161�
98 ibid para 163�
99 In the decision on jurisdiction the same Tribunal found that: “While the investor is promised protection against 
unfair changes, it is well established that the host State is entitled to maintain a reasonable degree of regulatory 
flexibility to respond to changing circumstances in the public interest. Consequently, the requirement of 
fairness must not be understood as the immutability of the legal framework, but as implying that subsequent 
changes should be made fairly, consistently and predictably, taking into account the circumstances of the 
investment�” Para� 7�77 of the Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability in the Electrabel S.A. 
v the Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No� Arb/07/19�
100 Electrabel (Award) para 165� In the Saluka case the Tribunal also found that “A foreign investor protected 
by the Treaty may in any case properly expect that the Czech Republic implements its policies bona fide by 
conduct that is, as far as it affects the investors’ investment, reasonably justifiable by public policies and that 
such conduct does not manifestly violate the requirements of consistency, transparency, even-handedness 
and non-discrimination. In particular, any differential treatment of a foreign investor must not be based on 
unreasonable distinctions and demands, and must be justified by showing that it bears a reasonable relationship 
to rational policies not motivated by a preference for other investments over the foreign-owned investment�”�
101 Electrabel (Award) para 166�
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As for the question of potential arbitrariness, the Tribunal drew together the terms 
arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonable, inequitable and disproportionate as having the 
same meaning (collectively referred to as arbitrariness by the Tribunal) under the Energy 
Charter Treaty’s fair and equitable treatment standard� In essence, the Tribunal considered 
it necessary to fulfill one of the several conditions to find a case of arbitrariness: that 
Hungary’s conduct was arbitrary, that there was no legitimate purpose for Hungary’s 
conduct, or alternatively, that Hungary’s conduct had no reasonable relationship to that 
purpose (which the Tribunal equated with it being disproportionate)� After reviewing 
the claimant’s five principal arguments (such as Hungary’s motivation for the regulatory 
changes, issues with compensation, etc�) on how Hungary was supposedly acting in an 
arbitrary manner, the Tribunal found that none of them are sufficiently strong arguments 
to establish the host state’s arbitrariness, or were otherwise dismissible due to lack of 
relevance and other factors�102 It was furthermore stated by the Tribunal that a measure by 
the host state is not arbitrary if it is reasonably related to a rational policy� This necessarily 
required two elements in the Tribunal’s view, also referring to the AES Tisza v Hungary 
case: the existence of a rational policy, and the reasonableness of state conduct in relation 
to the policy� These two elements are conjunctively required, the existence of just one 
is not sufficient. According to the Tribunal (following the AES tribunal’s logic), rational 
policy is when the state follows a logical explanation (or to say it in another way, it is in 
good sense) and aims at addressing a public interest issue� As for reasonableness, there 
must be a sufficient correlation between the public policy objective of the host state and 
the actions/measures the host state undertook to achieve it� The Tribunal also added that 
this reasonableness includes proportionality: the measure’s effect on the investor must be 
proportional to the public policy objective that motivated the host state� This element of 
proportionality was particularly emphasized by the Tribunal as strongly relevant�103
In relation to the above, the Tribunal found that if the test was sufficiently met by the 
disputed measure, then the host state will necessarily have a wide scope of discretion 
in determining its exact contents (in harmony with the Tribunal’s earlier observations 
on the host state’s regulatory freedom)� This discretion is limited by the necessity of 
correlation between the policy objective and the measure, and a balancing exercise to ensure 
proportionality between the intended objective of the measure and its impact� Interestingly, 
the Tribunal took the view that objective correctness is not necessary for a measure to be 
reasonable under the fair and equitable treatment standard: as the Tribunal put it, the host 
state can be mistaken without being unreasonable� In this particular case, this was raised 
by the claimant in relation to how Poland and Portugal took different regulatory directions. 
In the Tribunal’s view, this was not an objection towards Hungary’s reasonableness, and 
regardless, the Tribunal believed there weren’t enough material similarities between the 
three states, to use Poland and Portugal’s own measures as benchmarks for Hungary’s 
reasonableness� In relation to this non-requirement of correctness, the Tribunal emphasized 
that Hungary was undergoing a turbulent period of transition, and thus, potential errors in 
judgement could have occurred even if the host state acted reasonably� It then proceeded to 
demonstrate several instances where Hungary manifestly undertook balancing exercises�104
102 ibid paras 167-178�
103 ibid para 179�
104 ibid paras 180-188�
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1.4. Plama Consortium Limited v Republic of Bulgaria105
This is a very interesting case with a lot of contradictions involving privatization� During 
the second half of the nineties, the Bulgarian State privatized a company (Nova Plama) 
that owned an oil refinery. The company soon went bankrupt and the shareholder, Plama 
Consortium Limited, initiated arbitration in 2003 under the Energy Charter Treaty� The 
company claimed that the Bulgarian state was responsible for its failure� The Tribunal 
established that a French citizen, a certain Mr� Vautrin, owned and controlled Plama 
Consortium Limited indirectly through a very complicated chain and network of companies�106 
Mr�Vautrin was accused by the Bulgarian State of misrepresentation� Under the applicable 
law107, a withdrawal of the two well-capitalized investors from the business was required 
to be disclosed to the Bulgarian Privatization Agency during the privatization, which 
Mr�Vautrin supposedly “forgot”� The Tribunal found that this was unlawful, prohibiting 
the claimant from enjoying the protection of the Energy Charter Treaty as the investment 
was obtained by deceitful conduct�108
Nevertheless, the Tribunal still discussed the merits of the case� Among others, the 
alleged breach of fair and equitable treatment obligation. The Tribunal treated the different 
standards of article 10(1) as interrelated� However, it was noted that despite this, these 
standards of protection can be also defined individually.109 When it turned to the discussion 
of the legitimate expectations of the investor, it referred to the Thunderbird case, in which 
it was concluded that these expectations should be reasonable and justifiable. At the same 
time, the host state should respect such principles as good faith, non-discrimination and 
due process�110 The Tribunal also stated that the stability of the legal framework is essential 
as it contributes to the standard of fair and equitable treatment in international law� And 
so, respecting all these principles, the host state has the right to regulate�111 The Tribunal 
also discussed the transparency requirement� It found that the requirement is important 
to protect the legitimate interest of the investor and stability, and therefore related it to 
the fair and equitable treatment�112 Regarding the protection and security requirement of 
article 10(1), the Tribunal referred to the AMT v Zaire case, in which it was stated that:
The obligation incumbent on the [host State] is an obligation of vigilance, in the sense 
that the [host State] shall·take all measures necessary to ensure the full enjoyment 
of protection and security of its investments and should not be permitted to invoke 
its own legislation to detract from any such obligation�113
From this, the Tribunal deducted the obligation of the host state to actively provide a 
legal framework that secures and protects foreign investment� And through legal security, 
105 Plama Consortium Limited v Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No� ARB/03/24 (Award)�
106 ibid para 95� However, in its decision on jurisdiction the same Tribunal stated that: „Mr� Vautrin’s evidence 
as to his ultimate ownership and control of the Claimant is not only largely unsupported by contemporary 
documentation but ��� is materially inconsistent with parts of that documentation and also contradicted by 
other statements apparently attributable to Mr� Vautrin ��� „ ibid para� 90�
107 ibid para 107�
108 ibid paras 135, 143�
109 ibid para 163�
110 ibid para 176�
111 ibid para 177�
112 ibid para 178�
113 ibid para 179�
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is also related to fair and equitable treatment�114 However, the standard is not absolute and 
does not imply strict liability of the host state�115 The Tribunal found overlapping and a 
correlation between the fair and equitable treatment standard and the reasonableness and 
non-discrimination standards. But it pointed out that these standards can be also defined 
individually�116
1.5. Ioannis Kardassopoulos and Ron Fuchs v the Republic of Georgia117
At the beginning of the nineties, two foreign investors (Mr�Kardasssopoulos and Mr�Fuchs, 
Greek and Israeli citizens, respectively), entered into a joint venture with the Georgian 
state-owned oil company through, Panama-based corporation, Tramex, which was originally 
based in the United States� The purpose of the joint venture was to extract oil, build 
pipelines and refineries, and related business activities.118 The joint venture company got 
certain concessions that offered exclusive rights from the state. However, after a few years 
when the competition appeared on the market, the state cancelled these rights with new 
legislation� On the initiation by the claimants, a commission was established to compensate 
for the cancellation of the rights� However, the Government stalled proceedings, which 
ended in no compensation awarded to the claimants� Therefore, the claimants initiated 
international arbitration, basing their claims on three international instruments; the Energy 
Charter Treaty as well as the Georgia-Greece and Israel-Georgia Bilateral Investment 
Treaties in consideration of Mr� Kardasssopoulos being a Greek citizen and Mr� Fuchs 
an Israeli citizen�119 All of these international instruments contain the fair and equitable 
treatment requirement provision�
From the claimants’ perspective (specifically Mr. Fuchs’), a violation of the fair and 
equitable treatment standard occurred� Though Mr� Fuchs primarily relied on the Israel-
Georgia BIT’s fair and equitable treatment standard provision in his claim, the Tribunal also 
chose to include interpreting fair and equitable treatment under the Energy Charter Treaty 
in its analysis, hence its relevance to the present book� The primary basis of this claim was 
that the fair and equitable treatment standard should be considered an autonomous standard 
that demands a higher level of conduct from the host state than just the minimum standard 
(as based on customary international law)� The latter claim the claimants attempted to 
justify by referring to the Saluka v Czech Republic case� In general, the claimants’ claim 
in this regard can be divided into four arguments: that there was a breach of legitimate 
expectations, that Georgia’s administration acted in an arbitrary and/or negligent fashion, 
and there was an insufficiency of action, that there was a failure to provide due process 
during the administrative proceedings, and that the host state’s conduct towards the foreign 
114 ibid para 180�
115 ibid para 181�
116 ibid para 182-184� “The standard of „reasonableness” therefore requires, in this context as well, a showing 
that the State’s conduct bears a reasonable relationship to some rational policy, whereas the standard of 
„non-discrimination” requires a rational justification of any differential treatment of a foreign investor.” ibid 
para 183�
117 Ioannis Kardassopoulos and Ron Fuchs v the Republic of Georgia, ICSID Case Nos� ARB/05/18 and ARB/07/15 
(Award)�
118 ibid para 73�
119 ibid para 57�
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investor was inconsistent� Out of these, the legitimate expectations sub-claim was the most 
stressed by the claimants�120
By contrast, Georgia rejected the claimants’ reading of the Saluka v Czech Republic case 
(arguing that the case showed that finding a violation of the fair and equitable treatment 
required more than just illegality or lack of authority in the host state’s conduct), and 
attempted to establish that the fair and equitable treatment standard can be considered 
as an equivalent to the customary international law, and thus, the threshold for violating 
the standard is high. With regards to the specific sub-claims, Georgia argued that the 
claimants’ alleged legitimate expectations were not valid, and that it is an attempt by the 
claimants to deflect responsibility for bad business decisions onto the host state (referring 
to the Maffezini case in the process). It also stressed that the regulatory flexibility of host 
states is an integral part of interpreting legitimate expectations� The other sub-claims were 
likewise rejected by Georgia�121
The Tribunal first had to determine what was the content of the fair and equitable 
treatment standard in the context of the Israel-Georgia BIT (and the Energy Charter Treaty)� 
Partially based on the Saluka v Czech Republic case, it determined that the fair and equitable 
treatment standard is tied to the encouragement of foreign investment, and that legitimate 
expectations serve as its crucial element� Referring here to the Saluka v Czech Republic, 
the Sempra v Argentina, and the Tecmed v Mexico cases, the Tribunal evaluated whether 
the fact that specific assurances (of compensation) were only given after the investment 
was made affected the legitimacy of thr expectations. The Tribunal found that while the 
specific expectation of compensation was only raised due to these specific assurances later 
on, this did not preclude claimants from having legitimate expectations towards Georgia’s 
conduct, specifically that it would treat their investment in a reasonably justifiable manner, 
and that its conduct would not violate the basic necessities of consistency, transparency, non-
discrimination and what the Tribunal called even-handedness� So, the Tribunal found that 
the fair and equitable treatment obligation, as well as legitimate expectation of the investors 
to treat their investments in a non-discriminatory, transparent and consistent manner, does 
not only apply to the investment� Rather, the obligation also applied to the compensation 
procedure, as well as to the work of the compensation commission that was stalled by 
Georgia� And so, the Tribunal found the compensation procedure as non-transparent, 
arbitrary and unfair, referring to the excessive delays of the compensation procedure, 
circular responses by the host state’s Government, and the complete denial of responsibility 
by Georgia towards the claimants’ compensation (despite evidence showing that senior 
members of Georgia’s Government were aware that claimants were owed compensation)� 
Thus, the Tribunal found that Georgia violated the fair and equitable treatment standard, 
not only under the Israel-Georgia BIT, but also under the Energy Charter Treaty (tying 
the latter into the context through the notable overlap in “treaty matrices” as the Tribunal 
put it)�122 Ultimately, an award was rendered in favor of the claimants in 2010 (beyond 
the violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard, expropriation was another issue 
the Tribunal found in favour of the claimants)� The related ICSID annulment proceedings 
were suspended in 2011, then discontinued�123
120 ibid paras 409-416�
121 ibid paras 417-427�
122 ibid paras 428-452�
123 ‘Ioannis Kardassopoulos v Georgia’ (International Energy Charter) <https://www�energychartertreaty�org/
details/article/ioannis-kardassopoulos-v-georgia-icsid-case-no-arb0518/> accessed 24 June 2021�
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1.6. Limited Liability Company AMTO v Ukraine124
The claimant was a Latvian company (AMTO) that started to buy shares in a Ukrainian 
registered company (EYUM-10), that supplied services to a nuclear power plant 
(Zaporozhskaya AES), and a division of the state-owned company (Energoatom) in 2000� In 
2003, AMTO had acquired 67% of EYUM-10’s shares. In the meantime, Zaporozhskaya AES 
accumulated debt towards EYUM-10, therefore, the company initiated proceedings against 
Zaporozhskaya AES and obtained judgement, and finally asked for execution. However, 
it was stayed, because of bankruptcy proceedings against Energoatom� Meanwhile, the 
Ukrainian State also enacted legislation that interfered with the bankruptcy proceedings�125
The claimant claimed, amongst others, breach of fair and equitable treatment (arbitrary 
and discriminatory treatment, violation of due process, infringement of the principle of 
legality, offending legitimate expectations regarding the enforcement of claims, failing 
to provide a stable, predictable and transparent framework)�126 The Tribunal did not find 
the breach of fair and equitable treatment, however, there are still some interesting issues 
related to this case� For instance, as a response to the host state’s claim that AMTO did not 
conduct due diligence when investing, AMTO argued that it was “entitled to believe that 
Ukraine, being a Contracting Party of the ЕСТ, and hence also its organs and enterprises, 
would act in conformity with the obligations under the Convention”�127 Meaning, that the 
claimant regarded the Treaty as a guarantee for its reasonable and objective expectations�
The AMTO Tribunal, similarly to the Plama Tribunal, found that there can be an 
overlapping between the fair and equitable treatment and the minimum standard requirement 
in international law� That is to say, that the host states should refrain from unreasonable, 
discriminatory or non-transparent actions� Therefore, the “claimant can plead that the 
same conduct breaches various obligations in Article 10(1) in circumstances where the 
content and relationship between these obligations is not clear”�128 Furthermore, the Tribunal 
found that denial of justice is a “manifestation of a breach of the obligation of the state to 
provide fair and equitable treatment”� In practice, it happens when the host state’s organs 
(administrative, legislative or judicial) do not assure the possibility for the foreign investor 
to exercise its rights�129
1.7. Liman Caspian Oil BV and NCL Dutch Investment BV v Republic of 
Kazakhstan130
This case concerned transfer of license to extract hydrocarbons in Kazakhstan� However, 
as only parts of the award are publicly available, and therefore only very limited data is 
124 Limited Liability Company AMTO v Ukraine, Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 
Arbitration No� 080/2005 (Award)�
125 ibid� paras 15-24�
126 ibid para 27�
127 ibid�
128 ibid para 74�
129 ibid para 75�
130 Liman Caspian Oil BV and NCL Dutch Investment BV v Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No� ARB/07/14 
(Award)�
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accessible regarding the facts of the case, we are going to examine only part of the award 
available and dealing with the issue of fair and equitable treatment�131
The available part of the award is very didactical with a logical structure, and some 
important findings. The Tribunal established that the fair and equitable treatment is more 
than the minimum standard treatment, and therefore:
when assessing Respondent’s actions, a specific standard of fairness and equitable-
ness above the minimum standard must be identified and applied for the application 
of the ECT�132
Furthermore, the Tribunal also stated that denial of justice squarely falls under the 
standard of fair and equitable treatment in the context of Article 10(1) of the Energy Charter 
Treaty� Thus, if fair treatment is to be followed, then there should be no denial of justice�133
Beyond that, the Tribunal was also of the opinion that:
a judicial act breaches the standard of fair and equitable treatment and/or denial 
of justice standards only if the act attains the high threshold which is described in 
Waste Management, Final Award (Ex CA-15) at para� 98: “Taken together, the S�D� 
Myers, Mondev, ADF and Loewen cases suggest that the minimum standard of 
treatment of fair and equitable treatment is infringed by conduct attributable to the 
State and harmful to the claimant if the conduct is arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust 
or idiosyncratic, is discriminatory and exposes the claimant to sectional or racial 
prejudice, or involves a lack of due process leading to an outcome which offends 
judicial propriety – as might be the case with a manifest failure of natural justice in 
judicial proceedings or a complete lack of transparency and candour in an admin-
istrative process�” The Tribunal views that a misapplication of domestic procedural 
or substantive law provision might under certain circumstances be an indication of 
lack of due process� However, the Tribunal emphasizes, and the Parties agree, that 
by no means would this be sufficient to establish a breach of Article 10(1) ECT 
committed by a judicial act�134
The Tribunal also made some observations regarding the standard of most constant 
security and protection� Particularly, the Tribunal was of the opinion that this standard is 
fundamentally distinct from the fair and equitable treatment standard, and has a meaning 
beyond the latter standard� The purpose of this standard in the Tribunal’s view is that it 
protects the integrity of a foreign investment against interference, by say use of force or 
particularly physical damage� It does not actually extend to contractual rights�135
Finally, the Tribunal was particularly clear that corruption in itself (assuming the Tribunal 
can find evidence of it) is a grave violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard 
under the context of Article 10(1) of the Energy Charter Treaty�136 Regardless, in this 
particular case, the Tribunal found no breach (of the fair and equitable treatment standard 
or otherwise) and rendered an award in favour of Kazakhstan in 2010�
131 ‘Liman Caspian Oil BV and NCL Dutch Investment BV v Republic of Kazakhstan’ (Investment Policy Hub) 
<https://investmentpolicy�unctad�org/investment-dispute-settlement/cases/248/liman-caspian-oil-v-kazakhstan> 
accessed 13 May 2021�
132 Liman (Award) para 263�
133 ibid para 268�
134 ibid para 285�
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1.8. Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul v Republic of Tajikistan137
In this case, the claimant was an Austrian investor that invested in exploration and 
production of oil and gas in Tajikistan in 1998� Agreements were signed with the Tajik 
State Committee which promised necessary materials and licenses from Tajikistan� In 2000, 
with a new agreement, the parties set up a joint venture with the foreign investor’s majority 
shareholding, and further exploration and production agreements were signed� However, 
there were permanent technical and management issues, and the promised licenses were 
not issued by the state� On the other hand, the Austrian investor did not pay the whole 
contribution undertaken to the joint venture company� The Tajik party initiated a court 
proceeding in Tajikistan to reduce the Austrian party’s interest in the joint venture company, 
in proportion to its contribution� National court proceedings successfully reduced the Austrian 
investor’s interests in the joint venture, to which the investor, among other things, claimed 
a violation of due process and fair and equitable treatment under international arbitration�138
The Tribunal accepted the viewpoint of the Petrobart tribunal that all the provisions 
from article 10(1) are interlinked�139 And the grounds for breach, inconsistency and lack 
of transparency in the issuance of licenses and in the issuance of visas being the first, were 
examined. The Tribunal stated that transparency and consistency are definitely elements of 
the fair and equitable treatment standard� Regarding transparency requirement, it referred to 
the Metalclad award which found that all relevant legal requirements affecting the investment 
should be capable of being readily known to the investor�140 Concerning consistency, it 
quoted the Tecmed decision, which stated that the foreign investor should be entitled to 
expect the host state to act, without arbitrarily revoking any pre-existing decisions or 
permits issued by the state that were relied upon by the investor to assume its commitments 
as well as to plan and launch its commercial and business activities�141 However, it added 
that none of them require the chilling of the legal system by the host state, but rather to 
act in an open manner and consistent with commitments it has undertaken�142 However, 
in the case of consistency, the Tribunal could not establish the fault of the Tajik state� Nor 
did the Tribunal find enough evidence to establish the failure of the host state to meet 
legitimate expectations in the issuance of licenses�143 The Tribunal established a test and 
required the proof of the nature of the expectation, the reliance on the expectation and the 
legitimacy of that reliance�144 It also referred to the Thunderbird and Parkerings cases but 
did not find enough evidence. Claimant’s third basis for alleging unfair and inequitable 
treatment related to the question of due process and/or denial of justice in the Tajik court 
actions�145 The court found that the duty to provide due process is part of the obligation to 
provide fair and equitable treatment�146 The Tribunal identified several aspects of denial 
137 Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul v Republic of Tajikistan, Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce Case No� V (064/2008) (Award)�
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of justice in jurisprudence, like failing to notify the investor about the hearing, deciding in 
its absence, maliciously misapplying substantive law, exercising unreasonable pressure on 
the investor (like refusing to prolong licenses), etc�147 However, due to limited evidence, 
the Tribunal could not establish denial of justice or breach of due process�
1.9. AES Corporation and Tau Power B.V. v Kazakhstan148
AES v Kazakhstan was an Energy Charter Treaty arbitration case that dealt with the question 
of legitimate expectations extensively� It also had an interesting perspective on the fair and 
equitable treatment standard as a whole�
The dispute originated from the privatization efforts of Kazakhstan over the course 
of the 1990s� Due to the necessity of restructuring its electricity sector, owing to its 
newfound independence after the end of the USSR, Kazakhstan decided to encourage 
foreign investment into their country through the privatization of several of its state-owned 
electricity companies� These involved the passing of several resolutions by the nation’s 
authorities� One of which explicitly aimed at the creation of competitive wholesale market 
for electricity production by 1998� According to the claimant, the respondent was of the 
opinion that the particular resolution’s content was more a statement of intent� Meanwhile, 
an Irish subsidiary of the primary claimant (though there was some dispute between the 
parties about the period during which the subsidiary was under the control of the claimant), 
acquired one of these privatized power plants, and later was announced as the winner of 
tenders related to two concessions and four heat and power plants� The latter explicitly led 
to a formal agreement between the primary claimant’s subsidiary and the respondent host 
state (the Altai Agreement)� The rights conferred by this agreement were later assigned to 
another company (the secondary claimant)� This was followed by further agreements among 
various foreign investors and their subsidiaries related to the Kazakh electricity market� 
However, after the privatization, Kazakhstan engaged in a sweeping competition law reform 
between 1998 and 2008, by enacting nine different pieces of legislation (many of which 
related to monopolies, and the electricity production market specifically). Consequently, 
the regulatory environment for companies involved in electricity production, significantly 
changed over these years� As a result of this legislation, several of the claimants’ companies 
were registered as dominant market players and subjected to fines and penalties over 
alleged violations of competition law, and for abusing their market positions� In total, the 
primary claimant’s subsidiaries were subjected to 53 different orders and/or fines between 
2001 and 2010� Furthermore, as alleged by the claimant, Kazakhstan Government bodies 
also threatened criminal prosecution against these subsidiaries from 2007 onwards�149 
Also, between 2002 and 2010, Kazakhstan attempted to make domestic courts proclaim 
the invalidity of the above-mentioned Altai Agreement� The agreement led to a protracted 
dispute concerning whether its arbitration clause invalidated the jurisdiction of domestic 
courts which in the end, an English court established the arbitration clause as valid�150
147 ibid para 221�
148 AES Corporation and Tau Power B.V. v Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No� ARB/10/16 (Award)�
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The Arbitral Tribunal analyzed separately the legislative evolution related to the case 
from 2009 to 2012� From 2009 onwards, Kazakhstan enacted further legislation which 
followed the trend already established in the previous period, and some of which aimed 
specifically at the electricity production market. Such as the 2009 electricity law and its 2012 
amendment� Based on these regulations as well as the earlier ones, the Government took 
actions against the claimants’ companies� This culminated in actual criminal proceedings 
being launched against the companies’ select personnel in 2011� Such as the general director 
of the companies, who was investigated by Kazakhstan’s financial police as well as faced 
various administrative proceedings and fined for alleged monopoly activity and market 
position abuses. This led to a significant escalation of the dispute between the parties.151 
And finally, investment arbitration was initiated with ICSID by the claimants in 2010 based 
on the Energy Charter Treaty and the Kazakhstan-United States BIT�
There were numerous claims in this case, however, we are going to focus on the question 
of legitimate expectations and the fair and equal treatment standard� One of the claims 
was that the provisions of the Altai Agreement, in conjunction with the circumstances in 
which it was concluded, as well as various pieces of legislation and the Energy Charter 
Treaty itself, entitled the claimants to legitimate expectations in the period prior to 2009� 
These expectations included amongst others, not being subject to price control or other 
sanctions, indemnification for losses resulting from any breach of the Altai Agreement, 
Kazakhstan refraining from taking any action that would have a material adverse effect 
on their investments or the enjoyment of their rights provided by the Altai Agreement�152 
The Tribunal categorized the expectations raised by the claimants into four categories: (i) 
expectations of a stabilization of their position towards legislation being more adverse to 
their investment; (ii) expectations regarding the way in which Claimants were allegedly 
entitled to be treated under relevant Kazakh competition law, in particular with regard to 
their asserted right to sell electricity at market rates and to do so through central trading 
companies using blended tariffs; (iii) expectations that Kazakhstan would only apply rational 
competition policies in a reasonable and proper manner for the purpose of deterring or 
redressing anti-competitive conduct. (iv) and finally, expectations that Kazakhstan would 
resolve disputes arising out of the Altai Agreement by way of arbitration�153
However, as per the Tribunal’s view, all these expectations were ultimately directed 
towards the effects of the revisions of the Kazakh competition law that Kazakhstan 
accomplished prior to 2009, and thus were examined by the Arbitral Tribunal in this context� 
In relation to this, the Tribunal denied that there would be a legitimate expectation from 
claimants of no changes in Kazakhstan’s general competition law for the public interest, 
or an exemption from such revisions� Furthermore, the Tribunal also dismissed the notion 
that successive amendments of Kazakh competition law would constitute a violation of 
legitimate expectations� It noted that the Kazakh state would have had to make a very 
clear commitment to the claimants on not modifying its regulatory framework in some 
specific manner, to have a legitimate expectation for the claimants to be protected from 
further evolution of competition law� The Altai Agreement did not contain such explicit 
commitments, and thus, the Tribunal ruled that there was no legitimate expectation� The 
Arbitral Tribunal also noted that Kazakhstan was introducing commonly used regulatory 
tools, all in the pursuit of goals that had been clearly announced by the state when the 
151 ibid paras 51-57�
152 ibid paras 283-285�
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foreign investment was being contemplated and concluded, which reinforced the Arbitral 
Tribunal’s view that the claimants had no reason to believe that they are insulated from 
further regulatory evolution� With regards to other alleged legitimate expectations concerning 
market and trading practices, the Tribunal also examined whether the relevant provisions 
of the Altai Agreement gave rise to a legitimate expectation, the frustration of which would 
constitute a separate breach of fair and equitable treatment� According to the Tribunal, 
the breach of contract does not automatically mean a breach of treaty protection, denying 
that legitimate expectations under treaty and under contract were conterminous with each 
other� Instead, the latter would only be also a legitimate expectation under treaty, if it is 
of such nature that it justifies its protection under the given treaty, and the frustration of 
it is sufficiently serious in nature that it constituted an independent breach of the given 
protection standard of the treaty� The Tribunal also highlighted that there must be other 
factors, other than the existence of the contract, that justifies considering an expectation of 
performance of the contract as a legitimate expectation under the Energy Charter Treaty� 
Particularly, the overall circumstances must be considered, such as the expectation’s basis, 
the reasons for its frustration, etc� Since these factors were missing according to the Tribunal 
in the present case, it rejected the claimants’ allegation in this regard� With regards to 
blended tariffs and similar terms-connected, alleged legitimate expectations, the Arbitral 
Tribunal highlighted that these are too vague, lack definition in the Altai Agreement, and 
are interpreted too differently in meaning by the involved parties. Thus, the Tribunal 
believed that, considering other relevant factors, such as the stage of development of 
Kazakhstan’s economy and the stage of competition law development in the host state, 
these provisions in the Altai Agreement are not sufficiently clear to give rise to a legitimate 
expectation protected by the fair and equitable treatment standard� As for the expectations 
arising out of stabilization, the Arbitral Tribunal simply referred to an earlier part of its 
award, where it determined that the stabilization clause found in the Altai Agreement 
cannot be exempted from a given legal provision of a law, while remaining subject to 
other, beneficial provisions, and thus it can also not give rise to a legitimate expectation 
on the claimants’ part� And for the third category of expectations, the Arbitration Tribunal 
noted that the legitimate expectation in this case is an expectation that the Energy Charter 
Treaty’s and the BIT’s relevant standards will be applied by Kazakhstan� Thus, this is a 
question of whether the competition law as applied by the Kazakh state was in breach of 
the fair and equitable treatment standard (and thus will be discussed below by us, as well)� 
Finally, regarding the arbitration clause, the Tribunal used a similar argument as earlier, 
noting that a contractual expectation does not automatically suffice for giving rise to a 
legitimate expectation protected under the broader fair and equitable treatment standard, 
and instead, the circumstances must also be considered alongside the breach of contract� 
In this case, the Tribunal rejected to decide on the validity of the arbitration clause, citing 
its lack of jurisdiction� However, it did acknowledge that English courts at the place of 
arbitration did confirm the validity of the clause, and thus the claimants cannot claim 
to have been deprived of legitimate forums to resolve the dispute� The Tribunal also 
believed that the claimants have shown no proof that they suffered damages due to the 
domestic courts’ ruling against the validity of the clause� Thus, the Tribunal determined 
that it is not possible to base a claim on legitimate expectations (and the breach of fair and 
equitable treatment consequently) on the fact that Kazakhstan’s domestic courts ruled the 
arbitration clause to be invalid, at the given stage of the proceedings at least� If in the future, 
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damages would arise from this aspect of the dispute, then the claimants are free to file a 
new claim�154
After dealing with the legitimate expectations sub-standard, the Tribunal moved to 
examine the applicability of the larger fair and equitable standard with regards to the other 
sub-claims made by the claimants in relation to occurrences prior to 2009� The Tribunal 
declined to establish a detailed definition of the fair and equitable treatment standard, noting 
that all interpretations of the standard contain a shared element: a significant threshold of 
impropriety on the host state’s part� Thus, the Tribunal reasoned that to determine whether 
the fair and equitable standard was breached, it is necessary to examine whether any of 
the actions by Kazakhstan in this period were sufficiently serious to fail the standard. In 
particular, the Tribunal used the requisiteness of transparency, stability and predictability as 
a baseline� The Tribunal also referred to the AES v Hungary case, specifically by accepting 
the latter tribunal’s assertion that fair and equitable treatment is only infringed if the host 
state’s actions or procedural omissions, considering the facts and circumstances presented to 
the arbitrators, are manifestly unfair or otherwise unreasonable (to the extent that it would 
surprise or even shock a sense of juridical propriety)� Based on these reasons, the Tribunal 
rejected the claimants’ claims in this context, and found that neither the enactment nor 
the application of Kazakhstan’s competition law changes reached that threshold� Beyond 
this general dismissal, the Tribunal also examined in detail the various sub-claims related 
to alleged violations of the fair and equitable treatment standard in the period leading 
up to 2009� For many of these, it referred to its earlier statements regarding legitimate 
expectations, considering these sub-claims of fair and equitable treatment violation to be 
essentially an extension of the legitimate expectation claims, and thus unsuited for separate 
discussion� For other sub-claims, such as the claimants’ allegations regarding coercion, 
harassment and lack of due process for example, the Arbitral Tribunal found that the factual 
basis for these sub-claims is insufficient. And with regards to the lack of due process, it 
also noted that violating the fair and equitable treatment standard requires a substantial 
denial of justice� According to the Tribunal, this was not the case in the present dispute, as 
it found the conduct of the Kazakh courts and other governmental bodies to be sufficiently 
motivated, and considered them detailed in their findings, while also noting that there were 
instances of these bodies deciding in favor of the claimants� Thus, there was no violation of 
the standard in the Arbitral Tribunal’s view, as there was no substantial denial of justice�155
Interestingly, the claimants attempted to advance here an argument that refraining from 
unreasonably or arbitrarily impairing investments is a separate protection standard than fair 
and equitable treatment� The Arbitral Tribunal mostly side-stepped having to answer this 
question, noting that even if there are theoretical differences between the two standards, 
their application in the present case largely overlaps due to how the claimants constructed 
their claims� Thus, the Tribunal used the above-described arguments relating to the fair 
and equitable treatment standard to dismiss these particular sub-claims�156
Moving on, claims were also advanced connected to alleged violations of the fair and 
equitable treatment standard (and legitimate expectations) under the Energy Charter Treaty 
based on the conduct of Kazakhstan between 2009 and 2015� In particular, the claimants 
were mostly advancing such claims based on the 2012 electricity law amendment that we 
already mentioned among the facts of the case� In particular, the claimants believed the 
154 ibid paras 283-297, 323�
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law mandating that all electricity producers re-invest all their income and profits into their 
generating facilities was unreasonable and disproportionate for the pursuit of any legitimate 
policy goal by Kazakhstan� Most of these were dismissed by the Tribunal based on its earlier 
findings on legitimate expectations, or as the Tribunal noted with regards to the frustration 
of legitimate expectations deriving from other provisions of the Energy Charter Treaty, the 
sub-claims presented by the claimants replicate the content of substantive provisions of the 
Energy Charter Treaty, and thus are indistinguishable from the sub-claims the claimants 
already advanced under these provisions� Thus, it ruled that these sub-claims do not give rise 
to a separate breach of the fair and equitable standard that can be assessed by the Tribunal� 
However, it devoted significantly more attention to the question of legitimate expectation 
to earn a reasonable return of and on an investment, which was what Kazakhstan allegedly 
violated with its conduct as described above� The Tribunal here ascertained that there exists 
a legitimate expectation to that effect, and that it necessarily implies the right to a certain 
degree of discretion when it comes to the use of this return by the investors, such as the right 
to repatriate it (in theory)� It based this on provisions of the Altai Agreement, as well as on 
general principles� The Tribunal also emphasized here that the fair and equitable standard’s 
protection of legitimate expectations is not absolute, but rather the restriction must be seen 
as unfair or inequitable� Thus, it analyzed whether Kazakhstan’s implementation of policy 
was reasonable and proportionate� Curiously, the Arbitral Tribunal determined that while a 
certain degree of restriction on the repatriation of returns could be seen as justified within 
the context (ergo, it appears indispensable to prevent a collapse of the electricity system), 
Kazakhstan had to show that this threat of collapse was sufficiently real and imminent, and 
that no measures could have been reasonably introduced that had less intrusion upon the 
rights of the claimants� According to the Tribunal, the host state failed on the latter point� 
This was compounded by the fact that these regulations were meant to stay in place for 
seven years, thus meaning that they were not merely a response to an immediate threat 
of collapse, but represented a larger policy plan, according to the Tribunal� As such, the 
Tribunal ruled that in this context, there was a violation of the fair and equitable standard, 
via the frustration of the protected legitimate expectations of the claimants�157
Interestingly, while the arbitral Tribunal found in favour of the claimants in the above 
context (though almost all their other sub-claims were rejected), the Tribunal did not 
award damages�158
1.10. Anatolie Stati, Gabriel Stati, Ascom S.A., Terra Raf Trans Traiding Ltd. v 
Kazakhstan159
This case was similar to the Kazakh case of AES Corporation and Tau Power B.V. v 
Kazakhstan, in that both involved the oil and gas sector, and allegations of a targeted 
governmental harassment campaign. However, the Tribunal in this case found a significantly 
more damning factual situation� And thus, its conclusion on fair and equitable treatment 
was also different.
157 ibid paras 384-412�
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As mentioned above, the case concerned exploration and supply of oil and gas within 
Kazakhstan� The claimants were Moldavian, Romanian and Gibraltarian persons (natural and 
legal)� According to the facts of the case, the claimants invested heavily into the exploration 
of Kazakh oil and gas fields and established a functioning business enterprise. However, 
in 2008, the Kazak president issued a confidential document (several years after the initial 
investment, and by which time the companies were up and running)� The motive behind 
the document was a letter from the president of Moldova, which expressed concerns that 
claimants were using the proceeds from their Kazakhstan investment in areas under UN 
sanction in South Sudan� Thus, the document instructed Kazakh governmental bodies to 
thoroughly check claimants’ companies� Kazakhstan contended the notion that the president’s 
document was an order (which was the claimants’ opinion of this factoid), insisting that 
it was a pro-forma advisory document the president is obligated to send to Government 
bodies if he becomes aware of potentially unlawful conduct� Interestingly, as mentioned 
above, the document was confidential, but the claimants nevertheless managed to obtain 
a copy of it. The confidential document was soon followed by an order from the Kazakh 
deputy prime minister, which instructed Kazakh authorities to begin a thorough audit of 
the claimants’ two companies� Afterwards, the Kazakh Government and administrative 
bodies found a several irregularities regarding the claimants’ companies� These included 
among others the “discovery” that the companies were operating a trunk pipeline (whereas 
they only had a license for field pipelines) by the Kazakh financial police, and subsequent 
finings and various other administrative and court procedures. Certain executives of the 
claimants’ companies also faced criminal prosecution, with Kazakh authorities believing 
that they violated Kazakh law with regards to the companies’ pipelines and business 
deals� Various Kazakh experts and expert bodies also attested to the factual truth of the 
proceedings against the claimants’ companies (though claimants argued that this was due 
to governmental pressure)� Numerous other procedures against the claimants’ companies 
followed at different levels of the Kazakh Government in the next two years.160
In general, as per the claimants’ allegations, the market value of the claimants’ companies 
significantly dropped between 2008 and 2010 (due to the various proceedings against 
them, rendering normal operation impossible), which the Kazakh Government allegedly 
attempted to capitalize on by having its state-owned oil and gas company offer to purchase 
it repeatedly, at a fraction of the investment’s initial value� In the end, the claimants found 
a Kazakh-based private company willing to purchase the investment at a value closer 
to its initial value, but the purchase was allegedly frustrated and delayed by the Kazakh 
Government� Interestingly, as per the claimants’ statements, this company was owned by an 
influential and powerful Kazakh business family. According to the claimants’ allegations, 
when Kazakhstan understood that investment arbitration would be initiated against it after 
the closure of the sale, the Government moved to outright seize the investment by forcibly 
moving it into a public trust� By contrast, Kazakhstan attributed the devaluation of the 
investment to the bad financial management practices of the claimants, the general economic 
crisis of 2008, and the companies’ failure to properly acquire export licenses, among other 
factors� The respondent host state also referred to its numerous domestic administrative 
and court decisions, as well as the opinions of various Kazakh expert bodies, and insisted 
that its actions were coherent and enacted in full accordance with Kazakh law� Curiously, 
the claimants alleged that the ordeal their companies underwent effectively constituted 
160 ibid paras 4-5�
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a targeted and deliberate campaign of harassment, driven by a specific “playbook” of 
Kazakhstan�161 Regardless, the dispute went into arbitration in 2010, before the Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce, and relying on the Energy Charter Treaty� The claimants alleged 
numerous breaches of the Treaty, including fair and equitable treatment, the Energy Charter 
Treaty’s umbrella clause, expropriation and others� Given the focus of the current book, 
we are naturally going to only examine in detail the Tribunal’s conclusions regarding fair 
and equitable treatment�
In total, the claimants assembled six categories of actions undertaken by Kazakhstan 
between 2008 and 2010, which they argued constituted a breach of the fair and equitable 
treatment standard as found in Article 10(1) of the Energy Charter Treaty� We are going 
to briefly look into each of these, as they will be relevant for properly summarizing the 
Tribunal’s conclusions. In the first category, the claimants identified actions directed against 
claimants’ companies and employees, based on fabricated grounds� This category mostly 
related to the above-mentioned dispute concerning whether the companies were operating 
trunk pipelines without license or not� Thus, we can see that in this case, there was a 
fundamental disagreement between the parties about the facts from the beginning of the 
dispute, and which persisted well into the arbitral proceedings� Claimants also highlighted 
the opacity and lack of transparency Kazakhstan allegedly displayed here� The second 
category of actions closely ties to the first one, and argued that Kazakhstan’s prosecution 
and conviction of one of the claimants’ employees, with the same judgment also delivering 
a hostile verdict towards a non-party (one of the companies), effectively constituted a sham 
trial, that was motivated by politics, violated due process and was factually incorrect� In 
the third category of fair and equitable treatment breach action was related to Kazakhstan’s 
refusal to approve one of the claimants’ companies’ contractual right to continue energy 
resource exploration in certain properties as defined by that contract (which the company 
signed with the Government of Kazakhstan)� This was part of the allegedly harassing 
and impeding actions that we mentioned earlier� The claimants argued here that this third 
category contained two separate breaches of the fair and equitable treatment standard: 
first, Kazakhstan arbitrarily ignored the company’s request for a six-month extension of 
the contract, and secondly, the claimants’ legitimate expectations were frustrated because 
Kazakhstan failed to extend the exploration contract, despite making promises to the 
company that it would do so earlier. The fourth category identified by the claimants was that 
Kazakhstan allegedly used the extensive and varied administrative proceedings against the 
claimants’ companies to burden them with ownership and title, which allegedly devalued 
the investment and made it harder for the claimants to sell it at on appropriate market 
value� This tied into the claimants’ concept of Kazakhstan acting in bad faith to take over 
their investment. The fifth category is related to the actions of the Kazakh Government 
mentioned above in the discussion of facts: the alleged fabrication of the grounds for directly 
seizing the claimants’ investment� And the sixth category seemingly tied into a denial of 
justice argument: claimants alleged that they filed dozens of complaints to various Kazakh 
authorities about their situation but received no substantive reaction�162
Kazakhstan argued that the Government authorities were acting in a coherent, consistent 
manner� The respondent host state also argued that the Tribunal must individually examine 
each allegation of fair and equitable treatment violation and that none of these allegations 
161 ibid paras 216-633�
162 ibid paras 897-919�
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individually meet the bar necessary to find a breach of Article 10(1). Kazakhstan argued in 
favor of a high bar or threshold of fair and equitable treatment violation, which necessitates 
blatant misconduct on the host state’s part� Otherwise, in Kazakhstan’s opinion, fair and 
equitable treatment would be interpreted in an overly investor-friendly manner and thus 
would prevent host states from admitting investors� The respondent essentially argued 
that the claimants sought not fair, but preferential treatment compared to other investors, 
which they did not receive and thus felt prosecuted�163
The Tribunal took a methodical approach to the question of fair and equal treatment� 
First, it determined the abstract definition of the standard, noting that both parties seem 
to agree at least that fair and equitable treatment means that the host state must act in a 
manner that is consistent with the legitimate expectations of investors� So, we can observe 
that the Tribunal somewhat conflated the sub-standard with the wider standard and did 
not examine them separately� With regards to fair and equitable treatment, it also noted 
that its exact content is case-specific and must consider the specific factual circumstances 
of the given case, and then those circumstances must be evaluated in the legal context of 
the Energy Charter Treaty� To accomplish this goal, the Tribunal proceeded to undertake 
an extensive factual overview of the case� However, it emphasized that fair and equitable 
treatment is “treatment”, meaning that not a single action of Kazakhstan has to be considered, 
but rather the host state’s treatment of the investment over a longer period of time� It 
found that the Tribunal does not have to establish whether there was a playbook as the 
claimants alleged, the factual overview in itself establishes that Kazakhstan’s conduct 
constituted a violation of fair and equitable treatment� The Tribunal conceded that while 
some specific actions undertaken by Kazakhstan might appear arguable (if not necessarily 
convincing), the sum of Kazakhstan’s actions as seen cumulatively in context, and the stark 
and obvious difference in treatment before and after the presidential document, can only lead 
to the conclusion that Kazakhstan’s disputed measures constituted a string of coordinated 
harassment of the foreign investor, and thus a breach of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard established in Article 10(1) of the Energy Charter Treaty� The Tribunal highlighted 
some specific factors that confirmed this conclusion: the sharp turn in Kazakhstan’s behavior 
in 2008 was ultimately suspicious, as before 2008 Kazakh authorities regularly inspected 
the companies’ pipelines (which leads to the question of why it was not discovered earlier 
that these were trunk pipelines, as Kazakhstan alleged)� Furthermore, the Tribunal noted 
that the financial police of Kazakhstan was not a competent authority to classify pipelines, 
lending further credence to the assertion of the Kazakh authorities acting arbitrarily� The 
Tribunal also accepted the claimants’ allegation based on the available evidence that the 
Kazakh Government (through the financial police) compelled relevant expert bodies to 
withdraw any statements in favor of the claimants� The Arbitral Tribunal also questioned 
the notion that any of the claimants’ actions (within the context of the FET evaluation) 
were contrary to Kazakh law, leading to the conclusion that there was a great degree of 
arbitrariness exhibited by Kazakhstan�164
Interestingly, the Tribunal also concluded that since it has already established a breach of 
the fair and equitable treatment standard, it need not examine further potential breaches of 
the Energy Charter Treaty relating to expropriation (Article 13) in detail, unless the damages 
sought by the claimants for them are not covered by the fair and equitable treatment breach�165
163 ibid paras 920-940�
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In the end, the Tribunal, based on the violation of fair and equitable treatment as 
described above, awarded half a billion USD to the claimants in 2013, and also ordered 
the respondent to pay half of the claimants’ legal costs� Kazakhstan unsuccessfully tried to 
annul the award in front of Swedish courts in 2016/2017 and in 2020� In the former case, 
Kazakhstan attempted to deploy a number of both procedural and substantive arguments, 
alleging procedural irregularities (such as claimants supplying false facts to the Tribunal) and 
that the foreign investors’ activities constituted a massive scheme of fraudulent corruption� 
These arguments were all dismissed by the Svea Court of Appeal166, the judgment of which 
came under extraordinary review of the Supreme Court of Sweden at Kazakhstan’s request� 
However, the Supreme Court simply noted that Kazakhstan had not shown any circumstance 
that would constitute a grave procedural error on the court of appeal’s part�167 In 2020, the 
same courts also noted that the matter is a res iudicata and that Kazakhstan brought no new 
fact to the case that would justify another examination of the merits�168 The enforcement 
proceedings of the award are also notable for being extremely elaborate, involving courts 
of Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States�
1.11. Mamidoil Jetoil Greek Petroleum Products Societe Anonyme S.A. v Albania169
In this case the arbitral Tribunal examined the issue of fair and equitable treatment within 
the Energy Charter Treaty’s context in relatively great detail�
The origins of the dispute stem from the 1990s, during which period Albania abandoned 
its centrally planned and controlled economy in favor of a market economy, as part of 
the political changes following the downfall of its communist regime� The claimant in 
the present case was a Greek petroleum company, which had spent the 1990s exploring 
the investment potentials within Albania (though the actual length of preparation was 
disputed between claimant and respondent, both agreed that the claimant made a concrete 
proposal (which failed) in 1995)� In particular, the claimant was considering the potential 
of establishing and/or renovating a petroleum tank farm at one of Albania’s ports� In the 
end, they chose the port of Durres and attempted to secure an investment in the area from 
the Albanian Government, with varied success (as shown by the above-mentioned failed 
proposal)� But between 1998 and 1999, the claimant managed to reach an agreement with 
the relevant Albanian Government bodies (Ministry of Economics and Privatization) and 
executed a 20-year lease contract to renovate, construct and develop a petroleum tank farm 
on the leased area of the port. The Tribunal found it difficult to establish a fixed timeline 
for the construction process, as the claimant made contradictory statements, some of which 
166 ‘Svea Court of Appeal Judgement’ (International Energy Charter) <https://www�energychartertreaty�org/
fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/Cases/29_Stati/Judgment_of_the_Svea_Court_of_Appeal_on_Kazakhstan_s_
Set_Aside_Application__Eng.PDF> accessed 18 May 2021.
167 ‘Report of Proceedings of the Supreme Court of Sweden’ (International Energy Charter) <https://www�
energychartertreaty.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/Cases/29_Stati/Decision_of_the_Supreme_Court_of_
Sweden__English_.pdf> accessed 18 May 2021.
168 ‘Minutes of the Supreme Court of Sweden’ (International Energy Charter) <https://www�energychartertreaty�
org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/Cases/29_Stati/Decision_of_the_Supreme_Court_of_Sweden_II__English_.
pdf> accessed 18 May 2021�
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were also disputed by Albania� In the end, the Tribunal found that the most reasonable 
conclusion was that this tank farm was being constructed from around March 2000 to 
February 2001, at least with regards to core construction works� During the construction 
work, the claimant was ordered by the port authority (acting under another ministry) to 
cease their activities� This was because the port of Durres was under consideration for 
a renovation master plan, which potentially included the transfer of any petroleum tank 
farms to other tank farms� In fact, work on the construction was ceased for several months 
due to the port authority’s order (which also affected other foreign investors developing 
the area) but later allowed to resume and be completed� In 2001, the claimant managed to 
secure a 10-year trading permit for the petroleum tank farm, which allowed it to continue 
functioning for its duration unless there was an earlier cancellation of the permit by relevant 
Albanian authorities� Over the course of the following years, the claimant operated the 
completed petroleum tank farm, though in the background, the port’s restructuring was 
still being planned and partially executed by Albanian authorities through a variety of 
governmental decisions and regulatory changes� However, there was contention between 
the parties about how much this was following the original master plan� This restructuring 
could have eventually led to the ceasing of petroleum unloading activities at the port� The 
claimant was aware of this possibility to some extent, and during this period, attempted 
to negotiate a relocation, if necessary, provided it was granted proper compensation in 
exchange� Albanian authorities, however, stuck to the claimant relocating at its own cost, 
without compensation� Beyond the trade permit, the claimant encountered issues with the 
acquisition of different permits throughout the construction and operation of the petroleum 
tank farm� To wit, the claimant only managed to obtain an environmental permit in 2007 
(after first applying for it in 2000), though the permit was manifestly temporary. The 
construction site and construction permit, meanwhile, were never granted to the claimant 
(even though the Albanian Government approved the construction project in principle)� The 
question of the exploitation permit was meanwhile particularly contentious from a factual 
perspective: Albanian authorities requested that the claimant applied for such a permit in 
2003-2004, but accounts differed on whether the claimant applied to the relevant Albanian 
authorities or not. And finally, the case also involved a customs warehouse authorization, 
which was granted to the claimant in 2006� In the end, Albania’s prohibition on petroleum 
processing ships in the Durres port became effective in 2009. Afterwards, the claimant 
relied on existing deposits in the petroleum tank farm and trucks to continue petroleum 
trading in limited, relatively small quantities, until the expiry of its trading permit in 2011� 
The original lease contract remained theoretically valid (if practically non-functional) by 
the time of arbitration�170
As the above passages already suggested, there was a high degree of contention between 
the parties regarding numerous facts of the case, involving conflicting allegations regarding 
communication and motivation, among other matters� The chief hotspots of this factual 
clash served as the onus behind the dispute and the reason the claimant filed for arbitration, 
thus we should also highlight them here� Namely, while the claimant admitted to being 
aware of potential changes to the port of Durres’ functioning, it alleged that it had faith in 
the stability of the 20-year lease contract and that it would be largely exempted from any 
restructuring going on in the port� The claimant also alleged that it exercised due legal 
diligence by repeatedly asking relevant Albanian authorities about what legal steps to take 
170 ibid paras 55-137�
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and what permits to request� However, alleges being told that it already has governmental 
authorization, and no further steps are necessary� Thus, believed that there is no need for 
further permits� Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, the claimant believed that 
the 2009 closure of the port with regards to petroleum unloading ships was not motivated 
by a master plan of restructuring (as we mentioned above), which the claimant believed 
that Albania had largely abandoned for the most part, but rather by a desire to provide 
a competitive advantage to an Italo-Albanian competitor of the claimant� The claimant 
also alleged that during this period, it suffered from arbitrary and excessive tax claims 
from Albania, as Albania imposed excise taxes and VAT on quantities of petroleum as 
shown on the bills of lading, and not on the actual quantities as they departed from the 
customs warehouse� This was arbitrary according to the claimant because it failed to take 
into consideration that due evaporation and other losses, the differences between the two 
quantities can be significant. Finally, the claimant also contended that Albania ignored 
frequent occurrences of fuel smuggling, which caused damages to the claimants’ operations 
between 2001 and 2011�171 Albania, of course, refuted all these claims, thus leading to 
the dispute, which was filed in 2011 by the claimant in front of the ICSID, relying on the 
Albania – Greece BIT and the Energy Charter Treaty�
As with other cases, our principal focus is on how the arbitral Tribunal adjudicated 
the claimant’s alleged violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard� The claimant 
also argued other breaches of the Energy Charter Treaty and the BIT, such as indirect 
expropriation� First, we must clarify that since the afore-mentioned BIT contained explicit 
no fair and equitable treatment standard, the Tribunal based its examination of the topic 
solely on the Energy Charter Treaty, which emphasizes its value for research from our 
perspective� The Tribunal in general divided its examination of fair and equitable treatment 
into four separate subcategories, each analyzed independently: the provision of a stable and 
transparent legal framework, legitimate expectations, alleged exertion of pressure, and denial 
of justice� This followed the same structure that the claimant used in their presentation�172
Thus, the first claim that related to fair and equitable treatment was that Albania failed 
to provide a stable and transparent legal framework to the claimant� In particular, the 
claimant believed that even given Albania’s state of economic and legal transition, its 
legal framework was extraordinarily unstable, unclear and contradictory� This included 
not informing the claimant about Albania’s possible plans for the port of Durres in the last 
years of the 1990s, as the claimant contended that it would not have agreed to the lease 
contract had it known that the investment’s legal future is uncertain� The minimum storage 
capacity was significantly reduced in 2002, decreasing the viability of running a tank farm 
business then re-increasing it in 2008 just before the claimant’s investment stopped its 
activity� The State of Albania did not order the relocation of the claimant’s tank farm or 
make known to the claimant the conditions of relocation when the port was shut down� 
Nor did it specify the permits needed for the claimant’s investment and their requirements� 
Albania primarily argued that claimant failed to negotiate for stabilization clauses; that the 
necessity of regulatory and infrastructural changes in Albania was manifestly obvious and 
foreseeable, and that it never made any representation to the claimant in the lease contract 
that would suggest it would have the ability to use it for discharging petroleum-carrying 
vessels for the totality of the lease contract’s duration�173
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When assessing the above contentions by the parties, the Tribunal established three 
criteria that must be considered when examining fair and equitable treatment in the context 
of a stable and transparent legal framework� Partially based on other arbitration cases,174 
the Tribunal first established that a critical factor here was the necessity of balancing 
(between the obligation and other legally relevant interests) and that legislative changes 
must not be characterized as continuous oscillation and unpredictability� The second 
criterion was whether Albania’s specific situation (a period of drastic economic, political 
and legal transition) is relevant to the interpretation of this obligation to provide a stable 
and transparent legal framework. The Tribunal was of the opinion that this specific situation 
was of relevance to the present case� Moreover, the claimant was found to be very familiar 
with Albania’s specific history and circumstances. It also highlighted that Albania had 
to build its infrastructure from scratch and suffered from great internal strife. Thus, the 
Tribunal basically argued that foreign investors are not entitled to believe that Albania’s 
efforts to live up to its international treaty obligations would generate the same results of 
stability as in more developed and stable countries� And that the minimum due diligence 
of host states to live up to treaty obligations is circumstance specific. The third criterion 
the Tribunal considered was that the foreign investor itself is obligated to evaluate the 
circumstances before investing and that the host state’s obligation to provide a stable and 
transparent legal framework does not dispense with this obligation� Thus, to rely on this 
framework obligation, the foreign investor must first conduct itself with diligent inquiry 
and information-gathering� The Arbitral Tribunal noted that in this context, the conduct of 
both parties must be examined in order to determine fairness and equitableness�175
Based on the above criteria, the Tribunal assessed the conduct of both parties to determine 
whether there was a breach of fair and equitable treatment standard in this specific context 
of the legal framework� First, it found that, based on the analyzed facts of the case, Albania 
made no specific representation and undertaking to assure the stability of the legal framework 
in the specific context of the claimant’s investment. It clarified for the parties that, without 
any detailed assurance or substantive commitment on the part of the host state, positive 
replies to an investor’s investment proposal cannot be construed as a commitment to 
stabilizing a legal framework for the claimant’s investment� The Tribunal also pointed out 
that the lease contract does not mention the use of Durres’ port facilities for tankers, it only 
entitled the claimant to set up a fuel storage center on the leased area� The contract also 
cannot be construed as possessing an implied term with regards to stabilization, due to the 
lack of any executive statements, directives, or such to this effect from Albania. So, there 
was neither specific commitment in this regard. As for Albania’s plans for restructuring 
the country’s infrastructure, the Tribunal found its modernization policy coherent and 
consistent, if somewhat delayed. It also found that Albania made sufficient warnings of 
possible changes to the claimant in an appropriate timeframe and accommodated the 
claimant� The claimant was allowed the continued use of the Durres port for petroleum 
ships up until 2009 when the port that was supposed to replace it was opened� Interestingly, 
the Tribunal did acknowledge certain shortcomings in Albania’s conduct, but these did 
not meet the threshold necessary to establish a violation of the obligation to provide a 
stable and transparent legal framework� As for other allegations raised by the claimant in 
this regard, the Tribunal dismissed the notion that the reduction of the minimum storage 
174 Like AEA v Hungary, Saluka v Czech Republic, Lemire v Ukraine�
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capacity between 2003 and 2008 constituted an instability of the legal framework, noting 
that the measure had a legitimate experimental policy objective of fostering competition, 
it was in effect for five years, and was mostly reverted due to compliance with European 
Union requests� Thus, it reasoned that the measure and its revocation cannot be construed 
as arbitrary and unstable� As for the alleged failure of Albania to provide information on the 
permits needed by the claimant, the Tribunal again considered the struggling governance 
of Albania in the period, and that the claimant had its own obligation to make independent 
inquiries about the legal requirements of its investment� While the Tribunal agreed with the 
claimant that there were certain imperfections and lack of communication from Albanian 
authorities, the legal texts related to the permits were stable and transparent, and thus the 
claimant could have learned the information via independent inquiry� As such, Albania 
could not have violated the obligation to provide a stable and transparent legal framework 
this way�176
The second line of allegations advanced by the claimant, concerning fair and equitable 
treatment, was that Albania frustrated its protected legitimate expectations� The claimant 
posited that even though neither the business plan it submitted to Albania, nor the lease 
contract explicitly refers to the use of petroleum ships, the claimant found it an obvious and 
implied element of the parties’ engagement� Especially given that it was an integral part of 
the claimant’s business plan� Thus, the claimant alleged that it had cause to believe that it 
would be allowed to operate its tank farm as intended for the entire duration of the lease 
contract� These expectations were allegedly reinforced by Albania allowing the claimant 
to finish constructions, after first suspending them. These expectations were frustrated in 
part by Albania only issuing a temporary trading permit and not renewing it, and by the 
prohibition of discharging fuel ships in the port of Durres from 2009 onwards� Albania 
advanced a similar counterargument, as we have seen above, that the claimant could not 
have legitimately expected to have their tank farm remain operational as under the original 
conditions for twenty years, given the transitional stage of Albania both from a legal and 
infrastructural perspective� It also noted that it never made any representation to the claimant 
that it would be authorized to use the port for the lease’s full duration, nor did it breach any 
term of the lease contract� Most notably for us, it also highlighted that the continued use 
of the tank farm by fuel ships between 2001 and 2009 was a special privilege granted to 
the claimant and several other Greek companies (until the construction work in the newer 
port was complete), because of an agreement between Albania and Greece�177
From the Tribunal’s perspective, the principal question here was when did the legitimate 
expectations emerge in the investor, as an expectation can only arise when the investment 
is made� Due to the particularities of this case, such as that no stabilization representation 
was made by Albania to the claimant, that the investor’s scouting activities took several 
years, as well as other facets of the dispute, determining this exact time was found to be 
difficult by the Tribunal. As such, it reasoned that instead of looking for a fixed point of 
time during the investment process, it takes into consideration the evolving and gradual 
nature of the investment process by weighing the interests of both the investor and the 
host state. Based on this general approach, it identified two types of actions by Albania 
(accompanied by general time periods) in relation to which legitimate expectations could 
have occurred from the claimant’s side. The first one was whether the claimant could 
176 ibid paras 635-675�
177 ibid paras 676-689�
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have legitimately expected, between the approval of the investment in 1999 and the start 
of the construction in 2000 that it would be exempted from acquiring the construction 
site permit, the construction permit, and the exploitation permit� The Tribunal found that 
an investor cannot claim legitimate expectations with respect to its illegal operations, as 
the lack of permits made the construction manifestly contrary to Albanian laws� Albania 
also never explicitly confirmed to the claimant that these requirements would be waived, 
according to the Tribunal� Interestingly, Albania’s inaction against the claimant later was 
not considered a relevant factor by the Arbitral Tribunal, as only the above-described time 
was relevant to the determination of legitimate expectation, consistent with the Tribunal’s 
earlier general observations� The second Albanian measure that could be connected to 
possible legitimate expectations from the claimant was the 2009 closure of the Durres 
port for discharging fuel ships. In a similar fashion to the first measure, the timeframe 
for legitimate expectation established by the Arbitral Tribunal was between the execution 
of the lease contract in 1999, and the start of the construction in 2000� In this case, the 
situation is further muddled by that during the year 1999, the claimant received warnings 
from certain Albanian authorities that a restructuring plan was being considered, which 
could potentially leave the future petroleum tank farm without access to fuel ships� This 
was followed by the temporary suspension of construction works until Albania and Greece 
managed to negotiate a temporary agreement� This indicated to the Tribunal that Albania 
did not suddenly change its mind in 2009, but rather behaved consistently and coherently� It 
noted that while in other cases, such as Tecmed v Mexico, Eureko v Poland, and MTD v Chile, 
the arbitral tribunals concluded the revocation of a license, the withdrawal of approval, or 
that the prohibition of a previously authorized activity constituted a frustration of legitimate 
expectations. But the circumstances in the present case markedly differ. Namely that the 
actions of Albania did not target the investment itself but rather the business environment� 
For a similar situation to occur in the present case, Albania would have had to revoke the 
lease contract� However, this did not happen� The Tribunal thus had to examine whether the 
claimant had a legitimate expectation to access the port as part of the general circumstances 
and conditions at the time of the investment� Here, the Arbitral Tribunal took the view that 
there must be more on the claimant’s side to a legitimate expectation than the subjective 
hope that nothing will change for the worse� Namely, there must be a promise from the 
host state, either implicitly or explicitly, one that is identifiable under the circumstances 
and thus can transform the investor’s subjective hope into objective (and thus legitimate) 
expectation� No such promise existed� And furthermore, the Tribunal found that Albania’s 
consistent public policy of increasing modernization of its infrastructure was sufficiently 
weighty to shift the balance in the host state’s favor in this regard: the investor does not 
have an absolute right to expect that old structures would continue to exist, regardless of 
circumstances�178
The third aspect of fair and equitable treatment that was raised in the dispute, concerned 
the alleged exertion of pressure by Albania� Namely, the allegation that Albania prohibited 
the discharge of fuel tankers in the port of Durres when it realized that the claimant would 
relocate only if compensated� Therefore, Albania used governmental power to force the tank 
farm out of the Durres port� The Tribunal dismissed this argument, noting that Albania’s 
position regarding the closure of the port was consistent from 2000 to 2009 (specifically 
that the claimant and select Greek companies could use the port to discharge fuel until 
178 ibid paras 691-735�
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the newer port is completed). And that the host state was also consistent in both offering a 
privileged location in the newer port if the claimant relocated while also making clear that 
it would not attempt to force a relocation on the claimant� Thus, both parties were clear 
and transparent in their positions according to the Tribunal�179
The final aspect of fair and equitable treatment that was raised in the dispute concerning 
the denial of justice. This concerned the alleged unfairness of taxation due to the difference 
in fuel quantities that the claimant endured (as we explained earlier in the case)� Namely, 
the Albanian Supreme Court declining the jurisdiction of civil courts on the matter, and 
referring it to administrative court jurisdiction, allegedly denied the claimant its access 
to justice in the host state� The Tribunal made it clear that it is not part of its role to act as 
an appeal against domestic courts, and that it has no competence to evaluate questions of 
domestic Albanian law� However, it noted that the Albanian Supreme Court’s judgment 
appears reasoned, understandable, coherent, and consistent with the Albanian legal system� 
It did not appear clearly improper, discreditable, or shockingly disregarding of Albanian 
law� Therefore, the denial of justice claim lacked foundation according to the Tribunal� 
Thus, no violation of fair and equitable treatment could be proved in this case�180
In a similar fashion, the Tribunal found that no other violation of the Energy Charter 
Treaty could be determined� And thus, the claimant lost the case in 2015, with each party 
bearing its own costs�181 ICSID annulment proceedings were later started but were then 
discontinued�182
1.12. Energoalians Ltd. v Moldova183
The Energoalians Ltd. v Moldova case is a typical example of a Tribunal finding a violation 
of the fair and equitable treatment standard by denial of justice� The claimant in this case 
was a Ukrainian private company producing and distributing electricity� This company 
entered into a number of contracts from 1999 onwards on the supply of electricity with a 
Moldovan state-owned electricity company� As a result, the state-owned company accrued 
a degree of debt towards the claimant for the electricity supplied� The payment of this debt 
was cumbersome due to the extensive restructuring and transfers of assets between state-
owned electricity companies that was orchestrated by the Moldovan Government in the 
years following the original contracts concluded with Energoalians by a decree (no� 1000)� 
As part of this process, a major part of the original state-owned company’s assets, activity, 
etc� were transferred to another state-owned company� Eventually, the question of the debts 
owed to the claimant reached the so-called Audit Chamber of the Republic of Moldova� The 
Audit Chamber was an institution that was closely tied to the Moldovan parliament, and 
not a regular judicial body� The Chamber determined several administrative irregularities 
relating to the contracts signed between the claimant and the original state-owned company, 
179 ibid paras 736-749�
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181 ibid para 839
182 ‘Mamidoil v Albania’ (International Energy Charter) <https://www�energychartertreaty�org/details/article/
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which resulted in a reduction of the debt owed to the claimant� The claimant unsuccessfully 
challenged the Audit Chamber’s decision (decree) via national courts, before turning to 
international arbitration under the Energy Charter Treaty and the Ukraine-Moldova BIT� 
Simultaneously, there were also claims in front of national courts relating to the portions 
of the debt held by other companies as a result of the restructuring�184
There are two relevant facets of the dispute. The first being Decree no. 1000, which 
was contested by the claimant as being contrary to their (and other creditors’) legitimate 
expectations� As for the second facet, the Arbitral Tribunal also had to ascertain whether 
the Audit Chamber’s decree constituted a violation of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard, specifically concerning denying justice to the claimant.
Implicitly, the Arbitral Tribunal had seemingly accepted that legitimate expectations 
served as a sub-standard for fair and equitable treatment and referenced the two in 
conjunction with each other. In this specific case, the third version of the legitimate 
expectations mentioned in Part I was present in the case, namely that the host state should 
provide stability in its “general regulatory framework”� This is the most sensible category 
to put the Tribunal’s approach to legitimate expectations into, as the violation of legitimate 
expectations was raised in conjunction with the changing regulatory environment, it was 
not a case of a government withdrawing from a formal obligation or informal promise made 
to the investors in specific. The Arbitral Tribunal examined the circumstances surrounding 
the issuance of Decree No� 1000� An important sub-question they had to answer was 
whether the mechanism contained in the Decree, supposedly there to protect the company’s 
creditors, was also sufficient to justify the Decree not being aimed at infringing the interests 
of the creditors� The Tribunal determined that these mechanisms were vague, general, and 
depended on further actions by Moldova’s Ministry of Finance, there was also a lack of clear 
information towards the creditors about what sort of remedies would be available to them� 
In a similar sense, the Tribunal also noted that the Decree, by forcing the discontinuation of 
economic activity of the debtor, also cut off the income meant to serve as repayment for its 
debts� Thus, the Tribunal acknowledged that the primary aim of the Decree was to protect 
Moldova’s national interests (retaining state control over electricity), at the same time, it 
undoubtedly restricted the interests of the creditors� Interestingly, the Tribunal dismissed 
the claimant’s arguments that the Decree was discriminatory (by allegedly differentiating 
between foreign and domestic creditors), or aimed specifically at the claimant, and it also 
dismissed the notion that the Decree constituted an illegal form of reorganization under 
Moldovan law� However, it explicitly found that the Decree nevertheless violated the 
legitimate expectations and interests of the creditors (and also violated fair and equitable 
treatment in the process), specifically by violating the state’s obligation towards “stable, 
equitable, favorable and transparent conditions” found in Article 10(1) of the Energy 
Charter Treaty�185 This aspect is interesting to us because the Tribunal confirms in this 
particular case that regulatory changes need not be contrary to the general framework of 
national law to be considered a violation of the third approach to legitimate expectations�
The second facet is related to the Audit Chamber’s decree� The claimant alleged that 
this decree was a violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard, by constituting 
a denial of justice to the claimant and other creditors� The Tribunal analyzed the decree 
to determine the veracity of this claim� Interestingly, it noted that the Audit Chamber’s 
184 ibid paras 66-106�
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proceedings were unusual in several respects� First of all, the claimant was not entitled to 
participate in the Audit Chamber’s proceedings� Second, the Audit Chamber disregarded 
evidence and statements provided by the original state-owned company, as well as other 
Moldovan governmental bodies, to decide that a certain number of electric transfers did not 
take place� It based its conclusion solely on the lack of regulations-compliant accounting� 
Similarly, the arbitral Tribunal determined that while electricity transfer did take place in 
some cases, it found the evidence, that the state-owned company already paid for it, to be 
flimsy. As a result, the Tribunal considered the Audit Chamber’s decree to be arbitrary. An 
interesting question was also raised with regards to whether the Audit Chamber is a judicial 
body, and thus whether denial of justice can occur� The Tribunal concluded that while it 
is not a regular court, the Audit Chamber did fulfill a quasi-judicial role, and hence can be 
considered a judicial body from the perspective of the denial of justice claim� Therefore, 
the Tribunal concluded that it violated the fair and equitable treatment standard within 
the Energy Charter Treaty�186 So, we can see that the Tribunal considered even formally 
non-judicial bodies capable of committing denials of justice towards the foreign investor, 
provided that the function of these other bodies is sufficiently judicial in character.
The Tribunal also addressed the national court proceedings and their results to some 
extent, though it mostly dismissed the various allegations of the claimant in this regard, 
or noted that from the perspective of the Tribunal, it is not strictly necessary to determine 
whether the courts’ conduct constituted an additional and different violation of the Energy 
Charter Treaty�187
In the end, the Tribunal found in favor of the claimant, though it excluded part of its 
claims due to lack of jurisdiction (about one-fifth of it, related to one of the contracts), and 
awarded 195�5 million MLD in damages, with interest�188 It should be added, that there were 
several annulment proceedings related to the award in front of French courts (involving the 
Paris Court of Appeal, and the Court of Cassation of France)� But these mostly concerned 
jurisdictional questions and those of definitions found within the Energy Charter Treaty 
(such as investor)� At the moment, the Paris Court of Appeal posed a number of preliminary 
questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union relating to these definitions.189
1.A. Cases related to green energy investments in the European Union
There is a set of cases related to incentives provided for investors who invested into green 
energy sector, and later revoked by some European countries like Spain, Italy or the 
Czech Republic�190 The policy change happened during the years of austerity following 
the economic crisis of 2009�
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With regards to Spain-related cases, due to the large number of cases based on 
generally the same factual premises (or very similar), we try to avoid repetitions, and 
therefore introduce the reader to the common factual background once, including a general 
presentation of some basic facts as presented in the following� The background of the dispute 
lies ultimately in various European Union directives, particularly Directives 2001/77/EC 
and 2009/28/EC, which set targets for the Member States for the production of electricity 
generated from renewable energy sources within specified periods. Partially to comply with 
its related obligations, and partially to address its problems of energy dependence, Spain 
created a special regime for electricity generation that was designed to boost investment 
in renewable energy sources� This regime was made possible through a series of royal 
decrees and laws stretching from the late 1990s to 2010. Specifically, electric energy 
producers covered by this special regime had a series of guaranteed rights, that is to say, 
they had the right to incorporate their surplus energy into the system, receiving remuneration 
determined in accordance with the legal foundations of the regime� They also had the 
right to receive a premium, the amount of which was determined by various factors such 
as the level of energy delivery to the grid, the effective contribution to the improvement 
of the environment by the producer, etc� All of this was to make it possible for producers 
to achieve reasonable rates of return on their investments�191 Furthermore, in 2005, the 
Spanish Government adopted a new renewable energy plan for the period of 2005-2016, 
which actually modified an existing plan for the promotion of renewable energies in Spain 
between 2000 and 2010� This plan maintained existing commitments to supply a given 
percent of Spain’s total energy consumption with renewable energy by 2010, but also 
added two new, more ambitious targets for the same year: increasing renewable energy 
generation to an almost 30% of Spain’s energy generation, and increasing the use of biofuel 
in transport to almost 6%. This plan was realized by a series of decrees and laws over the 
course of the next several years� As a result, a legal environment was created, which was 
greatly favourable to foreign investors looking to invest into the renewable energy sector�192
1.13. Charanne B.V. (Netherlands) Construction Investments S.à.r.l. (Luxembourg) 
v The Kingdom of Spain193
In the Charanne case, the claimants, Charanne and Construction acquired shares of a Spanish 
company Grupo T-Solar Global S�A� in 2009� This company owned more than three dozen 
renewable energy facilities in Spain, producing electricity with photovoltaic technology�194 
At the time, there was a special regulation providing incentives and subsidies to such 
renewable energy producers, and the afore-mentioned photovoltaic solar power plants 
were also covered by this special legal regime. To be more specific, the afore-mentioned 
T-Solar company was established in 2007, and the great majority of its photovoltaic solar 
power plants (according to the claimants) were all registered with the so-called RAIPRE 
registry (which covered renewable energy plants benefiting from Spain’s special regime) 
191 Isolux Infrastructure Netherlands B.V. v Spain, SCC Case V (2013/153) (Award) paras 86-90�
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before the autumn of 2008, thus even before the investment was made by the claimants� In 
2012 the claimants initiated international arbitration based on the Energy Charter Treaty, 
claiming that the new renewable energy regulation Spain introduced in 2010 retroactively 
caused losses to its investments by eliminating regulated tariffs after a while, and by 
introducing further requirements�195 Therefore, it was in breach of the provisions of the 
Energy Charter Treaty, and so claimed damages�196 The claim specifically referred to three 
articles of the Energy Charter Treaty: (i) to article 13, claiming expropriation, (ii) article 
10(1), claiming that Spain breached its fair and equitable treatment obligation, and (iii) 
article 10(12), claiming that Spain breached its duty to provide effective means for the 
protection of the investors’ rights�
Regarding the first claim, the Tribunal did not find that the claimants could prove that 
Spain’s actions amounted to expropriation, and rejected the breach of article 10(12)�197 
However, for us, the examination of the alleged breach of fair and equitable treatment 
standard is far more interesting and relevant� The claimants believed this standard requires 
the “maintenance of a stable and predictable legal framework”, and that the host country 
breached it by frustrating the legitimate expectations of the investors by changing the 
regulatory and economic framework in unexpected ways� They asserted that they relied 
on the “commitments and representations” of the host state, and that the emergence of 
legitimate expectations’ stabilization clause is not necessary� Furthermore, the claimants 
also posited that the regulatory changes were retroactive in nature, violating their rights, 
thus breaching the fair and equitable treatment standard from this perspective as well�198
For the Tribunal, the first step was determining the content of the fair and equitable 
treatment standard, as it appears in the context of Article 10(1)� It was of the opinion that 
the language of article 10(1) is clear that the fair and equitable treatment is part of a more 
general obligation to create stable, equitable, favorable and transparent conditions�199 This 
means that unlike some tribunals, the Tribunal in Charanne did not apparently label these 
obligations as constituting parts of the fair and equitable treatment obligation, but rather 
the latter forms a part of the former�
After having succinctly established the foundations, the Tribunal went on to review 
each specific fair and equitable treatment-related element of the claimants’ claim. First, 
it examined the question of regulatory instability, as it was already mentioned that the 
claimants contended that Spain’s renewable energy reforms in 2013 led to an ongoing 
instability of the regulatory framework� Interestingly, the Tribunal did not adjudicate this 
particular aspect of the dispute, determining that it had no jurisdiction to do so� Due to 
how the claim was submitted by the claimants, the scope of the international arbitration 
only extended to pre-2013 Spanish regulations� Thus, the Tribunal took the view that it 
could not use the 2013 regulatory changes as a basis for its decisions, without manifestly 
exceeding its power as an arbitral tribunal in the process� Instead, the Tribunal determined 
that only the 2010 norms can serve as a basis for examining any alleged violation of Spain’s 
international obligations� And with regards to the 2010 norms, the Tribunal found that it 
could not posit that Spain breached its treaty-based obligation of regulatory stability� It 
also noted that the clarity of the regulatory framework is not in dispute, and in fact, any 
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raised ambiguity by the claimants exclusively refers to the evolution of the legal regime 
between 2010 and 2013, a subject that as the Tribunal determined, did not form part of 
the scope of the arbitration�200
Regarding 2010 norms, which fall under the scope of its investigations, the Tribunal 
determined that the existence of legitimate expectations could be a relevant factor� The 
Tribunal derived from the good faith principle of customary international law a rule, 
according to which host states cannot induce foreign investors to make investments, with 
said inducements generating legitimate expectations, then later ignore its commitments that 
served as the basis for these legitimate expectations� In this particular case, the question 
was thus, whether the regulations that created the original beneficial special legal regime 
generated legitimate expectations as well, and whether these expectations were violated 
by the 2010 regulations Spain introduced� To support this position, the claimants referred 
to the El Paso v Argentina, Perenco v Ecuador, Total v Argentina, CMS v Argentina, and 
Enron v Argentina cases� The claimants also referred to a 2012 UNCTAD study on fair and 
equitable treatment, which posited, that not only specific commitments made to the investor 
can generate a legitimate expectation, but also regulations that are not specifically addressed 
to any specific investor, but which are introduced with the specific goal of inducing foreign 
investments, and on which the foreign investor relied on when making the investment�201
However, regarding the legitimate expectations claim, the Tribunal concluded that no 
specific commitments were made by the host state (Spain) in the present case. The Tribunal 
stated for example, that there was no stabilization clause or other specific agreement, 
assurance or statement in which the host state promised to the claimants not to change 
the regulatory framework existing at the time of the investment� Having not found any 
statement addressed to the claimants by Spain, the Tribunal thus ruled out this potential 
source of legitimate expectations�202
The claimants, by contrast, argued that the two regulations that formed the original 
special legal regime were in essence specific commitments, as they were directed at a 
specific group of investors, limited in number, who met the regulatory requirements within 
specific time periods. The Tribunal heavily disagreed with this notion, as it was of the belief 
that the fact that the regulations were directed to a limited group of investors, and were 
thus not universal in scope, did not necessarily turn them into commitments specifically 
addressed at each investor meeting the regulatory requirements� The Tribunal posited that 
such limitation in scope does not mean that a law or regulation loses its general nature 
shared by other laws and regulations� In fact, the Tribunal was of the opinion that if it did 
find that such laws and regulations would constitute specific commitments by the host state, 
merely because the persons affected by the regulation are limited in character and number, 
then that would result in an excessive limitation on the regulatory power of hosts states, 
with regards to regulating the economy in a manner that is suitable to the given public 
interest in the given situation. Thus, it reached the conclusion that no specific commitment 
could be found by Spain towards the investors�203
Even without specific commitments, the Tribunal did not initially rule out the possibility 
that, while interpreting them as specific commitments would be contrary to legal principles, 
the regulations, and more specifically, the regulatory framework in itself might generate 
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legitimate expectations. Here, the Tribunal first established that legitimate expectations 
should be based on an objective standard, as the starting position of this examination� It 
noted that mere subjective belief on the part of the investor when it made the investment 
is insufficient in itself. It also stressed that the expectation must have been reasonable, in 
light of the circumstances of the particular case, and with relevance towards representations 
made by the host State to the foreign investor that served to induce investments� Thus, 
the Tribunal turned to examining these representations� First of these were the documents 
disseminated by Spain, as part of its campaign to attract investments in the renewable 
energy sector. These documents promised high returns and other benefits to investors. 
However, the Tribunal rejected the notion that these campaign materials could have generated 
legitimate expectations, at least with regards to the belief that the beneficial tariff regime 
would not be modified. In particular, the Tribunal found issue with the documents’ lack of 
specificity, and that the language used in them did not indicate, in any reasonable reading, 
that the tariff regime would remain untouched for the rest of the operating lives of the 
photovoltaic solar plants�204
Having dismissed these potential representations, the Tribunal again turned to the 
question of whether the regulatory framework itself could cause a legitimate expectation to 
come into being� The Tribunal’s general position here, consistent with its earlier remarks, 
was that if the framework does not contain a specific commitment, then the investor 
could not have had a legitimate expectation that the existing legal regime would remain 
unmodified. To reinforce this position, the Tribunal looked to Electrabel v Hungary (which 
stressed that host states are entitled to regulatory changes, and the requirement of fairness 
cannot be interpreted as immutability, but rather that changes to the framework should be 
fair, consistent and predictable), CMS v Argentina (which also reinforced the notion that 
the host state’s regulatory framework is allowed to evolve under the principles of foreign 
investment protection law), and El Paso v Argentina (which posited that “economic and legal 
life is by nature evolutionary”,205 and that fair and equitable treatment should not be equated 
with stability of the legal and business framework)� The Tribunal ruled that approving the 
existence of such a legitimate expectation would essentially mean the freezing of Spain’s 
regulatory framework with regards to the eligible photovoltaic solar power plants, as the 
regulatory framework would be subject to the same international legal effects in practice, 
as if Spain had provided a stabilization clause or other specific commitment. This was a 
conclusion the Tribunal found unsupportable�206
Furthermore, the Tribunal also noted that the jurisprudence of the highest Spanish 
domestic courts also reinforced the notion that there could have been no legitimate expectation 
that the regulatory framework would remain unchanged� In relation to this, the Tribunal 
also agreed with Spain that the investors should exercise due diligence when investing� 
Specifically, legitimate expectations necessarily demand that the investor first makes a 
diligent analysis of the legal regime its planned investment would fall under� Thus, the only 
instances where there would be a violation of the investors’ legitimate expectations would 
be situation where the host state’s new regulatory measures were not foreseeable at the time 
of the investment� Applying this principle to the present case, the Tribunal concluded that 
the claimants could have reasonably foreseen alterations to the regulatory framework at the 
time they made their investments� The Tribunal emphasized in particular that a relatively 
204 ibid paras 495-497�
205 El Paso (Award) paras 350, 352��
206 Charanne (Award) paras 498-503�
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high level of care could be expected of foreign investors in fields as highly regulated as 
the energy sector, where thorough knowledge of applicable law is essential for successful 
investments�207 Beyond these argumentations, the Tribunal also offhandedly dismissed the 
claimants’ allegation that the registration of the affected plants into the RAIPRE system 
would have entitled them to an acquired right to the tariff system, which in turn would have 
given rise to legitimate expectations� The Tribunal agreed with Spain that registration into 
the RAIPRE system was only an administrative requirement, and did not actually entitle 
investors to acquired rights� Interestingly, the Tribunal also noted that legitimate expectations 
must be analyzed under international, and not national law, so the relevance of the exact 
domestic legal consequences of the registrations is questionable regardless�208
But by the same token, the Tribunal concluded that at the same time, the investor has 
a legitimate expectation that the state will not act “unreasonably, disproportionately or 
contrary to the public interest”, when modifying the existing regulation based on which the 
investment was made�209 Regarding the issue of proportionality, the Tribunal found that it 
is satisfied as long as the changes are not capricious or unnecessary, and do not amount to 
suddenly and unpredictably eliminating the essential characteristics of the existing regulatory 
framework� The essential characteristics in the Tribunal’s reading were the guaranteed 
tariff (or potentially a premium where relevant), and privileged access to the electricity 
distribution grid� As already implied, these features were not eliminated in the Tribunal’s 
view�210 Thus, the claimants failed to prove a violation of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard on these grounds as well, the amendments to the regulatory framework were not 
considered by the Tribunal to be unreasonable, arbitrary, disproportionate or contrary to 
the public interest�211 The retroactivity argument was likewise dismissed by the Tribunal�212 
In the end, no breach was found by the Tribunal�
However, there was a dissenting opinion by one of the arbitrators� Part of this opinion 
concerned the fair and equitable treatment standard, so briefly examining it would prove 
useful� The dissenting arbitrator’s position was that contrary to the Tribunal, the legal order 
in force when the investment is made can itself originate legitimate expectations, thus 
opposing the more “specific commitment”-focused approach of the Tribunal. The dissenting 
arbitrator’s main argument was that the specific circumstances of the two regulations 
serving as the regulatory framework’s basis, could have created an objective belief in 
investors (and thus legitimate expectations), owing partially to the limited number of 
targeted recipients and similar factors� The arbitrator considered it legally unacceptable 
that host states could modify frameworks without any judicial consequences in such a way 
as to eliminate benefits, benefits on which foreign investors relied on, after the host state 
used the framework to attract investments in the first place. The arbitrator also rejected 
the Tribunal’s conclusion that the concept of a legal framework generating legitimate 
expectations would lead to the freezing of said framework� Instead, the arbitrator merely 
noted that states always retain regulatory power, but they have to compensate the damage 
caused by their alterations to the framework�213
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208 ibid paras 509-510�
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1.14. Blusun S.A., Jean-Pierre Lecorcier and Michael Stein v Italian Republic
In this case, the dispute concerned a 120 MW energy project in the Region of Puglia in 
Italy� The project planned to connect approximately 120 photovoltaic power plants to each 
other and finally to the national electricity grid.214 The investors first established a Belgian 
holding company (Blusun S�A�), and later two Italian subsidiaries� However, there were 
several issues related to the project and its financing. At the same time, Italy changed the 
favorable treatment of energy projects and revoked certain incentives�
When it comes to the merits of the case, the claimants highlighted an alleged causal link 
between the solar energy project’s failure and Italy’s regulatory actions� They noted that 
in general, there was a lack of construction project financing in Italy during 2010-2011 on 
the field of solar energy projects, due to the legal insecurity created by Italy’s measures. 
This alleged legal insecurity, this perceived instability deterred potential investors from 
making financial investments into the claimants’ project, according to the claimants. And 
finally, the self-redress proceedings and stop-work orders that came to be in late 2011, 
early 2012, ended their project for good�215 Legally speaking, they thus claimed breach of 
article 10(1) of the Energy Charter Treaty by failing to create stable, equitable, favorable 
and transparent conditions (on account of the legal insecurity allegedly caused by Italy)� 
Furthermore, they also claimed a breach of fair and equitable treatment obligation by Italy 
frustrating the investors’ legitimate expectations� In addition, the claimants also alleged a 
breach of article 13(1), thus claiming expropriation�216 Interestingly, while the claimants 
seemingly separated the legal instability/insecurity claim from the fair and equitable 
treatment standard (for which they referred to in the context of legitimate expectations), 
the Tribunal invoked precedents which treated legal insecurity in the context of the fair and 
equitable treatment standard� Thus, we will also necessarily examine the legal instability 
claim in an ancillary fashion�
Mostly relying on the Charanne case, the Tribunal noted that, without a specific 
commitment made to the investor, the host country is free to adapt its legislation to the 
needs of economic changes and public interest�217 The Tribunal generally accepted that 
individual measures, which on their own do not violate fair and equitable treatment 
obligation, cumulatively may do it� However, it held that in this case these measures, 
even cumulatively, did not reach the level necessary to breach it� Thus, it rejected the legal 
instability claim�218
The second claim, one which was much more firmly founded in the concept of fair and 
equitable treatment, both in the argumentation of the claimant, and in the statements of 
the Tribunal, was the legitimate expectations claim� Essentially, the claimants posited that 
they had legitimate expectations that the so-called Third Energy Account (the favorable 
214 Blusun S.A., Jean-Pierre Lecorcier and Michael Stein v Italian Republic, ICSID Case No� ARB/14/3 (Award) 
para 53�
215 ibid para 310�
216 ibid para 311�
217 ibid paras 319, 367. At the same time, it referred to the so-called roller-coaster effect “In PSEG Global v. 
Turkey (not ECT case), the tribunal found a breach of the fair and equitable treatment (FET) standard by 
reference to what it described as: ... the ‘roller-coaster’ effect of the continuing legislative changes. ‘[stability 
cannot exist in a situation where the law kept changing continuously and endlessly, Paras� 250, 254”� ibid 
para 315�
218 ibid paras 361, 364�
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regulatory environment) would be maintained for the entirety of its duration (so, until 
the end of 2013)� This was presented by the claimants, and accepted by the Tribunal, as 
an alternative claim to the legal instability claim� The Tribunal referred to several other 
cases here, such as Charanne, El Paso, and Philip Morris v Uruguay� Based on these, the 
Tribunal took the view that it is problematic to view laws as express promises by the host 
state. In fact, according to the Tribunal’s opinion, regardless of the difficulties surrounding 
the interpretation of informal representations, there is a clear distinction between laws and 
contractual commitments� In the Tribunal’s view, international law cannot turn something 
that was not binding in the first place to a binding obligation, nor can it render something that 
was originally temporary perpetual� Furthermore, the Tribunal also noted that considering 
the circumstances (especially European Union law) it was clear, or should have been 
clear, the incentives offered under the Third Energy Account were subject to modification 
(consistent with the observations we made regarding the other claim)� The Tribunal thus 
took the view, that specific commitments need to be made by the host state, in order to 
establish an obligation on its part� However, it also acknowledged that:
If it becomes necessary to modify them, this should be done in a manner which is 
not disproportionate to the aim of the legislative amendment, and should have due 
regard to the reasonable reliance interests of recipients who may have committed 
substantial resources on the basis of the earlier regime� These considerations apply 
even more strongly when the context is subsidies or the payment of special benefits 
for particular economic sectors�219
Though claimants attempted to use witness testimony to establish that they had reasonable 
expectations towards the Third Energy Account living out its planned duration, according 
to the Tribunal, when viewing the specific circumstances of the case, it should be clearly 
noted that the risk of change is carried by the investors by default, and that reasonable 
market expectations in themselves cannot serve as a basis for shifting risks to the host 
state’s budget� According to the Tribunal, circumstances can and do change, and without 
a specific commitment, this risk cannot be shifted away from the investors. Thus, in the 
absence of any specific relevant commitment by Italy towards the claimants, the Tribunal 
could not establish a legitimate expectation as posited by the claimants�220 In general, The 
Tribunal rejected the claimants’ claims in all respects in its 2016 award� This award was 
also upheld by the ICSID annulment committee later�221
1.15. Antaris Gmbh and Dr Michael Göde v the Czech Republic222
Antaris was a case between German investors who invested in solar power plants and the 
Czech Republic� The Czech Republic changed the system of incentives, as there were too 
many investments into this subsidized energy sector� The claimants initiated international 
arbitration based on the Energy Charter Treaty and a BIT, claiming among others unfair 
219 ibid para 372�
220 ibid paras 365-374�
221 ‘Blusun v Italy’ (International Energy Charter) <https://www�energychartertreaty�org/details/article/blusun-
sa-jean-pierre-lecorcier-and-michael-stein-v-italy-icsid-case-no-arb143/> accessed 22 May 2021�
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and inequitable treatment, unreasonable and arbitrary measures, and indirect or creeping 
expropriation�223
Out of the claims presented by the claimants, one of the relevant claims for us is that 
the claimants alleged that the Czech Republic breached an obligation to provide a stable 
and predictable legal framework� Interestingly, the claimants posited that this is a separate, 
autonomous obligation from the obligation to protect the legitimate expectations of investors� 
However, referring to Tecmed v Mexico, Bayindir v Pakistan and other cases, the claimants 
tied both obligations to the fair and equitable treatment standard in their argumentation 
regardless. Essentially, the claimants attempted to differentiate so-called basic investors’ 
expectations towards the stability of an investment framework, and individual legitimate 
investor expectations� Claimants further contended that a promise of stability may come 
into being even without a specific stabilization clause inside the legal framework, and that 
stabilization clauses are in general not relevant in establishing an international law stability 
obligation, as these clauses arise in the context of domestic law� Contractual stabilization 
clauses likewise should be considered unnecessary in the claimants’ view, owing to the 
circumstances, namely that in the renewable energy sector, it is atypical for the Czech 
Republic to enter into contractual relationships with individual foreign investors�224
As for legitimate expectations, the claimants posited that a threefold test must be used, 
referring to the Micula v Romania case, namely:
(a) the Respondent made a promise, assurance or representation of regulatory stabil-
ity; (b) the Claimants relied on such promise, assurance or representation; and (c) 
such reliance was reasonable�225
In general, the claimants alleged that they had a legitimate expectation regarding the 
stability of the feed-in-tariff levels over the lifetime of the project (twenty years, to be 
precise), and that the income tax exemption they benefited from would remain in place for six 
years� The claimants noted that the fair and equitable treatment standard does not expressly 
describe what type of expectations can be considered legitimate, arbitral tribunals must 
determine them based on the specific circumstance, and consider whether the host state’s 
behavior gave rise to an expectation in the foreign investors that its regulatory framework 
would not change to their detriment� And according to the claimants, when examining the 
circumstances of the case, it was clear that the Czech Republic was attempting to attract 
foreign investors by providing long-term and stable incentives� They also contended that 
domestic legislation can effectively serve as a promise by the host state in the context of 
legitimate expectations, and even dismissed the results of the Charanne v Spain case, as being 
different due to its unique factual circumstances, and that the claimants there attempted to 
invoke an extremely long-term stability commitment from the host state� Interestingly, the 
claimants attempted to argue that the general promises contained by Czech legislation (in 
their view), were converted to specific promises via the investors undergoing the licensing 
process, and acquiring permissions to construct, and then operate the photovoltaic plants 
at the center of the dispute� The claimants also extensively detailed how their reliance on 
these alleged promises by the Czech Republic was reasonable, while conversely, the Czech 
Republic’s amendment of the previously investor-beneficial framework was unreasonable.226
223 ibid para 74�
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The Czech Republic mainly argued that a stabilization clause is absolutely essential for 
establishing either claim as being acceptable, and that none of its regulations contained a 
stabilization clause or otherwise sufficiently implied stability to the extent that claimants 
alleged� In general, the Czech Republic denied that Article 10(1) of the Energy Charter 
Treaty would create a stabilization obligation in present circumstances� The host state 
heavily referred to Charanne v Spain to argue that a stabilization guarantee was absolutely 
necessary, and that in general, governmental statements issued regarding relevant regulatory 
frameworks should not be necessarily treated as stabilization guarantees� The Czech Republic 
reinforced this by referring to Arif v Moldova, to claim that any legitimate expectation must 
be precisely identified with regards to its origin, thus any such expectation derived from 
regulations must be based on actual provisions of said regulations� In present case, the 
Czech Republic argued, there was no such provision from which a legitimate expectation 
could be derived from� Naturally, the Czech Republic also took the position (referring to 
AES v Hungary and Electrabel v Hungary in the process) that the claimants relying on 
assurances was unreasonable under the circumstances�227
The Tribunal referred to several precedents, and established numerous statements about 
the nature of fair and equitable treatment in its opening remarks� Principally, it noted that 
the fair and equitable treatment standard would be violated if legal or business stability, or 
specifically, a regulatory framework, was altered in such a way that it would frustrate the 
investors’ legitimate and also reasonable expectations, or the guarantees of stability given 
to said investors� It acknowledged the Czech Republic’s position with regards to the origin 
of the legitimate expectation: the expectation’s origin must be clearly identifiable, so that 
the expectation’s scope can be determined with sufficient precision. It also reiterated the 
afore-mentioned test of the legitimate expectations� Namely, that the claimant should prove 
that the clear and explicit (or implicit) representation was attributable to the host state� 
That it was reasonably relied upon by the claimant, but subsequently repudiated by the 
host state. It also interestingly accepted the notion that specific guarantees may arise from 
legislation as well. It noted that specific representations can be significant factors when it 
comes to assessing the investor’s knowledge, or the reasonableness and legitimacy of its 
expectations, but are not otherwise strictly necessary to advance a legitimate expectation 
claim� Interestingly, the Tribunal also stated that regulatory provisions that apply to a 
plurality of persons, or a category of persons, cannot create a legitimate expectation that 
the law will not change� The Tribunal furthermore accepted that an expectation might be 
created by general legislation, but without an explicit stabilization clause, any amendment 
to said legislation would only violate the fair and equitable treatment standard if the host 
state’s conduct exceeds the normal regulatory power it is afforded in the pursuit of public 
interest, or it otherwise modifies the regulatory framework (relied upon by an investor at 
the time of making the investment) in a fashion that is outside the acceptable margin of 
change�228 Regardless of this notion, this Tribunal accepted that there is no need for an 
“express stabilization clause” and that an implied promise might be enough for a legitimate 
expectation of stability�229
The Tribunal also reinforced the notion that legal stability requirements and legitimate 
expectations do not affect the host state’s right to legislate, and that the host state is not 
forced to elevate the interests of foreign investors above all other considerations, but instead, 
227 ibid paras 318-359�
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the fair and equitable treatment standard allows for a balancing or weighing exercise (a 
phrase also used by other arbitral tribunals) on the part of the host state� However, it was 
also quick to note that outside of specific promises, or other representations by the host 
state towards the investor, it is not possible for the foreign investor to use investment 
treaties as a sort of insurance policy against regulatory changes. As some final notes on 
the nature of fair and equitable treatment, the Tribunal also concluded that the protection 
of investors from arbitrary or otherwise unreasonable behavior is part of the fair and 
equitable treatment standard, non-impairment similarly being part of the standard in the 
Tribunal’s view� Lastly, it noted that regardless of other considerations, the foreign investor 
is entitled to an expectation that the host state will not act in a manifestly inconsistent or 
unreasonable manner�230
However, it rejected all the claims of the claimants as “there was neither an impairment 
of the investment, nor the use of unreasonable or irrational or arbitrary measures”� And it 
also took into consideration that the investor did not exercise due diligence when investing 
and rejected all the claims of the claimants�231 Thus, it rendered an award in favor of the 
Czech Republic in 2018�
Interestingly, there was a dissenting opinion by one of the arbitrators� The dissenting 
arbitrator mainly disagreed with the Tribunal’s interpretation of the facts of the case, with 
regards to the fair and equitable standard. Specifically, the dissenting arbitrator argued 
that one of the legislative acts relevant to the case contained not only an abstract promise 
of stability (which was the Tribunal’s view), but also a statutory guarantee� Furthermore, 
the dissenting arbitrator took a strong stance on how the Energy Charter Treaty provides 
unqualified fair and equitable treatment, and that if the host state provides either express 
or implied assurance of a specific treatment to investors, then failing to follow those 
assurances will naturally lead to failing the fair and equitable treatment standard as well� 
He also rejected the Tribunal’s observations regarding assurances given as part of general 
legislation towards groups or categories of persons� The dissenting arbitrator believed that 
there was no significant difference between an undertaking directed towards a class of 
investors or an individual investor, within the context of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard (which, in his opinion, should explicitly rise above such technicalities to ensure 
effective protection). He also disagreed with the need to tie the legitimate expectations of an 
investor to a specific representation or point of origin, noting that in this context especially, 
the legitimate expectation refers to the general regulatory framework� But even more so, 
he rejected the Tribunal’s view that a certain margin of appreciation when it comes to the 
host state amending its regulatory framework was compatible with the objectives and 
character of the Energy Charter Treaty (and the relevant BIT)� His primary concern was that 
applying this margin of appreciation to fair and equitable treatment would undermine the 
very purpose of this legal guarantee to investors afforded by the Energy Charter Treaty. In 
the dissenting arbitrator’s view, this approach would also not lead to a crystallization of the 
regulatory framework, but would still maintain the sovereign regulatory rights of the host 
state� In the end, he took the position that the Czech Republic’s conduct in walking back 
on its assurances would establish a violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard�232
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1.16. Sunreserve Luxco Holdings S.à.r.l., Sunreserve Luxco Holdings II S.à.r.l., 
Sunreserve Luxco Holdings III S.à.r.l. v the Italian Republic233
During the ‘80s and the ‘90s, Italy introduced plans and regulations providing incentives to 
produce energy from renewable resources� Which was also supported by European Union 
directives� This tendency of providing incentives for renewable energy went on at the 
beginning of the new millennia� Based on these incentives,234 the claimants, three companies 
all subsidiaries of SunReserve International LP, started to invest and develop photovoltaic 
plants in Italy in 2010, and built up altogether nine such plants�235 Shortly after this, Italy 
partly revoked and partly changed the rules related to these incentives� The investors 
initiated arbitration with the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 
claiming breach of article 10(1) of the Energy Charter Treaty by Italy, particularly by not 
providing fair and equitable treatment to its investment, impairing it through unreasonable 
and discriminatory measures, and breaching the “umbrella clause”�236
The Tribunal carried out a very detailed analysis of all the issues in the case� First, 
there were some general findings of the Tribunal, like the legal standard for the fair and 
equitable treatment obligation is not the same as the customary international law minimum 
standard for fair and equitable treatment obligations. This follows first of all from the text 
of article 10(1)� And that the international law minimum standard is incorporated into the 
Treaty but only as a minimum threshold of treatment of foreign investors�237 The Energy 
Charter Treaty does not define the fair and equitable treatment obligation, therefore, it 
should be interpreted according to Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties�238 So, the Tribunal concluded that to determine the meaning of fair and equitable, 
all the circumstances of a given case should be considered�239 Furthermore, a “stable and 
transparent legal framework” is also an important part240 that should be balanced against 
the host state’s public interests� That is the right to regulate, as also expressly mentioned 
in the Energy Charter Treaty�241 Based on all this, the Tribunal established that the standard 
of breach of the fair and equitable treatment obligation is high and referred to in the AES v 
Hungary case that the host state’s actions should be “manifestly unfair or unreasonable”�242 
It also referred to words “radical or fundamental”�243
233 Sunreserve Luxco Holdings S.à.r.l. (Luxembourg); Sunreserve Luxco Holdings II S.à.r.l. (Luxembourg); 
Sunreserve Luxco Holdings III S.à.r.l. (Luxembourg) v the Italian Republic, SCC arbitration V (2016/32)�
234 For qualifying power plants, among others, these were: incentive tariffs for 20 years, obligation to purchase 
electricity from renewable energy producers by the state company, minimum price guarantee, no payment 
of “imbalance costs”, etc�
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As per the claimant’s claim,244 the Tribunal treated legitimate expectations, transparency 
and consistency, and good faith as tenets of the fair and equitable treatment obligation and 
examined separately�245 It started with the analysis of legitimate expectations standard� First, 
it examined if the investor’s expectations were legitimate; if it relied on these expectations, 
and finally if they were frustrated by the conduct of the Italian state.246 Regarding the 
first issue, the Tribunal was of the opinion that legitimate expectations can be created by 
general legislation, and that specific commitments by the host state are not necessary for 
this�247 At the same time, the Tribunal cited the Saluka v Czech Republic case that that the 
investor’s expectations should be legitimate and reasonable, and such expectations cannot 
be based only on the investors’ subjective motivations (should be “crystalized”)� It also 
established that the investor has the duty of “due diligence” of a “prudent investor” when 
investing�248 Second, regarding the reliance of the investor on legitimate expectations, the 
Tribunal stated that it is a factual question�249 And third, as to the issue of frustration of 
the legitimate expectations, it concluded that not every breach of legitimate expectation 
of the investor is automatically a breach of the fair and equitable standard, in other words, 
international obligations under the Energy Charter Treaty� There is a high standard to 
constitute a breach,250 thus it should be proven that the conduct of the host state:
[…] was manifestly or grossly unfair or unreasonable, was arbitrary or discrimina-
tory, or that the host State engaged in a willful neglect of duty or a willful disregard 
of due process of law or showed an extreme insufficiency of action falling far below 
international standards, such that the conduct would shock judicial propriety�251
After the legitimate expectation standard, the next issue under scrutiny was the 
independent nature of the transparency and consistency duty on the part of the host state� 
The Tribunal held that fair and equitable treatment obligation can be breached by the host 
state’s non-transparent and non-consistent conduct, even if such conduct did not amount to 
the frustration of legitimate expectations� However, it emphasized again that for the breach 
of fair and equitable treatment standard the change should be “radical or fundamental”�252
The parties were also in dispute whether the good faith principle is an independent 
component of the fair and equitable treatment obligation� According to the Tribunal, it is 
not a separate obligation under article 10(1) but an indispensable part of all obligations 
in international law�253
Following the examination of the standards, the next step was to see if Italy frustrated 
the claimants’ legitimate expectations� The claimant claimed that statutory regulatory 
framework also creates legitimate expectations, and that it took into consideration several 
factors which constituted the basis for its legitimate expectations, when it decided to invest 
into the plants, like Italy’s policy goals, decrees which promised to keep the incentives 
244 ibid para 588�
245 ibid para 667�
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247 ibid para 699�
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for 20 years, tariff confirmation letters from the state company (implementing body of the 
decrees), public statements of Italian officials confirming the incentives, confirmation of 
the incentives by Italian Government agencies�254 Interestingly, the Tribunal did not find, 
based on different excuses, that these factors created legitimate expectations for the investor 
or that they satisfied the threshold of legitimacy. One of the most interesting arguments of 
the Tribunal was the lack of acquiring a tariff confirmation letter from the state company 
before the investment, and that the investor did not meet the requisite threshold of objective 
certainty�255 Finally, regarding the first claim that the Spalma-incentivi Decree frustrated the 
investors’ legitimate expectations and that it constituted a breach of the fair and equitable 
treatment obligation, the Tribunal did not grant for the claimants�256
Likewise, the Tribunal rejected claims that the imposition of the Administrative 
Management Fee or the imbalance costs and changes to the minimum guaranteed price 
regime amounted to a breach of fair and equitable treatment obligation and frustrated 
the claimants’ legitimate expectations�257 The Tribunal also did not establish that Italy’s 
conduct was non-transparent or non-consistent, or that it had proceeded in bad faith when 
dealing with the investor�258
1.17. Eiser Infrastructure Limited and Energia Solar Luxembourg S.à.r.l. v 
Kingdom of Spain259
This is one of those cases in which the Tribunal found in favor of the investors� The 
claimants (investors from the United Kingdom and Luxembourg) initiated arbitration in 
2013, based on the Energy Charter Treaty� They claimed that the host state, Spain, breached 
its obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment by amending the regulatory framework 
related to renewable energy projects�260 The claimants, after conducting legal due diligence 
in 2007261, started investing in concentrated solar power plants relying on the legal regime 
established by a royal decree from the same year� These plants began operation in 2012� 
However, due to economic reasons, already during the next two years, Spain changed the 
subsidy and tax system related to concentrated solar power plants�
The Tribunal, first of all, established that it is accepted by arbitral jurisprudence that 
host states have the right to change the regulatory framework if economic circumstances 
change and the public interest requires so�262 This means that if there is no stabilization 
254 ibid paras 601, 770�
255 ibid para 839 and 125�
256 ibid para 871�
257 ibid paras 213, 886, 905�
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contractual arrangements between the host State and the particular investors or investments in question, or by 
unilateral legislative or regulatory acts directed at a small and well-defined class of investors.” ibid para. 995.
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clause or other specific assurance which would give ground for legitimate expectations, 
the investor should not be surprised by the change in the regulatory framework�263
There were other claims of violations of the Energy Charter Treaty, however, the 
Tribunal approached the case primarily from the aspect of fair and equitable treatment 
obligation: “obligation to accord investors fair and equitable treatment provides the most 
appropriate legal context for assessing the complex factual situation presented”�264 The 
investors claimed that this obligation under the Energy Charter Treaty is an autonomous 
standard, and that it should be interpreted in the context of the Treaty’s object and purpose, 
that is to say, assuring stable conditions for the investors� Furthermore, they maintained that 
a stabilization clause contained in the royal decree of 2007 was crucial to their decisions 
to invest in this sector�265 The Tribunal agreed and established that the meaning of the fair 
and equitable treatment obligation must be determined in the context of the particular treaty 
in which it is found�266 Therefore, the Tribunal referred to the principles of the European 
Energy Charter and to article 2 and articles 10(1) (“create stable … conditions”) of the 
Energy Charter Treaty, and came to the conclusion that both of them aim at creating a 
stable investment environment�267 Thus, fair and equitable treatment obligation embraces 
the duty to assure fundamental stability in the legal regime on which the investor relied 
when investing, and radical change of that regime is not acceptable� Especially if that 
change leads to depreciation of the investment�268 Therefore, fair and equitable treatment 
obligation in the Energy Charter Treaty should protect investors from fundamental change 
to the regulatory regime�269 In the opinion of the Tribunal, in this case, the host state’s 
measures were unprecedented and entirely new�270 And so this drastic and abrupt change 
of the regulatory regime destroyed the investment’s value�271 The latest financial report 
available for the Tribunal, for example, showed that the earnings of the company under 
the new regulation were not enough even to cover the operational and financing costs of 
the plants�272 The Tribunal, comparing this case with the Charanne case, concluded that 
both the factual and the legal situation differ fundamentally. And that its effects are more 
dramatic in comparison with from those in the Charanne case�273 It also referred to the fact 
that several Spanish authorities274 expressed reservations regarding the new regulation’s 
sweep and novelty�275 The Tribunal also contrasted this case to the AES v Hungary case, 
and found that there were assessments of the characteristics of individual parts, while in 
this case, the regulation was designed on the one size fits all principle.276
263 ibid para 362�
264 ibid para 353�
265 ibid para 357�
266 ibid para 376�
267 ibid para 377-380�
268 ibid para 382� One of the arguments was also that the investor was able to get the necessary high initial capital 
for the investment because the legislation at the time of the investment offered “predictable subsidized prices” 
and thus stable return on the investment� ibid para 412�
269 ibid para 363�
270 ibid para 365, 389�
271 ibid para 387�
272 ibid para 416�
273 ibid para 367, 368� Furthermore, it referred to the El Paso case, were the tribunal concluded that “a number 
of measures, while individually not denying fair and equitable treatment, together effected a total alteration 
in the prior legal regime relied upon by the investor�” ibid para 384�
274 E.g. the Council of State drew attention to the dramatic scope of the proposed change�
275 Eiser (Award) para 407�
276 ibid para 401�
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Considering all the above mentioned, the Tribunal concluded that with the amendment 
of the legal framework, Spain deprived the investor of its investment’s value, and thus 
breached its obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment�277 The awarded reparation was 
calculated assessing the reduction of the fair market value of its investment by calculating 
the present value of cash flows said to have been lost on account of the disputed measures.278
The award was later annulled by the ICSID Annulment Committee in 2020, citing 
improper constitution of the Tribunal, and a serious departure from the fundamental rules 
of procedure�279
1.18. Novenergia II – Energy & Environment (SCA) (Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg), SICAR v The Kingdom of Spain280
This is the other renewable energy case, where the claimant was successful� The claimant, a 
company registered in Luxembourg, acquired Novenergia Spain in 2007 which held seven 
photovoltaic power plants through seven other Spanish companies�281 The claimant initiated 
arbitration with the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce in 2015� 
The issue was the same as in previous cases, the state promised incentives to invest in the 
photovoltaic power plants, but subsequently changed its policy and legislation�
The Tribunal in this case very much relied on precedents� First, it emphasized the 
importance of expectations of the investor at the time of the investment, and these 
expectations are primarily based on the host state’s laws�282 As a next step, it examined if 
the stability and transparency obligation of the host state forms part of the fair and equitable 
treatment requirement in the Energy Charter Treaty� Based on earlier case law it found that 
it is not a separate obligation, just an example of the obligation to respect the investor’s 
legitimate expectations through the fair and equitable treatment standard�283 However, the 
most important element of the fair and equitable treatment obligation is the legitimate and 
reasonable expectation of the investor�284
The Tribunal also found that the legitimate expectation of the investor of a stable 
regulatory framework can arise not only from the host state’s explicit guarantees and 
commitments but also from implicit conduct or statements of the state not specifically 
directed towards the individual investor�285 Thus, the Tribunal should examine whether 
the host state with its conduct and statements objectively provided a basis for legitimate 
expectations of the investor�286 The host state has the right to change the regulation, however, 
277 ibid para 418�
278 ibid para 441�
279 Decision on the Kingdom of Spain’s Application for Annulment in the Eiser Infrastructure Limited and 
Energia Solar Luxembourg S.À R.I. v Kingdom of Spain, ICSID case no� ARB/13/36 (Award) para 255�
280 Novenergia II – Energy & Environment (SCA) (Grand Duchy of Luxembourg), SICAR v The Kingdom of 
Spain, SCC Arbitration (2015/063) (Award)�
281 ibid para 2, 3�
282 ibid para 534�
283 ibid para 646� It also found that unreasonable and discriminatory actions of the host state which impaired the 
claimant to manage and use its investment, are good examples for the breach of fair and equitable standard� 
ibid para 714�
284 ibid para 648�
285 ibid paras 650, 651�
286 ibid para 652�
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the fair and equitable standard should protect the investors from radical or fundamental 
changes�287 The Tribunal also referred to the “acceptable range of legislative and regulatory 
behavior” expression from the AES Summit case�288
The Tribunal invoked the opinion of the Electrabel and the Saluka Tribunals, which 
stated that under the Energy Charter Treaty, the host state does not have an unconditional 
obligation to respect the investor’s interests� It is required from the state to take into 
consideration the investor’s legitimate and reasonable expectations and to balance them 
with the public (or legitimate regulatory) interest when regulating, taking into consideration 
all the circumstances. The effects of the intended measure should be proportionate with 
regards to the affected interests.289
The one who claims the breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard, also bears 
the burden of proof�290 There was no formal due diligence by the claimant, however, the 
Tribunal found that the claimant did carry out a reasonable analysis of the Spanish regulatory 
framework prior to its investment�291 Spain, with a measure introduced in 2013, retroactively 
terminated the fixed long-term feed-in tariff (originally, Spain promised incentives for the 
lifetime of the plants)� According to the Tribunal, this measure was radical and unexpected 
and entirely changed the legal environment and had damaging economic effect for the 
investor�292 The economic effect of the measures is only one factor that should be taken 
into consideration� Contrary to the Eiser Tribunal, this Tribunal did not require obliterating 
effect of such measures.293 Thus, with this radical measure the host state violated its fair 
and equitable treatment obligation towards the investor, and therefore, the Tribunal ordered 
Spain to pay compensation�294
1.19. PV Investors v Spain295
The factual background of the PV Investors v Spain is very similar to the Charanne v Spain 
case. To be specific, it was about the changes in Spain’s regulatory framework relating 
to solar energy� The claimants were numerous foreign investors of Luxembourg, Dutch 
and German origin, each of them possessing a renewable energy investment in Spain that 
originally fell under a special regime, similar to what we already discussed in Charanne� 
The foundation of this regime was a 1997 law on the energy industry and a regulation from 
2007. The 2007 regulation, in particular, provided significant advantages and incentives to 
287 ibid para 654�
288 ibid para� 655�
289 ibid paras 657, 658�
290 ibid para 660�
291 ibid para 679�
292 ibid para 695�
293 ibid para 694�
294 ibid para 697�
295 PV Investors v Spain, PCA Case No. 2012-14; See also: Anna De Luca, ‘Renewable Energy in the EU, the 
Energy Charter Treaty, and Italy’s Withdrawal Therefrom’ (2015) Bocconi Legal Studies Research Paper No� 
2657395; Rachel Nathanson, ‘The Revocation of Clean-Energy Investment Economic-Support Systems as 
Indirect Expropriation Post-Nykomb: A Spanish Case Analysis’ (2013) 98 Iowa L. Rev. 863; Ioannis Glinavos, 
‘Solar Eclipse: Investment Treaty Arbitration and Spain’s Photovoltaic Troubles’ in Constantin Gurdgiev, 
Liam Leonard, Maria Alejandra Gonzalez-Perez (eds), Lessons from the Great Recession: At the Crossroads 
of Sustainability and Recovery (Emerald 2016)�
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investors seeking to develop the renewable energy sector in Spain� However, this special 
regime gave way to a significantly less beneficial regime in 2010, as a consequence of 
the global financial crisis. This was ultimately followed by a law in 2013 that erased the 
distinction between normal and special regimes, citing the lack of purpose in separately 
regulating renewable energy� Thus, these investors initiated arbitration against Spain in 
2011 (as the 2010 regulatory changes already allegedly harmed their investments, as with 
Charanne), based on the Energy Charter Treaty� In this case, their claims focused on alleged 
breaches of Article 10(1) of the Treaty, particularly legitimate expectations� Interestingly, 
the investors also put forward an alternative claim to the arbitral Tribunal (in response to 
certain statements by Spain), which reasoned that even if the Tribunal were to find that 
the investors’ legitimate expectations were limited by Spain’s own concept of reasonable 
return, then Spain still faces liability for breaching the Energy Charter Treaty, due to 
lowering said reasonable return by its newer regulatory policies�296
PV Investors was a particularly long-running case, as it was concluded only in 2020� 
In its final award, the arbitral Tribunal devoted significant attention to the question of fair 
and equitable treatment, and especially to legitimate expectations� In its analysis, it relied 
partially on the already discussed Charanne case, which we can consider logical, given that 
nearly the same factual background was present in both cases� The Tribunal’s particular 
approach here was a common method of tribunals, it first discussed the concept of fair and 
equitable treatment (and legitimate expectations) in general terms, followed by applying 
these established principles to the particular case at hand� The Tribunal established that 
it followed the Electrabel interpretation, in that fair and equitable treatment consists of 
the protection of legitimate or reasonable expectations, the protection against arbitrary, 
unreasonable and disproportionate conduct, and the principle of transparency� However, 
it also noted that the Energy Charter Treaty, in particular, emphasizes stability as a core 
component of Article 10(1) which raised the question of whether this means that stability 
is an integral part of the content of fair and equitable treatment (as the claimants alleged)� 
The Tribunal was of the opinion (referring again to Electrabel, and also to Plama) that 
stability is not an absolute requirement in itself of fair and equitable treatment, but is 
otherwise closely linked to, and intertwined with fair and equitable treatment� It also 
iterated, that based on the intention and goal of the Energy Charter Treaty, it would be 
wrong to assume that the requirement of stability is absolute: rather, it must be balanced 
with other relevant principles, such as those that derive from the state’s right to adapt its 
regulations to changed circumstances� This is similar to the view we have seen tribunals 
take in other ECT-related investment cases, stressing the necessity of balancing between 
regulatory stability and state sovereignty�297
When it came to legitimate expectations specifically, the Arbitral Tribunal first noted 
some general principles here as well� Referring directly to Charanne (and also Perenco) 
in establishing that legitimate expectations have an objective standard of protection (as 
opposed to a subjective standard), they must be interpreted by tribunals concerning all 
relevant circumstances� It also reiterated the commonly accepted principle by investment 
tribunals, that legitimate expectations must arise in an investor at the time the investment 
is made� Similarly, it established three general criteria that must be examined: (i) there 
must be a specific commitment given to the investor by the host state, (ii) the change in 
296 PV Investors (Award) paras 181-216�
297 ibid paras 561-571�
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regulatory frameworks must be unreasonable to breach fair and equitable treatment, and 
that (iii) legitimate expectations must be balanced with the host state’s right to regulate 
(there is a margin of appreciation host states enjoy, especially with regards to economic 
regulation)� As we can see from the other cases presented in this work, this is also quite like 
the reasoning of several other tribunals (except the specific commitment requirement).298
With the contents of both fair and equitable treatment in general and legitimate 
expectations in specific established by the Arbitral Tribunal, it now turned to applying 
these principles to the specific case at hand. First, it established that outwardly, none of 
Spain’s relevant regulations constituted a specific commitment to stability with respect to 
the foreign investors� Then the Arbitral Tribunal turned to a systematic examination of the 
wider regulatory context to discern whether there was a legitimate expectation towards 
the immutability of the special regime (at least while the foreign investors’ plants were 
operational)� To do so, much like in Charenne, it relied on examining the evolution of 
the renewable energy legal framework in Spain and noted that domestic court practice 
is highly relevant� The outcomes of this being treated as facts by arbitral tribunals when 
evaluating legal frameworks� In particular, it noted that when the investments were being 
made, the Spanish Supreme Court in at least two instances rejected the view that the 
renewable energy legal framework should not be subject to changes� Alongside similar 
factors that also indicated an ongoing evolution of the regulatory landscape in Spain, it 
thus established that no reasonable investor would have a legitimate expectation towards 
the immutability of the legal framework, and the special regime in the timeframe that the 
investments were made�299
With the lack of a proper legitimate expectation in this regard thus established, the 
Arbitral Tribunal turned to examining whether any other legitimate expectations could have 
been at play in the case� It highlighted the legitimate expectation to receive a reasonable 
return on the investment, which, as the Arbitral Tribunal stated, was also enshrined in 
several relevant pieces of Spanish legislation and regulation� Thus, a principle of reasonable 
profitability was certainly present. Considering the circumstances, the Arbitral Tribunal 
dismissed the applicability of this expectation with regards to the original claim and deferred 
the subject to the already mentioned alternative claim’s examination� Interestingly, in the 
latter regard, it engaged with the assistance of the parties in a thorough quantification 
process to show the alleged difference between the reasonable return guaranteed by earlier 
legislation, and the return the investors would make under the newer regime� Based on 
this numerical analysis, it concluded that Spain did indeed reduce the reasonable return, 
and thus violated fair and equitable treatment in this regard�300
Returning to the original claim, after legitimate expectations, the Arbitral Tribunal also 
dealt with other aspects of fair and equitable treatment. To be specific, the allegations that the 
regulatory changes were unreasonable, arbitrary and disproportionate, amongst other facets� 
Thus, it followed the same line of thought as several other tribunals, treating the prohibition 
of discriminatory, unreasonable and arbitrary measures as close to and implicitly part of, 
(though the Tribunal’s language is ambiguous) the concept of fair and equal treatment� 
Based on the same line of reasoning that it used in the legitimate expectations, it established 
that regulatory changes in themselves did not satisfy the meaning of unreasonableness, 
arbitrariness and disproportionateness� The Arbitral Tribunal also noted that there was a 
298 ibid paras 572-584�
299 ibid paras 587-615�
300 ibid paras 616-620, 847�
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clear correlation between Spain’s policy and the measure� And that it sought a balanced 
and middle-of-the-road measure when it enacted the newer regime in response to the 
financial crisis. Thus, it cannot be considered disproportionate, arbitrary or unreasonable. 
The Arbitral Tribunal also dismissed here allegations relating to Spain’s alleged lack of 
transparency, noting that it had been in contact with investors and was sufficiently clear 
about its planned measures�301
Finally, based on the alternative claim, Spain was found to be in breach of the fair and 
equitable treatment standard� Awards were rendered to the foreign investors in 2020,302 
which the investors however, later renounced the right of collection�303
1.20. Isolux Infrastructure Netherlands B.V. v Spain304
As with several of our other Energy Charter Treaty cases we have discussed during the 
course of this book, Isolux v Spain is tied to the evolution and development of the Spanish 
renewable energy sector�
The claimant (Isolux Infrastructure Netherlands, B�V�) was incorporated under the laws 
of the Netherlands in 2012. This company had a number of businesses and specifically, 
investment deals involving Brazilian and Canadian corporations and other private 
organizations� It also underwent a large overhaul of its bylaws and share division a few 
months after its incorporation, and received large capital stock investments� At the time of 
the final award, it held more than 88% of the shares in a Spanish-incorporated solar energy 
company� This company was the owner and operator of 34 solar power plants in Spain, 
and thus constituted a significant player in the Spanish solar energy market.305
The source of the dispute between the parties lies in the effects of the later reforms 
affecting electric power generation, and specifically the renewable energy sector, in Spain, 
as it was the situation in some other Energy Charter Treaty cases relating to Spain� In 
order to address its tariff deficit, Spain started introducing more substantial changes to the 
established regime for the production and remuneration of electric power� This included 
introducing three new taxes at the end of 2012, such as a tax on the value of electric 
power production, with the aim of assisting in the achievement of a budgetary balance for 
Spain� This applied to all electricity generating plants, thus signalling the downwards turn 
in the special status of renewable energy, specifically solar energy in the case’s context. 
This legislative trend continued over the course of 2013, before and after the initiation of 
investment arbitration, as well as in 2014� These regulatory changes were found by the 
claimant to be damaging to its investments in the afore-mentioned Spanish solar company, 
especially the elimination of a feed in tariff, and thus led to an investment arbitration under 
the Energy Charter Treaty, curiously conducted in Spanish, despite the nominal Dutch 
nationality of the claimant�306
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303 ‘PV Investors v Spain’ (International Energy Charter) <https://www�energychartertreaty�org/details/article/
the-pv-investors-v-spain-pca-case-no-2012-14/> 3 June 2021�
304 Isolux Infrastructure Netherlands B.V. v Spain, SCC Case V (2013/153) (Award)�
305 ibid paras 140-161�
306 ibid paras 117-139�
Vig.indd   74 2021. 08. 26.   9:35:10
 75
While the claimant posited several different parts of the Energy Charter Treaty, and 
jurisdictional matters were also heavily debated, from our perspective, the question of fair 
and equitable treatment naturally takes the centre stage, being the truly relevant part of 
the case� Interestingly, as a side note, with regards to Article 10(1) of the Energy Charter 
Treaty, the claimant attempted to establish an independent obligation of the host state to 
encourage and create stable and transparent conditions for the making of investments in their 
territory� Thus, the establishment of a regulatory framework designed to attract investment, 
only to later radically abolish it, results in a violation of Energy Charter Treaty standards, 
independently and without necessarily having to also establish the breach of another concrete 
obligation contained within Article 10(1) (such as fair and equitable treatment, for instance)� 
This was refuted by the Tribunal, which established that such actions could only result in 
a violation of the Energy Charter Treaty, if they as a consequence resulted in the breach of 
another concrete obligation of the host state contained within the Energy Charter Treaty�307
Moving onto the fair and equitable treatment analysis of the case, the crux of the 
argument was that the (in part, retroactive) changes Spain made to the regulatory framework 
for solar energy in 2012-2013, constituted a violation of the legitimate expectations the 
claimant derived from the previously existing regulatory framework� Unlike some other 
cases, here, there was no significant dispute regarding whether a legitimate expectation could 
be established by the foreign investor regarding the immutability of the legal framework� 
Rather, the claimant argued that it had a legitimate expectation derived from the belief 
that Spain would respect its commitment of a fixed long-term feed in tariff in a stable and 
predictable framework. There was also no significant dispute regarding whether Spain made 
any specific commitments to the foreign investor, as the Tribunal had already established 
that no such action took place earlier�308
This was followed by the Tribunal analysing what exactly legitimate expectations meant 
in the context of the Energy Charter Treaty� It referred to the UNCTAD’s analysis on the 
matter, noting that an investor can derive legitimate expectations “either from (a) specific 
commitments addressed to it personally, for example, in the form of a stabilization clause, 
or (b) rules that are not specifically addressed to a particular investor but which are put in 
place with a specific aim to induce foreign investments and on which the foreign investor 
relied in making his investment�”�309 The Tribunal also referred to other investment cases, 
such as Total v Argentina and Perenco v Ecuador, in order to further demonstrate the 
concept of legitimate expectations� With regards to the former, the Tribunal noted that a 
legitimate expectation can be generated when the host state (through its public authorities) 
made the foreign investor believe that the host state’s obligation in this regard exists 
through its conduct or by a declaration made by it, such as officially announcing their 
intent to pursue a certain line of conduct in the future, on which the foreign investor relied 
when making the investment or otherwise incurring costs to themselves� And for the latter 
case, the Tribunal noted in particular that legitimate expectations (being a central aspect 
of analysis for an alleged breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard) require an 
objective determination of expectations, which consider all the relevant circumstances�310
307 Curiously, there was also a dispute regarding this, that is to say, whether to use the wording of Spanish or 
English version of the Energy Charter Treaty, though the Tribunal ultimately found it immaterial to the dispute 
at hand� ibid paras 761-772�
308 ibid paras 773-775�
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It also referred to Electrabel v Hungary (noting that one of the relevant circumstances 
is the amount of information that the foreign investor possessed or should have possessed 
at the time of investing), and Parkerings v Lithuania (“The investor will have a right 
of protection of its legitimate expectations provided it exercised due diligence and that 
its legitimate expectations were reasonable in light of the circumstances� Consequently, 
an investor must anticipate that the circumstances could change, and thus structure its 
investment in order to adapt it to the potential changes of legal environment�”311)� The latter 
element (due diligence) is the first aspect that the Tribunal subjected to an in-depth analysis 
with respect to the present case� It noted that Spain alleged that the claimant failed to carry 
out proper legal due diligence, and exclusively relied on technical due diligence originating 
from solar projects conducted in 2008 and 2010� This was not refuted by the claimant, 
who however argued that foreign investors could not be expected to conduct exhaustive 
legal and jurisprudential investigations before making their investments (beyond having a 
general knowledge of the regulatory environment it operates in), and that there is no such 
international requirement in that would establish such an obligation on the investors’ part� 
The Tribunal agreed with the general notion that foreign investors should not be required to 
conduct extensive legal investigations, but noted, that in order for a legitimate expectation 
to be reasonable, it is necessary for the investors to know the aspects of the regulatory 
framework that could affect their investment, before making their investment. The Tribunal 
also noted that it is the investor’s effective information that invokes specific expectations. 
This means that the foreign investor cannot have a legitimate expectation derived from 
the host state’s regulatory framework if the investor’s personal information allowed them 
to foresee and anticipate the unfavourable development of said regulatory framework, 
before the investment was made� This in turn means that new regulatory measures can be 
considered to be violating the legitimate expectations of the investor if they haven’t been 
foreseeable, whether by a prudent foreign investor, or on behalf of an investor which, 
because of its personal situation, disposed of specific elements to foresee them.312
This leads to another issue that the Tribunal had to consider� The question of foreseeability 
is tied to the question of when the investment was made� According to the claimant, the 
decision to invest was made in June 2012, which thus should count as the guiding date for 
the above consideration, while Spain alleged October 2012 (when the shares in the Spanish 
solar company were acquired by the claimant)� The Tribunal opted to side with the host 
state’s opinion on the matter: while it did not refute the claimant’s assertion that the decision 
to invest was made in June, the claimant would have been able to renounce its investment 
plans until October, when the shares were actually acquired� This is further compounded 
by, as the Tribunal noted, by how the claimant was allowed by the provisions of its relevant 
investment agreement for the purchases of these shares, to terminate without compensation 
the agreement before the October date of purchase, provided events occurred that could 
negatively affect the value of the investment. As such, the Tribunal had to determine whether 
a legitimate expectation by the claimant regarding the existing regulatory framework could 
have come into being at this later date�313
The Tribunal made several observations in this regard� First, it noted that already when 
the claimant made their decision to invest in June 2012, the original regulatory framework 
for renewable energy had already been amended, and was subjected to several studies 
311 ibid para 779; Parkerings-Compagniet AS v the Republic of Lithuania (Award) para 332�
312 Isolux (Award) paras 778-781�
313 ibid paras 782-784�
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that made its eventual revision inevitable� As such, the Tribunal noted that no reasonable 
investor could have had the expectation that this framework would not be amended in the 
future, and would thus remain unchanged� Furthermore, it found that the claimant had 
access to special knowledge, which in turn meant that it could not have had a legitimate 
expectation beyond a reasonable return on its investment, a reasonable investor would 
have foreseen that the more beneficial feed in tariff system would not have lasted for 
the entire lifetime of the affected solar plants. And not only the framework was already 
amended by 2012, but the Spanish legal system had also already affirmed the legality of 
such changes, including its supreme court, the latter of which clearly noted that the only 
limit to Spain’s power to amend existing regulatory frameworks for renewable energy is 
that it must guarantee a reasonable return on investments� Interestingly, while the Tribunal 
acknowledged that the rulings of Spanish courts have no bearing on the dispute, as it must 
decide the case based on the Energy Charter Treaty and international law only, the rulings 
were still relevant insofar as the question of legitimate expectations are concerned� The 
Tribunal also argued that not only a presumption regarding this could be established for 
reasonable foreign investors, but that in this specific case, the claimant evidently had 
knowledge of Spanish jurisprudence at the time, as the parent company of the claimant 
had previously brought related claims to the Spanish court system, the result of which it 
came to know by September 2012, and which clearly presented to the claimant the picture 
that the regulatory framework could be subject to change� Thus, it necessarily had time to 
renounce its investment before October�314
The claimant also contended that no reasonable investor could anticipate the complete 
abolition of the afore-mentioned special regime, nor foresee that a maximum limit would be 
placed upon the return on an investment, especially considering the legislation’s retroactive 
nature� The Tribunal rejected these views, stating that not only the claimant was a particularly 
well-informed investor, but its arguments were also not convincing in themselves� Namely, 
as it was already touched upon, it is not possible to consider the notion that a special regime 
would last throughout the life of the affected solar plants a legitimate expectation, given 
the circumstances of the case� By October 2012, it would have been necessarily clear to 
all investors (or should have been clear) that the system will be further amended� The 
Tribunal went further in this regard than earlier, noting that even the eventual elimination 
of the special regime would have been anticipated by any investor� Not to mention the 
special knowledge the claimant possessed in this regard, which would have made this 
eventual abolition evident. As for the maximum profit limit, the Tribunal established that 
the claimant’s attempts to argue that the related laws only talk about the guaranteeing of 
profits in the sense of baseline, but not in the context of a ceiling, thus the imposition of 
a maximum limit on investment return was unforeseeable, were incorrect� Analysing the 
text of the related law, the Tribunal found that it merely guaranteed a rate of reasonable 
profitability, meaning that a minimum profitability is guaranteed (but does not guarantee 
that a higher return will be possible than what is guaranteed as a minimum), without 
explicit reference to any concept of a base or ceiling in the profits. The Tribunal also 
referred to the system of calculations used by the claimant for the profitability of its solar 
plants to underline that no legitimate expectation could be at play here, either� Finally, it 
addressed the question of retroactivity� Most interestingly, the Tribunal made a distinction 
between retroactivity and immediate application (in line with Nations Energy v Panama): 
314 ibid paras 787-798�
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the relevant regulation did not entail the return of compensations received before it came 
into effect, or retroactively revoke rights, it merely used both existing and past parameters 
in its compensation system, which the Tribunal considered nothing unusual� As such, it 
concluded that no violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard based on the Energy 
Charter Treaty could be established�315
Curiously, there was a dissenting opinion, and part of it dealt with the fair and equitable 
treatment standard� The dissenting arbitrator was of the opinion that legitimate expectation 
could be derived from legislation specifically aimed at inducing foreign investments, and 
on which the foreign investor relied on when making the investment� The arbitrator also 
disagreed with the conclusion that the relevant date is October 2012� Instead, the arbitrator 
argued that June 2012 was the appropriate date, since that was when the decision was made 
by the foreign investor, and when they entered into the relevant investment agreement, and 
from which date it was effective. The dissenting arbitrator was of the opinion that merely 
the inclusion of suspensive conditions and provisions guaranteeing the ability to retract the 
investment decision without penalties are not sufficient enough to alter the relevant date. 
But the brunt of the dissent was aimed at the predictability of changes to the regulatory 
framework� The arbitrator argued that neither in June 2012 nor in October 2012 was there 
convincing evidence that would lead the investors reasonably concluding that the afore-
mentioned feed in tariff system would be completely eliminated. Thus, the arbitrator was 
of the opinion that if “an investor complies with the requirements established by current 
legislation to be entitled to a specific and determined benefit, the subsequent ignorance of 
the investment on the part of the host State violates a legitimate expectation”�316
Ultimately, the Tribunal rejected all claims made by the claimant. Spain bore 30% of 
the claimant’s costs, while the claimant bore 70% of Spain’s costs; whereas 70% of the 
arbitration costs was borne by the claimant�317 To our knowledge, no appeal or follow-on 
process followed the arbitration�
1.21. Voltaic Network GmbH v Czech Republic318
This is another Energy Charter Treaty case that is related to the renewable energy sector� 
As a preamble, we should note that several cases were arbitrated over by the same Tribunal 
at the same time, relying on the same facts (with the exception that the claimants differed), 
and reaching the same legal conclusions� As a consequence, we will not discuss separately 
ICW Europe v Czech Republic319, Photovoltaik v Czech Republic320, and WA Investments v 
Czech Republic321� These cases have no independent legal value to us, and thus covering 
one of them (Voltaic) will be sufficient for our purposes.
The foundation of the issue lies in the energy sector regulations that developed in the 
Czech Republic following the latter’s accession to the European Union in 2004� Over 
315 ibid paras 799-815�
316 ibid paras 3-13 and Dissenting opinion of the Arbitrator Prof� Dr Guido Santiago Tawil para 13�
317 Isolux (Award) para 868�
318 Voltaic Network GmbH v Czech Republic, PCA Case No� 2014-20�
319 ICW Europe Investments Limited v Czech Republic, PCA Case No� 2014-22�
320 Photovoltaik Knopf Betriebs GmbH v Czech Republic, PCA Case No� 2014-21�
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Vig.indd   78 2021. 08. 26.   9:35:10
 79
the course of several years, a series of legislations and other regulations have led to the 
appearance of an incentivizing regime, which greatly favored renewable energy investments 
through general preferential treatment, a combination of tariff and non-tariff mechanisms, 
such as obliging grid operators to purchase all electricity produced from renewable energy on 
a priority basis, etc� These measures were combined with a decrease in prices of photovoltaic 
components in 2008, which in turn led to solar energy becoming particularly attractive 
for foreign investors in the Czech Republic� It was among these circumstances that the 
claimant’s investment was set up in 2010, in the form of a solar plant�322
However, while the claimant’s investment was in the process of being realized, changes 
were occurring in the Czech political landscape� In early 2009, the then-incumbent prime 
minister was forced to resign, leading to an interim Government that was in power for 
more than a year, during which it decided not to interfere in any polarizing or politically 
contentious subjects� During the tenure of this Government, an impromptu solar energy boom 
developed in the Czech Republic, which was also popularized by media, with allegations 
that due to the incentivizing regime, as well as the falling prices of solar panel components, 
distributors were forced to enhance power lines, which in turn made electricity more 
expensive to consumers. However, due to the interim Government’s nature, no significant 
steps were taken to address the situation� Over the course of 2009 and early 2010, numerous 
voices in the Czech Government were highlighting that the current regulatory system in 
solar energy was unsustainable and prioritized excessive profits for investors over long-term 
societal benefits. Beyond governmental actors, these views were also echoed by Czech 
distributor companies, which faced unfavorable outcomes as the result of the solar energy 
boom� A new EU directive also set a new renewable energy percentage goal for the Czech 
Republic by 2020� As a result of the latter, an action plan was developed and released in 
2010 that seemed to suggest that a beneficial regime would be retained to some extent. 
However, by the second half of 2010, the Government was sending signs that the solar 
boom would be addressed by amending the existing incentives regime� This culminated in 
a proposal that aimed to withdraw the various beneficial subsidies from most solar plants 
(except the smallest ones)� Power plants already connected would have been exempt from 
this, however� This later changed, and over the next few years, the regulatory regime turned 
against the previously beneficial system, and included the introduction of a “solar power 
levy”, removing the income exemption, changing the shortened depreciation period� In 
2012, a requirement was also introduced by the Czech Government, that renewable energy 
producers wishing to maintain their access to certain subsidies have to enter into mandatory 
supply contracts with specific distributors chosen by the Czech Government. This course 
of events led to the filing of the arbitration claim by the claimant and nine other investors 
in 2013� Over the course of the arbitral dispute, further regulations were introduced, and 
the Czech Republic’s conduct was assessed by domestic courts (with regards to whether 
the “solar power levy” was double taxation or not, in particular) as well as the European 
Commission (with regards to whether the incentives were compatible with the internal 
market)�323
From our perspective, the most important facets are those related to fair and equitable 
treatment, the issue of which was raised by the claimant in connection with the Energy 
Charter Treaty� The claimant in particular alleged that the Czech Republic failed to provide a 
322 Voltaic (Award) paras 130-156�
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stable and predictable legal framework via its regulatory changes, and that it also frustrated 
the claimant’s legitimate expectations with its conduct� The Tribunal thus separated the 
question of fair and equitable treatment into the following categories: stable and predictable 
legal framework, legitimate expectations, and finally, the question of transparency was also 
addressed by the Tribunal� We shall follow the same structure in our analysis as well�324
Thus, we begin with the question of stable and predictable legal framework� Here, 
the Tribunal first established that based on the analyzed facts of the case, especially the 
various regulations introduced as part of the incentivizing beneficial regime, as well as other 
representations made by the Czech Government, there was no specific/express stabilization 
commitment from the Czech Republic towards the claimant or other foreign investors, 
whether legislative, contractual, individual or other� This lack of express commitment, 
according to the Tribunal, meant that it instead had to determine whether an obligation to 
provide a stable and predictable legal framework to foreign investments is a separate and 
distinguishable part of the fair and equitable treatment accorded by the Energy Charter 
Treaty� The Tribunal here took the view that the above obligation exists as a separate and 
identifiable element of fair and equitable treatment, distinct from the question of legitimate 
expectations� It noted that this obligation has to be considered objectively, and that this 
requirement of stability is not absolute, and instead, all relevant factual circumstances must 
be taken into account (similar to the other cases we discussed)� Considering the present 
case, it was of the view that the fact that the Czech legal regime was meant to attract 
foreign investment does not, in itself, also mean a commitment to stability by the Czech 
Republic. Even though some of the disputed documents (specifically, an explanatory report) 
contained phrases such as “stable” and “maintain”, the Tribunal ruled that these phrases in 
this context were not enough to establish an undertaking by the host state, partially referring 
to how such an undertaking would have been far-reaching and potentially burdensome to 
the host state, and thus it would not have committed to it through a few vague phrases� In 
the end, it concluded that the host state merely exercised its sovereign right in amending 
the existing regime, and that the claimants’ allegations were without sufficient legal basis, 
in this regard at least�325
Continuing with the second aspect of fair and equitable treatment examined by the 
Tribunal, legitimate expectations, there were a few interesting observations� First, the 
Tribunal noted that the domestic court proceedings of a host state cannot shield the host 
state from international responsibility (in present case, a domestic court judgment already 
decided that the claimants had no legitimate expectations)� Thus, it refused to engage with 
the domestic court judgment’s reasoning as part of its own reasoning, and instead referred to 
several other investment arbitration cases (such as Micula and Duke Energy)� It established 
an applicable test to be used for determining whether there had been a violation of legitimate 
expectations, divided into four parts or questions: i) whether the host state committed to 
regulatory stability or otherwise assured the investor of it; ii) whether the investor relied 
on this assurance or commitment in an effective manner; iii) whether this reliance can be 
considered reasonable, based on the given circumstances (social and economic) and finally 
iv) whether there was a violation of the investor’s legitimate expectations by the host state 
(excluding minor and insignificant violations). The Tribunal addressed each part separately. 
For the first question, it ruled that the host state in present case did not give any kind of 
324 ibid paras 371-544�
325 ibid paras 484-494�
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assurance about regulatory stability to the claimant, that all of its measures were within 
the scope of its regulatory power, and that in the absence of a stabilization provision (the 
existence of which the claimant failed to prove), the beneficial regime could be amended 
whenever the host state had sufficient economic justification to do so. Secondly, it established 
based on the available facts that the claimant investor was not relying on any such assurance� 
In fact, certain easement agreements entered into by the claimant seemed to rather show 
that the claimant was aware of the possibility of termination of its incentives� Thus, two 
elements of the applicable test failed to prove the existence of legitimate expectations� 
For the third aspect of the test, the Tribunal noted that even if the claimant was relying on 
an assurance, it would not have been reasonable in the context, due to the changes in the 
circumstances the claimant was aware of� For the fourth aspect, the Tribunal interestingly 
noted that EU law precluded any legitimate expectation that the benefits system would stay 
in place unchanged� In its reasoning, the Tribunal essentially interpreted EU law (a point 
of contention with the EU Commission and the Court of Justice of the European Union, 
as seen from cases like Achmea)� Finally, the Tribunal reached the conclusion that there 
was no legitimate expectation in play, and thus the Czech Republic could not be found to 
be violating fair and equitable treatment in this context�326
Fair and equitable treatment was also examined by the Tribunal in the context of 
transparency� The arbitrators established the fair and equitable treatment standard, as 
recorded in the Energy Charter Treaty, entailed a transparency component� This transparency 
component included an implicit requirement according to the Tribunal, that information 
about the relevant changes in the investment framework are communicated well in advance 
by the host state� The Tribunal examined the facts, and based on them, determined that the 
host state’s measures were sufficiently transparent in advance, and the notion that changes 
will occur was possible to predict� Thus, there was no fair and equitable treatment violation 
with regards to transparency by the host state�327
In the end, in 2019, the Tribunal found in its award that there were no breaches of the 
Energy Charter Treaty. It also ordered the claimant to pay 75% of the costs of arbitration. 
We have no information on any follow-up proceedings in this particular case�328
1.22. RREEF Infrastructure (G.P.) Limited and RREEF Pan-European 
Infrastructure Two Lux S.à.r.l. v Spain329
This case is closely tied to the renewable energy reforms affecting Spain’s energy sector, 
though in this case, the foreign investor also invested in wind energy, not just solar energy� 
The claimants first invested in Spain in early 2011, as part of a project, by indirectly 
purchasing an equity interest in three companies that dealt with wind power� This was 
followed by another indirect investment over the course of the summer of 2011, this time 
into three solar power plants� These solar power plants were already operational when the 
foreign investor made its investment. Interestingly, the claimants first expressed interest in 
326 ibid paras 495-537�
327 ibid paras 538-544�
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investing into Spain’s renewable energy sector in 2007, but these plans were shelved due 
to the beginning of the world financial crisis, and only resumed in 2010. During this latter 
year, the claimants made a thorough assessment of the afore-mentioned specific investment 
opportunities, including consultations with financial advisors, bankers and developers. This 
assessment period also resulted in several reports for the claimants that informed them of 
the investment situation in Spain regarding the planned investments� Notably, though both 
the wind and solar investments were assessed separately, the information was pooled by the 
claimants� Said solar power investments were sold in 2017�330 The investment arbitration 
case against Spain, as a result of its regulatory framework changes, was registered in 2013� 
The claimants sued under the Energy Charter Treaty�
One of the principal questions of the arbitral dispute, and one which is most relevant 
for the present book, is the question of fair and equitable treatment� The parties disagreed 
on the precise scope of this standard (as found within Article 10(1) of the Energy Charter 
Treaty), forcing the Tribunal to make a deliberation in this regard� The claimants’ position 
was that fair and equitable treatment should be considered an independent and autonomous 
standard that is separate from the minimum standard of protection (as found under 
customary international law), it only acts as an additional standard to it, but is not a part 
of it� In favour of this argument, it noted that a certain sentence found in an earlier draft 
of the Energy Charter Treaty (“[fair and equitable treatment shall be] in accordance 
with the principles of international law and the relevant national obligations”331) was 
later removed� The claimants further alleged that the fair and equitable standard is 
absolute in nature, meaning it is not necessary to consider the treatment others receive 
compared to the injured party when determining whether it has been violated (referring 
to Tecmed v Mexico, Azurix v Argentina and other cases)� However, the claimants alleged 
that even if this was not the case, and the fair and equitable treatment standard can be 
equated to the minimum standard of protection, Spain still violated the standard, as 
the minimum standard requires a reasonably well-organised modern state dedicated to 
good governance, but by contrast, Spain’s measures were “(a) unannounced, abrupt, 
retroactive, unprecedented in nature; (b) contrary to EU and international regulatory 
practice and good governance principles; and (c) were not the least harmful measures 
available to Spain”332 and thus did not satisfy the level of good governance required by 
the minimum standard of protection�333
However, Spain had its own views on the scope of fair and equitable treatment� First, 
it rejected the argument that the fair and equitable treatment standard somehow goes 
beyond the minimum standard protection, arguing that since the primary goal of the Energy 
Charter Treaty is to ensure the non-discrimination of covered foreign investors, then if 
the national treatment provided by the given host state does not adhere to the minimum 
standard of protection, it is at that point that the Energy Charter Treaty’s protections kick-in� 
Furthermore, Spain also categorically rejected the notion that the Energy Charter Treaty 
provides a higher level of protection than the minimum standard of protection, or that it 
contains a fair and equitable standard that can be autonomously interpreted�334
330 Decision on Responsibility and the on the Principles of Quantum in the RREEF Infrastructure (G.P.) Limited 
and RREEF Pan-European Infrastructure Two Lux S.à.r.l. v Spain paras 43-177�
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Interestingly, the arbitral Tribunal used a relatively simple method to address these 
contentions, dismissing the arguments posed by both parties as mostly academic in nature� 
Instead, it relied on sticking close to interpreting Article 10(1) of the Energy Charter Treaty� 
It noted that based on the Tribunal’s reading of the article, fair and equitable treatment 
includes in itself the minimum standard of protection as applied traditionally in international 
law� As such, the removal of the afore-mentioned sentence from the draft of the Treaty has 
no real significance when it comes to interpreting fair and equitable treatment. In general, 
it noted that the specific wording of the Energy Charter Treaty trumps general principles, 
but the Treaty is still anchored in international law and thus must be interpreted according 
to said law� In a similarly short fashion, the Tribunal determined (with a great degree 
of assertiveness) that the fair and equitable treatment standard contains the following 
elements: transparency, constant protection and security, non-impairment including non-
discrimination and proportionality and reasonableness� Interestingly, it noted that this is 
explicitly the case based on the Energy Charter Treaty, suggesting the Tribunal interpreted 
Article 10(1) in such a fashion as to include a major part of the article into the fair and 
equitable treatment standard� It noted that even if this was not the case, they would still 
be express treaty obligations Spain had to comply with� However, beyond the literalist 
reading of the article, it also noted that legitimate expectations are implied by the article 
and are thus part of the fair and equitable treatment standard�335
While discussing the scope of the standard, the Tribunal also saw it fit to briefly elucidate 
on the differences between legitimate and non-legitimate expectations, as not all of the 
foreign investors’ expectations necessarily imply an immutability of the conditions relating 
to the investment� And in line with most other tribunals, it noted that while expectations by 
nature are subjective, the legitimacy of an expectation must be objectively assessed, thus 
establishing a two-step process for identifying a legitimate expectation: determine what 
were the investor’s expectations, and whether these expectations were legitimate� If so, then 
their frustration means that the host state made a wrongful act� Interestingly, the Tribunal 
took time here to explicitly spell out that several factors must be kept in mind for assessing 
legitimacy of expectations: that the host states enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in the 
field of economic regulations, and as such, the threshold of legitimate expectations will 
necessarily be high and only measures that are in clear violation of the fair and equitable 
treatment standard can be declared unlawful and in breach of the Energy Charter Treaty�336
The disputes concerning the full extent of the fair and equitable treatment standard 
continued further in the case� First of all, with regards to the requirement of stability 
and predictability (as envisioned by Article 10(1) of the Energy Charter Treaty), the 
claimants attempted to establish that the first sentence of Article 10(1)337 consists of an 
autonomous free-standing obligation to provide investors and their investments stable 
conditions, especially with regards to maintaining a stable legal framework� Thus, it is 
independent of the fair and equitable treatment standard�338 Meanwhile, the respondent 
argued that this is incorrect, and that this first sentence does not contain a free-standing 
standard, but rather, it has to be assessed (as in cases such as Plama v Bulgaria) as part 
335 ibid paras 258-260�
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of the fair and equitable treatment standard�339 Moving onto the concrete claims of the 
claimants in the present subject, the claimants alleged that the refurbished renewable 
energy regime represented a complete overhaul of the original regulatory regime that was 
in place when the claimants made the investments� They also noted that Spain’s statement 
that the new regulatory system was compatible with the principle of reasonable return 
in itself confirms that Spain did not adhere to the stability and predictability of the legal 
framework requirement, as the claimants did not consider the notion of reasonable return 
when making their investments� Furthermore, they also found issue with how abruptly, 
opaquely, and retroactively the new legal regime was introduced� They noted that: “[e]ven 
if the regime did not affect the results or activities resulting from the pre-existing situation, 
which it does (i.e. the electricity already produced and sold on the market), the regulation 
would still be considered “retroactive” in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the 
word, and as provided under Spanish law”�340 In conclusion, the claimants’ position was 
that Spain wrongfully subjected them to a roller-coaster of radical changes in the relevant 
legal regime, that left the investors and their investments in uncertainty, resulting from the 
change of a stable regime to an ambiguous one�341
By contrast, Spain took the position that its measures were adopted for legitimate 
reasons, and in compliance with its international commitments� It also contended that its 
measures were not retroactive, as they did not affect already acquired rights by the investors. 
Interestingly, Spain referred to international arbitral case law, the practice of the European 
Commission, Spanish case law, scientific doctrine, and the criteria of various investor 
associations in its argument� Spain also noted that: “the only certainty a diligent investor 
could have is that the Respondent would take necessary measures to ensure the sustainability 
of the [Spanish Electricity Sector] and avoid over-remuneration situations, while respecting 
the principle of a reasonable rate of return”�342 It also referred to the reasonable rate of 
return principle in other ways, noting that the renumeration towards the investor must be 
reasonable, but also the cost allocation that return represents for the consumer should be 
reasonable. It noted that this principle cannot be infinite, but rather its aim is to guarantee 
a level playing field for renewable energy producers, while also ensuring that it does not 
place them in a more competitive position than non-subsidised producers� Thus, for Spain, 
the sensible option to adjust to new circumstances was to amend the hierarchically inferior 
measures (compared to the 1997 Electricity Law), which were the disputed regulations� 
Hence, the essential nature of the regulatory framework (respecting the principles of the 
afore-mentioned 1997 Electricity Law) was not changed, thus Spain had not breached the 
obligation to provide stable conditions to foreign investments�343
In a similar fashion to the earlier dispute regarding the scope of the fair and equitable 
treatment standard, the Tribunal was of the opinion that whether this was an autonomous 
standard or part of the fair and equitable treatment standard was an artificial issue. Instead, 
it merely referred to the Eiser case and ascertained that the fair and equitable treatment 
standard necessarily includes an obligation to provide fundamental stability in the 
essential characteristics of the legal regime� It noted that the obligation to create a stable 
environment excludes with complete certainty any unpredictable, drastic transformation in 
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the conditions of foreign investments� In this regard, it further referred to Eiser again (where 
the subject came up with regards to legitimate expectations, though the Tribunal used it to 
draw conclusions regarding stability here), and Blusun as well, noting that while foreign 
investors must accept the real possibility of reasonable changes and amendments in the legal 
framework, radical alterations that are applied to existing investments in such a way as to 
deprive investors of their investments’ value, provided the investors were relying on the 
original regime when investing� Afterwards, as we have seen elsewhere when dealing with 
stabilization, the Tribunal sought to determine whether there was any firm pledge towards 
stability on the part of Spain� In present case, it found that there were none� Interestingly, 
however, it declined to answer the question of whether the requirement of stability and 
predictability was violated, noting that it can only be answered by first examining legitimate 
expectations and the reasonability and proportionality of the changes. Thus, it effectively 
tied this element of the fair and equitable treatment standard to two other elements� Still, 
it made a brief detour in its reasoning to examine whether the changes were retroactive (as 
this was a point of contention with regards to stability by the parties), and found that the 
changes can be considered retroactive, accepting the claimants’ reasoning that while the 
new legal regime only applies for future remuneration, it still subtracts past remuneration 
from future renumeration, thus effectively clawing-back past remuneration that was the 
investors’ acquired rights when the remuneration was realised�344
The Tribunal then moved on to legitimate expectations� Here, the arguments of the 
claimants were fairly straightforward, arguing that legitimate expectations were fact specific 
enquiry, independent of the host state’s intentions or good faith, and instead required 
determining four questions: “first, whether the State’s conduct and representation gave rise 
to expectations; second, whether the expectations are legitimate and reasonable; third, the 
investor must show that it relied on the State’s conduct and representations; and, fourth, its 
expectations were frustrated by the measures in dispute”�345 The claimants presented the 
view that Spain’s conduct gave rise to their expectations (especially express promises and 
presentations made by Spain’s public officials) that the regime would retain stability in its 
essential characteristics at least for the entirety of the production and lifetime of their solar 
plants and wind parks, and that even then, any changes in the regime would only apply 
prospectively to new renewable energy installations, as otherwise, they would not have 
made their investments� Interestingly, the principle of reasonable rate of return which was 
frequently raised by Spain in its arguments were dismissed here by the claimants, who 
argued that this principle was not directed at investors, but rather towards the regulator 
when setting specific tariffs, and as such played no role in their legitimate expectations and 
could not have led them to expecting potential changes to relevant regulation� Finally, the 
claimants were also of the position that it was not necessary to have exhaustive due diligence 
for claiming legitimate expectations (though, they noted that the claimants had satisfied a 
higher standard of due diligence regardless, as they also held face-to-face meetings with 
high level Spanish officials on the issue of investments and the regulatory environment).346
Spain’s position on legitimate expectations was rather straightforward as well, stressing 
that in the absence of specific commitment to stability, the foreign investor cannot have a 
legitimate expectation that the regulatory framework would not change� The main thrust 
of its argument was that the Tribunal must analyse how much knowledge the investor 
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possessed of the regulatory framework at the time of its investment, due to the objective 
standard of legitimate expectations� It noted that claimants only made a cursory analysis of 
Spain’s regulatory framework, and failed to make the necessary due diligence� Spain also 
argued that even if due diligence can be established, the investors’ expectations were still 
not in line with the objective standard, since without a specific commitment to investors 
guaranteeing immutable regulation, there can be no valid legitimate expectation in that 
regard� It ended its argument with a lengthy factual and (domestic) legal analysis intending 
to prove that the claimants did not possess legitimate expectations towards immutability 
of the regulatory framework, especially with regards to the remuneration regime�347
In its conclusions on legitimate expectations, the Tribunal first noted that it is for the 
investors to prove that their expectations were legitimate, by demonstrating that they 
were reasonable and objective considering the circumstances of the investments� The 
Tribunal mainly focused on the question of whether the amendments to the regime that 
were introduced after 2012 constituted a drastic, radical alteration, which unexpectedly 
affected the investments’ conditions. Here, the Tribunal referred to the Charanne case, 
noting that the examination of legitimate expectations must be based on objective standards 
and analysis, that subjective belief on the part of the investor is in itself insufficient to 
establish a legitimate expectation, and that the expectation must have been reasonable (for 
which the various representations made by the host state could be relevant)� As already 
mentioned earlier in the case’s summary, the question of reasonable return cropped up 
here, as it was relevant for the exact content of the claimants’ hypothetical legitimate 
expectations� The Tribunal was of the opinion that this principle was evidently part of the 
guarantees provided by Spain to foreign investors� In fact, it concluded that this principle 
was the main specific commitment on part of Spain towards investors benefiting from the 
special renewable energy legal regime� Though, it also noted that this commitment must 
be interpreted alongside other considerations, with which it was systemically intertwined, 
such as Spain’s concerns about electricity costs and energy production competitiveness� 
As such, the Tribunal concluded that the only legitimate expectation on the part of the 
claimants was a reasonable return for their investments, though it also highlighted that this 
aim (reasonable return) was accomplished through specific means that were designed to 
attract investment into the renewable energy sector, which was otherwise unattractive if 
considered purely on a market basis� The Tribunal also noted, however, that this legitimate 
expectation necessarily included an expectation that implied a reasonable rate of return 
which is significantly above a mere absence of financial loss for the investors. The Tribunal 
also dealt with the methods that should be used to establish the potential violation of the 
legitimate expectation, mostly acquiescing to the claimants’ statements that were presented 
above on the issue� The Tribunal also concurred with Spain’s remark on the necessary 
objectivity and reasonability of assessing these investor expectations�348
With the fundamentals of legitimate expectation thus established, the Tribunal turned to 
answering the questions posed by it in this specific case. First, it noted that it was without 
doubt that Spain’s conduct and representation gave rise to legitimate expectations “insofar as 
the [c]laimants were entitled to expect that the Respondent would not significantly modify 
the legal framework applicable to the investors as provided for in its domestic law at the 
time when the investments were made”�349 The Tribunal concurred with the Novenergia 
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case’s tribunal, highlighting that the legal framework of Spain as it existed at the time of 
making the investment will be decisive when considering legitimate expectations� It further 
referred to Eiser, Charanne and Isolux in stressing that the time of the investment served 
as a crucial factor� After noting the time of investment (between February and August 
2011) and that the Isolux case concerned similar circumstances (which the claimant tried 
to argue away with the notion that changing legislation since then changed legitimate 
expectations on the part of the investors), the Tribunal engaged in a detailed overview 
of Spain’s regulatory actions at the time, in order to determine whether there could have 
been any new stronger or different expectations on the part of the investors. The Tribunal 
found this to be not the case. It also examined the question of due diligence briefly, also 
referring to Electrabel v Hungary on the matter� Ultimately, it noted that due diligence of 
the investors is not a relevant question when characterized as diligence� Rather, it simply 
concluded, based on the facts of the case, that the investors were made aware that Spain’s 
legal framework might change in the future, thus any expectation towards ruling out any 
change with regards to the legal framework could not have been legitimate� In the end, it 
was the Tribunal’s opinion that there was a legitimate expectation to get a reasonable return 
on the investments, but this didn’t include a guarantee of immutability with regards to the 
legal framework, though it did mean that amendments to the system should be reasonable 
and equitable� Interestingly, the Tribunal deferred the question of answering whether 
this was the case, noting that this can only be answered with a global view towards the 
case, and with taking into account economic calculations�350 The latter ultimately resulted 
in the Tribunal finding that with regards to the solar power plants, Spain breached its 
commitment towards insuring a reasonable rate of return for the investors�351 Since the 
Tribunal considered reasonable return a legitimate expectation, this would logically lead 
to the Tribunal concluding (in a roundabout fashion) that a legitimate expectation was 
violated, and thus by extension (taking into consideration the categorisation of standards 
relied on by the Tribunal) the fair and equitable treatment as well�
But as already noted earlier in the case, the Tribunal considered other standards it held to 
be components of fair and equitable treatment as well, such as transparency. In this specific 
case, the claimants presented an argument based on Tecmed v Mexico, Electrabel v Hungary 
and Plama v Bulgaria, to contend that “the State’s conduct toward investors and the legal 
environment must be free from ambiguity and uncertainty, for it not to be in breach of the 
FET standard”�352 They also noted that host states must be forthcoming with information on 
any planned regulatory changes that could affect foreign investors. Spain, by their account, 
failed in this regard� It was of the claimants’ view that Spain dismantled the original regime 
in a non-transparent manner, lacking both visibility and predictability� They also noted that 
Spain failed to establish a clear methodology regarding some changed subsidies, and that 
the timeframe in some regards was unclear�353 Spain rejected these allegations, arguing 
that the Energy Charter Treaty does not guarantee the complete predictability of the legal 
framework to foreign investors� Spain also argued that it followed all lawfully established 
procedures without undue delays, and involved stakeholders in the process of the regulatory 
change, and that the necessity of changes was communicated (or at least alluded to) by 
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Spain as early as 2009� It raised numerous other factual elements that suggested Spain 
gave ample transparency to the process of regulatory changes�354
The Tribunal’s analysis of the transparency sub-standard started with the statement that 
while a violation of it cannot be considered an autonomous breach of fair and equitable 
treatment in itself, on the one hand, the practical consequences would be the same legally 
speaking, and on the other hand, as shown by the Novenergia case, transparency still is a 
critical element of both stability and legitimate expectations (which the Tribunal folded 
under fair and equitable treatment)� The Tribunal made a very succinct decision here, noting 
that the claimants’ allegations were unpersuasive, as the possibility of adjusting applicable 
conditions was evidently present in the relevant instruments, while Spain publicized and 
explained the changes with sufficient care.355
Another standard the Tribunal folded under the fair and equitable treatment standard was 
the prohibition of measures that would be discriminatory or unreasonable� With regards to 
the first, the claimants relied on a parallel argument, noting that if Spain violated the non-
impairment clause of Article 10(1), then that would simultaneously result in breach of fair 
and equitable treatment. They argued that it did so, by setting up a 7% levy on renewable 
energy generators, but not on ordinary plants, and thus applied discriminatory measures� 
356 Spain rejected these arguments, referring to the notion that the Energy Charter Treaty 
is aimed to protect against discrimination between foreign and domestic investors, and it 
thus has nothing to do with the discrimination between renewable and conventional energy 
producers� It also rejected any claim that its measures were unreasonable or irrational in 
character, noting that it had clear policy goals it sought to pursue�357 Interestingly, both 
parties blurred non-discrimination and reasonableness in their arguments to some extent, 
something which the Tribunal also took note of�358
The Tribunal’s position, as mentioned earlier in the case’s summary, was that fair and 
equitable treatment necessarily encompasses the principle of non-discrimination� Interestingly, 
it stated that even if the Energy Charter Treaty did not have an express provision on fair and 
equitable treatment or non-discrimination, then the non-discrimination principle would still 
be applicable based on customary international law. The Tribunal thus first established what 
non-discrimination means as a principle: it requires host states to treat equally what is equal, 
but by the reverse, also does not require them to treat different subjects equally (which is why 
reverse/positive discrimination can be acceptable)� Then it turned to applying this principle 
to the present case, noting that while prima facie the 7% levy was unfavourable to renewable 
energy plants, Spain had included a number of compensatory measures in its revisions, 
which meant in the Tribunal’s reading that it had engaged in reverse discrimination to assure 
reasonable profitability to the renewable energy investors, to counter the negative outcomes 
of the levy, and thus no claim of discrimination could be sustained by the claimants�359
The final sub-question was the proportionality and reasonableness of Spain’s measures. 
The claimants contended that Spain did not satisfy the proportionality test360 and offered 
354 ibid para 407-414�
355 ibid para 415-416�
356 ibid para 417-421�
357 ibid paras 422-427�
358 ibid para 436�
359 ibid paras 428-436�
360 „…assessing whether a State measure is proportionate by comparing the relationship between the burden 
imposed on the foreign investor and the aim sought by the State measure, with due consideration of the other 
alternatives available�” ibid para 437�
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various alternative measures Spain could have taken to achieve its policy goals while 
reducing the impact on foreign investors�361 By contrast, Spain took the position that burden 
of proving disproportionality falls on the claimants, and rejected allegations that it acted 
in a disproportionate or unreasonable manner, referring to international law and existing 
arbitral decisions as support that its measures were proportionate and reasonable in light 
of the alternatives�362
The Tribunal’s position was that the parties’ discussion of the burden of proof in this 
context is mostly immaterial, as it considered that whoever brings the claim should have 
the responsibility of proving its case� It also noted that the proportionality requirement 
is “fulfilled inasmuch as the modifications are not random, unnecessary or arbitrary, that 
is, provided that they do not significantly modify the legal framework applicable to the 
investors”�363 It noted that proportionality is a weighing mechanism that is seeking a balance 
between differing interests and principles, taking all relevant facts and circumstances into 
account. For reasonableness, it identified three necessary elements that are required (within 
the context of exercising regulatory power): legitimacy of purpose (ergo, it represents the 
interests of society as a while, and it does not change the substance of relevant rights), 
necessity (there is a pressing social need that needs to be met, this is a higher standard 
than usefulness or desirability), suitability (the regulatory exercise must be suitable to 
achieve the legitimate purpose)� It also noted that Spain enjoys a margin of appreciation 
here, though this appreciation cannot be unlimited with the fair and equitable treatment 
standard constituting the clearest limits of this appreciation, and that it cannot be demanded 
of Spain to take only measures that could only result in the investors’ initial situation being 
maintained, as this would be equal to immutability of conditions�364
Interestingly, the Tribunal was of the opinion, that while it separated the various sub-
questions of fair and equitable treatment, the parties treated them in a mixed-together fashion, 
and thus it considered proportionality and reasonableness the ideal place to assemble them 
together� In particular, it tied legitimate expectations with reasonableness, and as mentioned 
earlier in the summary, decided that an empirical assessment was necessary to establish 
a violation of fair and equitable treatment, especially in connection with reasonableness 
and legitimate expectations�365
Hence, the Tribunal then proceeded to engage in a grand examination of both the 
legal principles underlying the calculation of damages, and the facts of the case, in order 
to make an empirical assessment of damages� For the purposes of this book, a detailed 
account of it is not necessary� In the end, the Tribunal concluded that it lacked the necessary 
technical expertise to correctly interpret the factual results within the scope of the Decision 
on responsibility and on the Principles of quantum, thus deferring the question to the 
Final award. However, as already noted, the Tribunal still managed to find, based on its 
examinations, that reasonable return was violated by Spain (furthermore, as also already 
mentioned earlier in the summery it also found that Spain breached the Energy Charter 
Treaty via its retroactive application of the new energy regime)�366
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There was a partially dissenting opinion to this decision by one of the arbitrators� 
The arbitrator contended the scope of legitimate expectation, arguing in favour of a more 
claimant-friendly approach� The main crux of its argument was that while it agreed on 
principles of law with his fellow arbitrators, he disagreed with them on the facts of the 
case, or rather, what conclusions can be drawn from the facts regarding the calculation of 
reasonable return�367
Ultimately, the case received its final award in 2019, which concerned itself solely with 
the further calculation of damages, as well as costs, ultimately rendering a monetary award 
in favour of the claimants�368 However, the claimants renounced their right to collect these 
damages, and the case is currently undergoing ICSID annulment proceedings�369
1.23. Antin and Antin v Spain370
This case was also related to the Spanish reforms affecting the renewable energy sector. 
As such, we will again focus only on the claimants’ specific situation when it comes to the 
facts of the case. The case is specifically closely tied to the RREEF v Spain case, as the 
claimants in present case were business and investment partners of RREEF� To get into the 
details, the claimants first became aware of a potential investment in Spain’s renewable 
energy sector in the autumn of 2010, as a Spanish conglomerate was intending to sell part 
of its renewable energy generation assets� This was followed by the claimants getting into 
contact with the afore-mentioned RREEF in February 2011, who intended to convince 
the claimants to partake in an investment in two solar power plants (these power plants 
were also involved in the factual background of the REEF v Spain case)� The power plants 
benefited from Spain’s special regime for renewable energy generators due to the dates of 
their construction and registration� The claimants (and RREEF) carried out a due diligence 
process between March and June 2011, concerning a potential investment in said plants� 
During this period, they received both technical knowledge on solar power production, and 
legal information concerning Spanish regulations� It also included a professional report 
which noted a certain degree of regulatory uncertainty for (concentrated) solar power plants 
beyond 2014, but also highlighted that they are in a better position than photovoltaics� After 
several more reports, as well as numerous meetings, some involving the Spanish National 
Energy Commission, the claimants concluded in June 2011 at an investor meeting, that based 
on the available presentations, there was a strong governmental support for concentrated 
solar power, and thus the sector is likely shielded from regulatory changes (in contrast 
to the afore-mentioned photovoltaics)� Thus, later in June 2011, the claimants made their 
investment in the afore-mentioned solar power plants� As already known from other cases 
367 Partially Dissenting Opinion of Professor Robert Volterra to the Decision on Responsibility and the Principles 
of Quantum in the RREEF Infrastructure (G.P.) Limited and RREEF Pan-European Infrastructure Two Lux 
S.à.r.l. v Spain paras 40-47�
368 RREEF Infrastructure (G.P.) Limited and RREEF Pan-European Infrastructure Two Lux S.à.r.l. v Spain (Final 
Award) para 81�
369 ‘RREEF Infrastructure v Spain’ (International Energy Charter) <https://www�energychartertreaty�org/details/
article/rreef-infrastructure-gp-limited-and-rreef-pan-european-infrastructure-two-lux-sarl-v-spain/> accessed 
2 June 2021�
370 Antin Infrastructure Services Luxembourg S.à.r.l. and Antin Energia Termosolar B.V. v Spain, ICSID Case 
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concerning Spain, 2012 was the year that Spain enacted a number of new legislations that 
drastically altered the regulatory framework for renewable energy, including concentrated 
solar power producers�371 As a consequence, an arbitration case was initiated in 2013, based 
on the Energy Charter Treaty�
The question of fair and equitable treatment also arose among the merits of the case� 
The claimants in particular contended that the fair and equitable treatment standard, as 
found within the Energy Charter Treaty, is an independent and autonomous standard� The 
claimants emphasized the relevance of Spain’s conduct towards provisioning a stable, 
transparent legal framework for foreign investors, as a central element of the fair and 
equitable treatment standard in their view� They also alleged that they had legitimate 
expectations concerning the stability of the legal regime, based on regulatory presentations 
made by Spain, as well as assurances given by Spain’s public officials. These expectations 
were allegedly frustrated, and the fair and equitable treatment standard was violated by 
Spain’s conduct, in radically transforming the regulation of the renewable energy sector, 
specifically with regards to concentrated solar power generators. Spain rejected these 
arguments, postulating that the Energy Charter Treaty only mandates a minimum standard 
when it comes to restricting the host state’s regulatory power, and thus it had not committed 
a breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard� Spain also denied the legitimacy 
of the claimants’ expectations, noting that they could not have reasonably expected that 
the beneficial regulatory framework would remain frozen, as there was no stabilization 
clause and Spain did not make any promises to the claimants about the immutability of 
the special legal regime� Similarly to other cases involving Spain, the country also relied 
on the concept of reasonable return as the full extent of fair and equitable treatment in the 
current context�372
The Tribunal thus set out to determine the meaning of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard within the context of the Energy Charter Treaty� In doing so, it relied partially on 
customary international law, and also examined the ordinary meaning of the words “fair” 
and “equitable”� With regards to the latter, it examined the meanings both in English and 
Spanish� It noted, that the terms must be interpreted together with the Energy Charter 
Treaty’s context, object, and purpose� As such, it turned to examining the Treaty’s purpose 
and object� Based on these, the Tribunal reasoned that interpreting the fair and equitable 
treatment standard under the Energy Charter Treaty thus necessarily involves the Energy 
Charter Treaty’s objectives of legal stability and transparency� This was tied by the Tribunal 
to the first sentence of Article 10(1). The Tribunal was of the opinion, that Article 10(1)’s 
language, as well as reinforcing context from the rest of the Energy Charter Treaty, implies 
a strong obligation for host states to establish stable, equitable, favourable and transparent 
conditions for investors that goes beyond just encouragement�373
The Tribunal also had to determine the scope and extent of this stability obligation, as 
the parties disagreed on the issue� The claimants were of the opinion, that stability in this 
context means that the original regime should have stayed in place for the entire life of 
operation of the affected plants, while Spain was of the belief that no such “freezing” is 
mandated by the stability requirement and that the Energy Charter Treaty does not limit 
the regulatory powers of host states to such an extent� Thus, Spain was of the opinion 
that a reasonable rate of return was sufficient to comply with the stability obligation. The 
371 ibid paras 109-139�
372 ibid paras 508-515�
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Tribunal found that stability does not lead to immutability, referring both to dictionary 
definitions and other cases such as Plama v Bulgaria and Electrabel v Hungary� While 
it mostly thus accepted Spain’s position, it disagreed with it on the matter of whether the 
fair and equitable treatment can be equated to minimum standard found in international 
law� Referring to Charanne v Spain and Eiser v Spain, the Tribunal found that the crucial 
element in the stability obligation includes the notion that the essential features of the 
existing regulatory framework are not eliminated in a sudden and unexpected manner�374 
Meaning that “a regulatory regime specifically created to induce investments in the energy 
sector cannot be radically altered – i.e., stripped of its key features – as applied to existing 
investments in ways that affect investors who invested in reliance on those regimes”.375
The Tribunal next determined that the legitimate expectations claimed by the claimants 
closely tie into the stability of the legal framework obligation� As we have seen in several 
other cases, the parties here disagreed about the content of these expectations and whether 
they were breached. As usual, the Tribunal first established the universal maxim that 
legitimate expectations cannot be based on the investor’s subjective beliefs or analysed in 
abstract� Rather, the legitimate expectations must be founded upon an objective standard, and 
this standard has to be assessed on a case-by-case basis� Next, it decided that the investor’s 
expectations have to be examined based on the time the investor made the investment� 
Thus, the Tribunal had to consider the timing of the investment, its circumstances, and what 
information the investor had or reasonably could have possessed, whether it acted with the 
requisite degree of diligence (this is in contrast to the related RREEF v Spain case, where 
the tribunal found due diligence of lesser practical importance)� Furthermore, the Tribunal 
also established that the legitimate expectations must arise from some action on part of the 
host state, either in the form of specific commitments, or in the form of representations, 
the latter of which could be general, such as devising regulations aimed at encouraging 
investment into specific sectors. These commitments or representations must be as such 
that they could objectively give rise to a reliance on part of the investor�376
Thus, the Tribunal engaged in a detailed analysis of the facts of the case� The Tribunal 
was of the view that Spain’s actions, when examined in their context, clearly show a 
pattern towards making stability representations through regulatory actions and other 
statements� It found that at the time the claimants made their investment, Spain was making 
an indirect representation (through its acts and regulations) that the regime applying to 
renewable energy projects would remain stable and predictable� Thus, this could give rise 
to a legitimate expectation� According to the Tribunal’s view, this was not an expectation 
towards immutability, but nevertheless, changes must be consistent with the assurances 
of stability, the essential features of the regulatory framework relied upon by the investors 
cannot be eliminated� Interestingly, the Charanne v Spain was referenced heavily here, 
though the Tribunal noted that while the tribunal in that case could not find evidence of 
Spain violating its obligation to provide regulatory stability, said case also did not involve 
the newer regulations Spain had passed afterwards� Thus, the question became whether 
these newer regulations eliminated essential features or not�377
To identify the essential features, the Tribunal first referred to the Charanne v Spain 
tribunal’s opinion on the matter, noting that it considered the offering of a guaranteed tariff 
374 ibid paras 527-532�
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377 ibid paras 540-558�
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and the granting of privileged access to the electricity transmission and distribution grid as 
the essential features of the regime. The feed-in-tariff system could also be considered as part 
of this essential feature set� Thus, the Tribunal mused that if it were to adopt the Charanne 
tribunal’s view, then these specific features were definitely eliminated by the later regulation. 
The Tribunal, however, sidestepped answering the issue from this perspective, and instead 
turned to Spain’s position that the only applicable content of legitimate expectations could 
have been the reasonable rate of return principle� With regard to this, the Tribunal took 
the interesting position that it is not truly relevant whether the altered regime complies 
with reasonable return, but rather how reasonable return is determined� In essence, it 
reasoned that in order to satisfy the stability and predictability obligations under the Energy 
Charter Treaty, the methodology for calculating reasonable return on concentrated solar 
power plants must be based on identifiable criteria. Based on the technical analysis of the 
facts, the Tribunal took the view that this methodology was lacking, and was indeed not 
based on identifiable criteria, and instead, it was seemingly dependent on governmental 
discretion, in sharp contrast to the relative precision of the original legal regime on which 
the investors relied when making their investment� The Tribunal took this to mean that 
the stability requirement was thus breached, and thus the legitimate expectations of the 
claimants towards stability were also frustrated. It also rejected Spain’s tariff deficit as a 
justification for the elimination of these key features of the original regime. Hence, the 
Tribunal found Spain to be in violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard�378 
The fair and equitable standard was also later referenced several times in the Tribunal’s 
reasoning when it came to calculating reparations� The award was rendered in 2018, and 
was followed by enforcement proceedings in 2019 in Australia� It is currently undergoing 
ICSID rectification proceedings, the outcome of which is still spending.379
1.24. Masdar v Spain380
Masdar v Spain concerned Spain’s renewable energy sector like many other Energy 
Charter Treaty cases involving Spain� Interestingly, the claimant was a company owned 
and controlled by a United Arab Emirates company, which in turn was owned by a company 
owned by the Government of Abu Dhabi� The claimant’s owner company engaged in a 
fact-finding survey of the Spanish solar energy market very early on, especially with regards 
to concentrated solar power� In fact, this survey occurred even before the adoption of the 
feed-in-tariff mechanism in 2007, which Spain used as a crucial lynchpin for attracting 
foreign investment into the renewable energy sector� Over the course of 2007, the claimant’s 
owner company identified a potential joint venture partner for investments in concentrated 
solar power� This was followed by the company commissioning a due diligence review 
as well� This resulted in a report that informed the claimant’s owner company on the 
special regime established in Spain, its conditions and scope� This was followed by a joint 
venture agreement in 2008, during which a new company was created to purchase three 
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concentrated solar power installations (these would serve as the objects of the dispute later)� 
This company’s shares were later acquired by the claimant� But as it was with other cases, 
the changes to Spanish regulations later on, especially in 2012, led to disputes between the 
parties�381 As a result, and following failed negotiations, the claimant initiated arbitration 
in 2014, based on the Energy Charter Treaty�
The issue of fair and equitable treatment played a central role in the dispute� The main 
thrust of the claimant’s argument in this regard was that Spain frustrated its legitimate 
expectations upon which the claimant relied� It was this notion of legitimate expectations 
that served as the chief perspective for the claimant on the fair and equitable standard� In 
particular, the claimant’s position was that through the enactment of Spain’s regulatory 
reforms, the original legal regime was completely dismantled, and replaced with a new 
legal regime that was significantly less profitable for investors like the claimant, yielding 
significantly lower returns and also in the process, the new regulatory measures destroyed 
the stability originally promised by Spain and on which the claimants relied� To be even 
more specific, the claimant was of the opinion, that it did its outmost to continue benefiting 
from the special legal regime at place during the original investment, while Spain suddenly 
and unexpectedly destroyed these expectations via its 2012-2013 measures concerning the 
renewable energy sector in Spain�382
Spain’s counterargument emphasised that it maintained the principle of the reasonable 
rate of return, as we have seen with several other cases involving Spain� Furthermore, the 
host state claimed that the claimant failed to conduct proper regulatory due diligence, and 
noted that the report, resulting from whatever legal due diligence the claimant undertook, 
failed to establish a commitment on the part of Spain towards the immutability of the special 
legal regime, and thus, the claimant could not have had such beliefs on a solid foundation� 
Spain especially highlighted that the claimant received a letter from the Spanish Secretary 
of State for Energy in early 2010, which referenced the future adoption of a new regulatory 
scheme, and invited investors to ask for clarification (which Spain alleges the claimant 
failed to follow through)� Spain, in general, rejected the notion that it was in breach of the 
fair and equitable treatment standard found in Article 10(1) of the Energy Charter Treaty, 
that it failed to provide stable conditions for investment, and that the measures it undertook 
offended international principles in respect of retroactivity, as Spain claimed that the latter 
did not purport to revoke already acquired rights and only had an ex nunc application� With 
regards to this, it referred to the Charanne v Spain case’s argumentation, where the arbitral 
tribunal noted that Spain’s measures were not retroactive, as it applied for the future, and 
respected already acquired rights, the latter of which consisted of the remuneration investors 
already received� Spain also alleged that its measures were transparent and underwent 
proper consultation, and lacked an arbitrary or discriminatory character, and satisfied the 
requirements of reasonability and proportionality� Furthermore, it attempted to justify its 
measures as necessary to ensure the stability of the Spanish renewable energy market going 
forward� Interestingly, the host state also made a point about its information exchanges in 
late 2010 with the claimant, during which Spain communicated the remunerations enjoyed 
by the claimant at that point, were not guarantees for the future of the special regime or 
the amount of future remuneration in specific.383
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This Tribunal did not waste too much time with establishing what it believed to be the 
constituting parts of the fair and equitable treatment standard, even though it acknowledged 
the relatively large amount of variance that is found in arbitral interpretations concerning 
the standard� It established that the fair and equitable treatment standard “constitutes a 
standard the purpose of which is to ensure that an investor may be confident that (i) the legal 
framework in which the investment has been made will not be subject to unreasonable or 
unjustified modification; and (ii) the legal framework will not be subject to modification 
in a manner contrary to specific commitments made to the investor.”384 In essence, the 
Tribunal indirectly focused on the question of legitimate expectation (which will also be 
evidenced once the Tribunal started dissecting these two specific constituting elements), 
though in a structure that can be considered somewhat different from what we have seen 
in the other cases involving Spain�
With the constituting parts thus established, the Tribunal turned to examine each in turn� 
Starting with the requirement of there being no unreasonable or unjustified modification, 
the Tribunal was quick to establish that, although host states enjoy liberty to regulate the 
energy sector under the Energy Charter Treaty, this right is not unfettered� It referred to 
several cases, including Parkerings, Continental Casualty, Plama, EDF, AES Summit, El 
Paso to reinforce this view� It particularly referred to CMS and Eiser to establish that explicit 
undertakings/specific commitments to the investors restrict the host state’s liberty to regulate, 
especially when it comes to dispensing with existing regulatory framework altogether, 
that would also negatively impact the foreign investors�385 Thus, this first constituting part 
directly led to the second constituting element, as the Tribunal outlined the limits of the 
host state’s regulatory freedom, and its answer to this question was in essence the content 
of the second constituting element of the fair and equitable treatment standard�
The Tribunal’s examination of the second constituting element was necessarily far 
more detailed. It noted that the principal question is determining which kind of specific 
commitments can give rise to protected legitimate expectations (thus confirming that it 
considered legitimate expectations to be the essence of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard)� Interestingly, as we have seen with other cases, the arbitral tribunals were divided 
between the belief that general statements (in general laws or regulations) can give rise to 
commitments on the part of the host state, and the belief that only specific commitments 
matter in this context. The Tribunal in the present case explicitly identified these two beliefs/
views as opposing schools of thought� It then proceeded to examine the merits of each� 
With regards to the position that general statements in general regulations can constitute 
commitments, it noted that the most respected commentators on investment law support 
the view that the foundation for determining an investor’s legitimate expectations is the 
legal framework or order of the host state when the investment was made� Thus, this could 
logically lead to the assumption that this foundation can necessarily generate commitments 
and thus legitimate expectations� In this regard, the Tribunal referred to the Suez case, 
where it was established by the tribunal of that case that the host Government’s laws, 
regulations, policies and statements can result in reasonable and legitimate expectations, 
and furthermore, frustration of these expectations can directly lead to the host state failing 
the fair and equitable treatment standard� In support of this view, the Tribunal also raised 
the conclusions of the UNCTAD, and the dissenting opinion of an arbitrator in Charanne 
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and Isolux� The Tribunal then proceeded to state that if general regulations can be regarded 
as a source of legitimate expectations, then that necessarily means that the investor must 
prove that it has exercised appropriate legal due diligence in that it familiarized itself with 
the existing laws and regulatory environment of the host state� The Tribunal also noted that 
this knowledge possessed by the investor at the time of the investment was established as 
a crucial factor by Electrabel�386
Thus, the Tribunal proceeded to undertake an examination of whether this requisite legal 
due diligence was undertaken by the claimant or not� It found based on available evidence, 
that the claimant possessed accurate knowledge of the legal status of the Spanish renewable 
energy sector at the time of the investment� This knowledge included the knowledge that 
Spain was actively encouraging investments in the sector, further evidenced by Spain’s own 
press releases and presentations, and the lack of judicial dissent towards the legal regime� 
Furthermore, the Tribunal also found that the claimant’s proactive actions in achieving legal 
due diligence were satisfactory, as it commissioned external reports, engaged in discussions 
with a co-investor which had detailed knowledge of the regulatory framework, discussed 
the subject with Spanish banks, and also consulted law firms. Thus, contrary to Spain’s 
allegations, the Tribunal was of the belief that the claimant achieved legal due diligence� 
And during this diligence, the Tribunal noted that no suspicion or concern appeared to 
suggest the possibility that the existing special regime would be swept away with regards 
to the claimant’s investments� Hence, the Tribunal found that based on its due diligence, 
the claimant established a legitimate expectation� A legitimate expectation that the laws 
would not be modified, as interestingly, the Tribunal was of the belief that the applicable 
Spanish regulations contained stabilisation clauses� In particular, the Tribunal found that 
the language employed by certain Spanish regulations, particularly the clauses promising 
conditional exemptions to existing facilities from revisions of the tariff system, was sufficient 
to establish the existence of stabilisation clauses, thus leading to Spain indirectly committing 
itself to stabilisation through these regulations� Hence, the Tribunal found that if it were to 
accept this first approach to the origin of legitimate expectations, it would find that there 
was a frustration of legitimate expectations�387
Before committing itself, the Tribunal then proceeded to cover the second school of 
thought: that general statements in general regulations cannot give rise to commitments and 
something more specific was necessary. According to the Tribunal, this approach would 
mean that the previously established stabilisation clauses would be insufficient to establish 
a legitimate expectation� To explore this viewpoint, the Tribunal referred to cases like El 
Paso, noting the tribunal there found these specific commitments to be two of a kind: 
either they are specific as to their addressee (ergo the foreign investor), or they are specific 
regarding their object and purpose� The Tribunal also referred to Continental Casualty 
and Charanne, to further reinforce that according to this school of thought, stabilisation 
provisions in general regulations/legislation, or political announcements cannot create 
legitimate expectations�388
Instead of unambiguously declaring support for either position, the Tribunal decided to 
first examine the facts of the case in more detail, in order to determine whether there had 
been specific commitments beyond general legislation. In particular, it concentrated to a 
specific element of the regulatory scheme, which was dismissed by the tribunal in Charanne 
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as an unimportant administrative step: the claimant’s registration with two special lists that 
covered renewable energy installations benefiting from the special legal regime. The Tribunal 
noted that during the course of this process, each of the solar power plants received a specific 
resolution (in the form of letters) from the Spanish State, each of which contained explicit 
statements that the plants were to benefit from the aforementioned guarantees (which the 
Tribunal interpreted as stabilization clauses)� This was followed by a further exchange of 
letters between the claimant’s company and the Spanish Ministry of Industry, Tourism and 
Business, in which the ministry seemingly confirmed these guarantees for the entire operating 
life of the plants. The Tribunal found that the firstly mentioned resolutions in themselves 
were sufficient to establish a specific commitment, and the later letters only reinforce this 
notion. Thus, the Tribunal ultimately decided that regardless whether the first or second 
school of thought is correct, the claimant evidently possessed legitimate expectations that 
the beneficial regime it enjoyed originally at the time of making the investment would 
remain unaltered� Therefore, the frustration of these legitimate expectations directly led to 
the Tribunal finding Spain to be in breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard as 
found in Article 10(1)�389 Thus, the dispute was decided in favour of the investor in 2018� 
The case was later subjected to proceedings towards the staying of the award’s enforcement, 
as well as discontinued ICSID annulment proceedings�390
1.25. NextEra v Spain391
It was another case that concerned Spain’s revision of its renewable energy sector regime� The 
background of the dispute on the claimants’ side lies in a project concerning the construction 
of two concentrated solar power plants in Spain� The claimants were both incorporated in 
the Netherlands in 2008, with a US parent company� However, the involvement of parent 
company-related companies with solar energy in Spain began earlier, in 2007, and related to 
land easements, water rights purchases, and the planned development of four concentrated 
solar power plants� After their own incorporation, the claimants focused on developing 
in this sector as well� In 2009, the two afore-mentioned concentrated solar power plants 
owned by the claimants were registered� Their construction proceeded from that point on, 
up until 2012� In 2013, they were registered in Spain’s RAIPRE system for plants qualifying 
for the original special regime�392 However, as a result of Spain’s regulatory changes, the 
claimants sought arbitral relief and initiated proceedings against the host state in 2014, 
relying on the Energy Charter Treaty�
The question of fair and equitable treatment played a pivotal role in the dispute� In 
particular, the claimants and Spain disagreed over the contents of the fair and equitable 
treatment standard� The claimants took the view that the fair and equitable treatment 
standard is an autonomous treaty standard that is independent of the minimum standard 
of treatment principle found in customary international law� They believed that it is a 
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complex set of distinct (if related) obligations� In particular, the claimants alleged that the 
standard obligates the host state to protect legitimate and reasonable expectations of the 
investors, maintain reasonable stability in its regulatory framework, act in good faith and 
proportionately, and respect due process, and not commit denial of justice� The claimants 
interestingly also mentioned other facets of Article 10(1) of the Energy Charter Treaty (such 
as the requirement of transparency, avoidance of arbitrary and discriminatory conduct), 
which they also folded into the contents of the fair and equitable treatment standard� The 
claimants particularly emphasized the investors’ legitimate expectations towards the stability 
and transparency of the regulatory framework, and the host state’s responsibility for its 
actions as a crucial element of the fair and equitable treatment standard�393
By contrast, Spain’s position was that the extent of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard ends at the minimum standard of protection, specifically national treatment in 
this context (as it achieves the goal of the Energy Charter Treaty to prevent discrimination 
against foreign energy investors in this manner)� And with regards to the stability issue, 
Spain took the view that there is a difference between stable conditions and stable regulatory 
framework, as the Energy Charter Treaty only mandates the former, but not the latter� 
Meaning, according to Spain, host states have no Energy Charter Treaty-derived obligation 
to maintain the stability and predictability of the relevant regulatory framework throughout 
the entire lifetime of the investment� In fact, Spain argued, there is no extreme limit on 
the host state’s regulatory power, nor was it the intention of the Energy Charter Treaty to 
provide a sort of insurance policy for foreign investors against regulatory changes� Thus, 
Spain alleged, the only real limit to the host state’s regulatory power, within the context of 
the Energy Charter Treaty, is the minimum standard of treatment principle, and the Treaty’s 
chief objective of non-discrimination. Spain also relied on the more specific interpretation 
of investors’ legitimate expectations: that they can only be based on a specific commitment 
to stability by the host state�394
With regards to the latter, the parties further elaborated on what constituted legitimate 
and reasonable expectations in their view� The claimants were of the opinion, that they 
were entitled to legitimate expectations towards Spain maintaining the original favourable 
regulatory framework for both solar power plants for their entire useful life� The origin of 
these expectations, according to the claimants, laid in part with the very terms of the original 
regulatory framework, in part with ministerial resolutions allegedly assuring both solar 
power plants uniquely and explicitly of stability, and also with the registration of the plants 
in appropriate registries� Interestingly, the claimants also contended that concentrated solar 
power investments are capital-intensive, and their success or failure is entirely determined 
by the actions of the host state, thus the claimants could derive an expectation of stability 
from the Spanish Government this way as well� It is also interesting that the claimants 
argued that the principle of reasonable return (a favourite defensive argument of Spain 
in the sister disputes of this case) was not in itself enough to attract their investment to 
Spain, thus it could not be the entire content of their legitimate expectations. Specifically, 
claimants viewed the principle as amorphous, and as a general directive to the regulator, 
which was superseded by more specific regulations concerning tariffs and premiums. They 
also noted that they temporarily put their investments on hold in 2010, amidst concerns of 
potential regulatory changes, but resumed construction after Spain provided assurances of 
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regulatory stability to solar energy actors� The claimants also went to great lengths to prove 
their due diligence in front of the Tribunal. And finally, and most interestingly, the question 
of EU law intruded into the discussion of legitimate expectations, as the claimants believed 
that the notion that the original regulatory framework might have been incompatible with 
EU state aid rules is not relevant to the present discussion of expectations, as even if that 
was the case, and the original regulatory framework was contrary to EU state aid rules, 
Spain was still obligated by the Energy Charter Treaty to respect the investors’ legitimate 
expectations through alternative measures (which the claimants contended that Spain did 
not do)�395
Spain’s more specific position on legitimate expectations was, that in order to establish 
a breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard, there must be a determination of the 
expectations that the investors had, or should have had at the time of the investment, and 
whether these expectations were reasonable or legitimate with respect to the regulatory 
framework of the time when these expectations formed� However, Spain argued, the investor 
must fulfil a number of requirements regarding this: it must be aware of the host state’s 
legal framework (both the laws and regulations, as well as applicable case law, how this 
framework is applied, and what effects it has on the investment). But beyond that, the investor 
should also know the risks making an investment and even assume these risks� Spain also 
positioned the almost universally acknowledged notion that legitimate expectations must 
be objective in character and derived from the specific circumstances at the time when the 
investment was made� As expected, Spain once again emphasized the reasonable rate of 
return principle as the fundamental basis of any real legitimate expectation on the part of 
the investors. It also pointed to the lack of any specific commitments in the rules that would 
suggest immutability or that investors would necessarily continue enjoying the original 
beneficial regime (according to Spain, at least). In Spain’s view, it had no commitment 
towards stability� Unlike the claimants, who viewed reasonable rate of return as a directive 
aimed at the regulator, and one superseded by more specific rules, Spain maintained that the 
reasonable return principle continued to be at the heart of Spanish regulation of renewable 
energy, and thus continued to play a crucial role in policymaking� It also noted that the 
central role of this principle was consistently established by domestic case law as well� 
Spain also attempted to use the Charanne case to argue that a specific regulation at the 
centre of the dispute (RD 661/2007, the chief instrument for the original beneficial system) 
was found by the tribunal not containing any specific commitment towards the investors’ 
investments, and thus in lieu of a specific commitment, no investor could have had a 
legitimate expectation that said regulation would remain unchanged throughout the entire 
operating life of the plant� It also referred to the AES case in general, as proof that it is not 
possible to deduce a stability clause from a general regulatory framework� Interestingly, 
with regards to the question of European Union law, Spain took the view that any decision 
reached by the Tribunal must be compatible with the European Commission’s relevant 
decision on the subject matter�396
The obligation to encourage and create stable, equitable, favourable, and transparent 
conditions was understood by the claimants to be both an autonomous standard in itself, 
and a matter that influences the interpretation of the fair and equitable treatment standard 
as well� With regards to this subject, claimants mostly alleged that Spain failed to provide 
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stability, due to the sudden and drastic changes experienced by the regulatory framework, 
while also emphasizing the retroactive nature of the new regulation, which it viewed as 
further proof of the lack of stability�397 As for transparency, the claimants took the view that 
Spain’s conduct in general did not satisfy the requirements of Article 10(1), referring to 
Tecmed, Electrabel and Plama to support their views� It noted that several crucial technical 
details of the newer regime were determined in secret, Spain inadequately explained the 
new systems of categorisation introduced for concentrated solar power plants, and there is 
a lack of clarity regarding several matters in the new framework� Spain also failed to give 
prior notice of the changes, according to the claimants, and even if warnings were given, 
they were well past the period during which the investment was made�398
Spain’s position was predictably denying the notion that it breached its obligation 
to provide a stable legal framework, noting that the disputed regulatory actions have 
maintained all essential characteristics of the original regulatory framework, and that stability 
in general was maintained with regards to renewable energy regulation� Using the Plama 
case, Spain posited that the regulatory framework in itself does not constitute a specific 
commitment, and that (referring to AES) the Energy Charter Treaty provisions regarding 
stable conditions do not constitute a stability clause� Spain maintained that its alterations 
to the legal system continued to uphold the principle of reasonable return (which Spain 
characterized as the essential feature of the regulatory framework), and were otherwise 
reasonable and justified. Spain also denied the alleged retroactivity of the disputed measures, 
noting that these measures only affect the future, and have no ability to affect payments 
made prior to their entry into force. According to the host state, only measures affecting 
acquired rights are retroactive� Spain was of the opinion, that the claimants did not possess 
an acquired right to a fixed remuneration feed-in-tariff-system. It also referred to the award 
of the tribunal in the Charanne case, noting that it already decided in favour of Spain’s 
measures not being retroactive in nature. And finally, with regards to the transparency of 
the framework, Spain took the position that it had acted transparently, and did not breach 
Article 10(1) in the process� It noted that the need for reforms was announced years before 
the alterations, all the legal developments were transparent, and all stakeholders had timely 
access to information on the topic, and Spain in general acted with absolute transparency 
with regards to all relevant information, among other arguments�399
The claimants also advanced claims based on the standards of proportionality and non-
discrimination, but they viewed them as independent standards, not elements of the fair 
and equitable standard�400 Regardless, they ended up tying the proportionality standard to 
the fair and equitable treatment standard over the course of their argumentation, noting 
that the latter necessarily requires host states to act proportionately with regards to foreign 
investors�401
The Tribunal’s analysis of the case, in sharp contrast to the detailedness of the claimants, 
can be considered relatively succinct� First of all, unlike some other arbitral tribunals, the 
Tribunal in present case took the view that establishing an overall view of the Energy 
Charter Treaty’s objectives is unnecessary� Instead, it simply noted that while the objectives 
of the Treaty may be used during the interpretative process of Article 10, an autonomous 
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analysis of them is not needed� In a similarly to-the-point fashion, the Tribunal wasted 
little time with establishing the contents of Article 10(1), merely quoting the individual 
elements of the paragraph, and referring to them as obligations affecting the host state.402
One of these quoted obligations was the fair and equitable treatment standard� The 
Tribunal did not engage in particular with the determination of the meaning and potential 
constituting elements of the standard� Instead, it merely stated its agreement with the 
notion that the protection of legitimate expectations is an essential element of the fair 
and equitable treatment standard, and that this is also the case within the Article 10 of the 
Energy Charter Treaty� The wording thus suggests that the Tribunal also recognized other 
elements of the fair and equitable treatment standard, but did not identify them within the 
context of its decision�403
With regards to legitimate expectations, the Tribunal first established that there were 
several foundations of the alleged legitimate expectations, and examined each of them 
briefly. The first potential foundation were the terms of the original regulatory framework. 
The Tribunal’s logic here was as to-the-point, as elsewhere in its analysis� The Tribunal 
noted its belief that the original regulatory framework could not have served as a foundation 
for legitimate expectations, specifically that the claimants would be guaranteed the terms 
of the regulatory framework� The Tribunal was of the opinion, that as the framework was 
based on legislation, it could be changed� It agreed with Spain that the claimants should 
have been aware that alterations to the legal regime were possible� Thus, the Tribunal 
reasoned, this regulatory framework in itself could not reasonably have been the basis 
for a legitimate expectation on the part of the claimants, because then that would entitle 
them to receive precisely the same benefits the original framework prescribed. The second 
potential foundation for legitimate expectations were the two registrations of the claimants’ 
plants in the Pre-Assignment Registry and the so-called RAIPRE registry� The Tribunal 
acknowledged that, while these were necessary parts of the process of acquiring the benefits 
of the regulatory framework, they did not in themselves grant any right to the special 
regime� To reinforce this position, the Tribunal also referred to the Charanne case, where 
the tribunal conclusively dismissed RAIPRE as an administrative step that did not result 
in the acquisition of any rights by investors�404
Beyond these general regulatory and administrative steps, there were also two ministerial 
resolutions in 2010 that claimants used as part of their argument that they had legitimate 
expectations� These resolutions reiterated the terms of the original regulatory framework� The 
Tribunal’s logic was simple: if the regulatory framework did not include a guarantee of its 
terms, then its reiteration could not confer such a right either� Thus, the ministerial resolutions 
could not have been considered as sources of legitimate expectations, according to the 
Tribunal� Even though all these more general sources of potential legitimate expectations 
were dismissed by the Tribunal, it did note that they provide some context for legitimate 
expectations and the claim itself. Specifically, these general facts and circumstances form 
the context in which a potential specific commitment could be found in the representation 
and assurance of the Spanish authorities�405
Thus, with the more general commitments dismissed, the Tribunal turned to specific 
commitments. It first established that the potential sources for specific commitments to 
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the claimants on part of Spain fall into five categories. These included written statements 
between the investors and Spanish officials, internal memoranda of the claimants on meetings 
with Spanish officials, witness statements that indicated the claimants’ understanding of 
the Spanish position, and statements made to industry and public trading enterprises� The 
Tribunal reasoned that out of these, the ones with the best potential evidence of Spanish 
assurances that could serve as a basis for legitimate expectations would be the written 
statements made by Spanish officials. However, the Tribunal did note, that despite Spain 
denying that the other mentioned sources could have weight as evidence, the host state did 
not deny their factuality� The Tribunal thus reasoned that it could rely on the truthfulness 
of these other sources as well�406
The Tribunal’s next step was to establish the scope and extent of the legitimate 
expectations that the claimants could have reasonably believed in� The Tribunal noted 
that a belief in a frozen legal regime was certainly unfounded� However, the Tribunal 
noted that the expectation that the “regime would not be changed in a way that would 
undermine the security that Claimants had in respect of the economic regime set out in 
RD 661/2007”407 is an entirely different matter, given the assurances given by Spain to the 
claimants� The Tribunal in particular focused on two letters sent by the Spanish Secretary 
of State for Energy� The Tribunal did not believe the assurances given by the secretary of 
state in these letters constituted a commitment, but interestingly, it took the position that 
legitimate expectations can exist in the absence of actual formal commitments by the host 
state� The Tribunal reasoned that the principal question is whether the content of these letters 
could reasonably lead to the claimants developing expectations about the future conduct 
of the Government� It ruled that this was so, especially in light of the context and the other 
assurances and statements given by Spanish officials. The Tribunal also noted that Spain’s 
regulatory conduct in 2010 suggested to the claimants that there would be no radical changes 
made to the economic regime (as said regulatory conduct involved extensive consultation 
with the solar energy sector, during which Spain received and accepted amendments proposed 
by the solar energy actors)� The Tribunal also rejected the argument that the claimants did 
not perform proper due diligence (as according to Spain, that would serve as an obstacle 
to establish legitimate expectations)� Thus, the Tribunal reached the conclusion that the 
claimants had a legitimate expectation that the original regulatory framework would not be 
changed in such a fashion that it would risk the security and viability of their investments�408
Therefore, the Tribunal next had to determine whether these expectations were frustrated 
by the regulatory changes introduced by Spain� The Tribunal was of the opinion that this 
was the case. It listed several ways the new regime is less beneficial to the claimants, and 
concluded that the original legal regime was changed at a fundamental and radical level� 
As a result, the Tribunal noted that:
[C]laimants were deprived of the security and certainty that, in light of the assurances 
they had received from Spanish authorities about guaranteeing the legal security of 
investments underway as well as the forecasts under which the investments were made 
and affirming legal and regulatory stability, they could have expected. The changes 
went beyond anything that might have been reasonably expected by Claimants when 
they undertook their investment�409
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Therefore, the legitimate expectations of the claimants were indeed frustrated� The 
Tribunal also refused to consider the reasonable return principle Spain attempted to use as 
a defending argument� The Tribunal found that the content of the legitimate expectations 
(based on the very assurances given by Spanish officials) was not reasonable return, but 
stability and regulatory certainty� Thus, by failing to provide that certainty and security by 
radically changing the legal regime, Spain also failed to protect the claimants’ legitimate 
expectations� As a consequence, the fair and equitable treatment standard was violated 
by Spain according to the Tribunal�410 Interestingly, the Tribunal refused to consider the 
additional arguments relating to the fair and equitable treatment standard or other elements 
of Article 10(1), noting that this failure to follow the fair and equitable treatment standard 
is sufficient to decide in favour of the claimants.411 Thus, in 2019, the Tribunal found 
Spain liable for breaching the Energy Charter Treaty, followed by an award shortly after, 
in which the Tribunal determined the damages� The case is currently undergoing pending 
ICSID annulment proceedings�412
1.26. Infrared v Spain413
The claimants, all of United Kingdom nationality, made their investments (two concentrated 
solar power plants) in 2011� The decision to invest was approved by their investment 
committees at the end of June, and the subsequent investment took place at the end of July 
2011� This occurred 19 months after said concentrated solar power plants were registered 
with the registry that was in place in Spain at the time, and 16 months before the plants 
were registered on the RAIPRE registry system (which was already mentioned regarding 
some other Spanish cases)� When this investment was made, constructions were already 
undergoing on both plants, and there was an evident pressure on the project to finish the 
constructions by the time the RAIPRE registry system was to be introduced in Spain� 
While the decision to invest was being considered, the claimants allegedly undertook an 
extensive (legal, technical and otherwise) due diligence process from multiple different 
approaches�414 The legal dispute between the claimants and the Spanish state emerged 
due to regulatory changes that took place in Spain’s renewable energy-related legal 
framework starting from 2012 (already described supra)� It was uncontested by both 
parties that the result of these changes was a decrease in the remuneration received by 
the claimants, compared to the regulatory framework as it was before the changes took 
place�415 Over the course of the arbitral dispute, several breaches of the Energy Charter 
Treaty were alleged by the claimants, all related to Article 10(1) of the Treaty, and also 
including the fair and equitable treatment standard� An expropriation claim was also 
advanced�
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However, it is the fair and equitable treatment-related aspect of the dispute what interests 
us. The claimants advanced three specific claims under the umbrella of the fair and equitable 
treatment standard: (i) that Spain violated an expectation of stability (the claimants alleged 
that they had a legitimate expectation that the original regulatory framework would remain 
stable during the relevant plants’ operating life, or at least the plants would not be affected 
by any regulatory changes), (ii) that Spain behaved with arbitrariness (and thus violated an 
expectation of consistency) by commencing a complete paradigm shift of the regulatory 
framework, resulting in the essential characteristics of the original framework becoming 
defunct, and finally, (iii) that Spain acted in a manner that was not transparent (no due 
process, no forewarning in a timely fashion of affected investors, etc.). The Tribunal 
seemingly implicitly followed the claimants’ categorization of fair and equitable treatment-
related issues when it comes to the structuring of the award’s analysis�416
In order to properly examine these claims, the Tribunal divided up its analysis of the fair 
and equitable treatment standard into the following four complex questions: (i) what is the 
legal standard applicable in assessing a host state’s fair and equitable treatment obligation 
(with particular regards to whether it is strictly limited in scope to non-discrimination and/
or minimum standard of treatment under international law, and whether due diligence on 
the part of the investors or the foreseeability of measures affect the analysis); (ii) whether 
there was a legitimate expectation on the part of the claimants that the original regulatory 
framework would remain unaltered, at least with regards to the relevant power plants, 
and whether this legitimate expectation (if real) was frustrated by Spain’s measures; (iii) 
whether there was a legitimate expectation on the part of the claimants that there would 
be no radical or fundamental changes to the original regulatory framework, and whether 
this legitimate expectation (if real) was frustrated by Spain’s measures; and finally, (iv) 
whether Spain acted without due process or the requisite transparency in its disputed 
conduct�417 The Tribunal answered each question in turn (with the exception of the third 
question for reasons that will become real), analysing the parties’ position before making 
their own conclusions� This is a logical structure from an analytical standpoint, and so we 
also strive to follow it in the parts below�
And so, we turn our attention to the first question posited by the Tribunal: the scope 
and legal assessment of the fair and equitable treatment standard within the context of the 
Energy Charter Treaty� The claimants’ position was that the fair and equitable treatment 
standard provides more protection than a mere guarantee of non-discrimination or the 
minimum standard of treatment as found in customary international law� Rather, in their 
opinion, it includes the protection of legitimate expectations, the obligation to act in good 
faith, and the requirement of proportionality in the conduct of the host state� The claimants 
did not deny that host states had the freedom to regulate, but argued that they could be held 
responsible if their measures frustrated the legitimate expectations of the investors� The 
claimants took to support the more generalist position regarding the origin of legitimate 
expectations, noting that they can arise from the regulatory framework itself or implicit 
state undertakings� However, the claimants argued that even if the Tribunal could not 
identify such a legitimate expectation, there would still be a fair and equitable treatment-
derived expectation of proportionality and consistency on the side of the investors, ergo 
the claimants� The claimants also posited that no comprehensive legal due diligence on 
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the part of investors was necessitated by the fair and equitable treatment standard, merely 
a requirement that the investors familiarize themselves with the relevant legal framework, 
and ensure that their investment is made in accordance with local laws�418 Unsurprisingly, 
Spain’s own interpretation of the scope of the fair and equitable treatment obligation 
exhausted itself at the prohibition of discrimination and equivalency with the minimum 
standard of treatment under customary international law� Interestingly, Spain also tried 
to argue that benefits provided to covered investors by the first and second sentences of 
Article 10(1) of the Energy Charter Treaty only apply during the actual investment-making 
process� In Spain’s reading, once the investment is made, fair and equitable treatment stops 
at the afore-mentioned non-discrimination and minimum standard of treatment� Otherwise, 
Spain argued that legitimate expectations towards stability are only possible if a specific 
stabilization commitment was entered into by the host state (which Spain alleges is not 
the case here), and that a thorough legal analysis of the framework and potential expected 
changes is an essential part of the investor’s due diligence�419
And now we turn to the Tribunal’s own analysis of the scope and the standard’s 
assessment, which occurred after it briefly reviewed existing arbitral practice. First, it 
immediately rejected Spain’s argument that fair and equitable treatment is limited to 
non-discrimination, citing that arbitral tribunals had a shared understanding that fair and 
equitable treatment is a distinct standard closely linked to legitimate expectations (this 
was based on the Tribunal’s interpretation of Charanne v Spain, Isolux v Spain, Eiser v 
Spain and Novenergia v Spain). However, it took the position that a specific commitment 
by the host state was necessary to establish a legitimate expectation of stability, referring 
to a number of cases such as Charanne v Spain, Eiser v Spain, Parkerings and others� The 
oft-mentioned balancing exercise also appeared in the Tribunal’s reading here� By contrast, 
it accepted the concept of legitimate expectation of consistency, in that an expectation that 
the regulatory framework would not change radically or fundamentally can arise even in 
the absence of a specific commitment, provided the surrounding facts justify it. As for due 
diligence, the Tribunal referred to Charanne v Spain, and noted that since the majority of 
the plants’ revenue (from the investors’ perspective) came from state subsidies, it stands 
to reason that a stricter interpretation of due diligence is necessary�420
With these basic questions answered, the Tribunal moved on to the alleged legitimate 
expectation of stability� Here, the claimants’ argument was essentially that a number 
of different representations and regulatory actions have essentially created a specific 
commitment on the part of Spain to maintain the regulatory stability of the original 
framework� Spain naturally rejected this argument, and claimed that in none of the actions 
and representations cited by the claimants could a stabilization clause, or any other specific 
commitment to regulatory stability be found�421 The Tribunal’s own analysis here relied 
chiefly on four cases: Charanne, Isolux, Novenergia and Esier� It noted that although no 
explicit stabilization clause can be found, certain representations and regulatory actions 
made by Spain clearly implicated that the power plants included in the afore-mentioned first 
registry would be shielded from further regulatory changes, and would continue benefiting 
from the advantages provided by the original regulatory framework for the duration of the 
plants’ operating life. Thus, the Tribunal could find an identifiable and adequate origin for 
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a legitimate expectation of stability to arise� Regarding due diligence, the Tribunal was of 
the view that even if it accepted Spain’s argument that the investors should have carried 
out a more thorough legal analysis, it would not influence the legitimacy of expectations 
towards stability due to the afore-mentioned implicit commitment to stability by Spain� The 
Tribunal also noted that the arbitral tribunals in the four mentioned cases did not examine 
the same representations, hence creating distinguishing factors that led to a different legal 
interpretation of similar facts in the present case� Afterwards, it analysed the scope of this 
specific commitment, and found that Spain did indeed frustrate a legitimate expectation 
of stability in the context of the Energy Charter Treaty� Because of this conclusion, it also 
found it unnecessary to analyse the third question (expectation of consistency) out of 
practical reasons, as it would not lead to a difference in the quantum of damages.422
Thus, we can move on to the final question: whether Spain violated its duty of 
transparency and due process� The claimants’ position was that the disputed measures were 
adopted alongside a number of irregularities that led to a period of harmful uncertainty� 
Spain’s conduct in the claimants’ view was not sufficiently forthcoming towards investors, 
and also failed to disseminate to the public two (in the claimants’ view, critically important) 
reports by consulting firms, among others purported issues of transparency and due process. 
Spain’s own position was that it announced the disputed measures in a timely fashion, 
and that the adoption of the measures complied with all public consultation procedures 
mandated by Spanish administrative law� Spain also brought counter-arguments to the smaller 
issues posited by the claimants (such as the voluminous nature of some ministerial orders, 
which Spain justified with the comprehensive nature of the reforms and the complexity of 
the subject matter)�423 The Tribunal’s own findings were that Spain did not breach these 
particular obligations� Analysing the facts of the case, it found that Spain announced the 
regulatory reforms sufficiently in advance, and the consultation process followed Spanish 
administrative law� Though it acknowledged that these transparency-related proceedings 
might have been imperfect, concentrated solar power producers and investors were given 
more than sufficient opportunities to engage with Spain’s authorities regarding the subject. 
Thus, there was no violation of this particular aspect of fair and equitable treatment by 
Spain in the Tribunal’s opinion. The Tribunal also noted that even if it did find a breach, 
it would not be materially relevant to the case�424
All in all, an award was rendered in favour of the claimants in 2019, owing to the 
frustration of their legitimate expectations towards stability, and thus violating the fair and 
equitable treatment obligation found in Article 10(1) of the Energy Charter Treaty� The 
case is currently undergoing pending ICSID annulment proceedings�425
422 ibid paras 390-456�
423 ibid paras 457-467�
424 ibid paras 470-475�
425 ‘Infrared v Spain’ (International Energy Charter) <https://www�energychartertreaty�org/details/article/infrared-
environmental-infrastructure-gp-limited-and-others-v-spain-icsid-case-no-arb1412/> accessed 16 June 2021�
Vig.indd   106 2021. 08. 26.   9:35:11
 107
CONCLUSIONS
Throughout the book, we have thoroughly analyzed the fair and equitable treatment standard 
and the legitimate expectations of the foreign investors within the context of the Energy 
Charter Treaty in the available arbitral practice� Some cases, like the Yukos cases, were not 
included into this analysis, because in some sense they comprise a kind of independent unit 
within the Energy Charter Treaty related arbitral practice, and from academic perspective 
it is worth devoting a whole new study to their examination� Others, such as certain Czech 
green energy cases, are closely tied to already processed cases, hence their analysis was 
not warranted� Finally, as already referred to in the introduction of the book, many Energy 
Charter Treaty related cases have ended in settlement agreements or otherwise, their awards 
are not public, thus, we could not research them� Regardless, this book can easily serve 
as a comprehensive treatise on fair and equitable treatment and legitimate expectations in 
the context of the Energy Charter Treaty�
Analyzing the cases from the perspective of the fair and equitable treatment standard, 
it is possible for us to set up certain common patterns� We generally follow the structure 
of the theoretical part of the book, so we first begin with certain observations concerning 
the wider fair and equitable treatment standard, and then we turn our attention towards the 
legitimate expectations (sub)-standard�
The first issue that most tribunals encountered related to the cases we examined, was 
determining the nature and content of the fair and equitable standard� The root of this problem 
is in the way of how the fair and equitable treatment standard is presented in the Energy 
Charter Treaty (as we also discussed earlier in the book)� Article 10(1) seemingly ties the 
standard to the stable, equitable, favorable and transparent conditions obligation, however, 
without a more express and clear association, it is difficult for tribunals to determine its 
exact scope� As we have observed throughout the analyzed case law, tribunals took diverse 
views towards what constitutes fair and equitable treatment, how it can be categorized 
in the context of the Energy Charter Treaty’s other identifiable standards and obligations. 
In general, most tribunals seem to agree at least that the fair and equitable treatment 
standard is an autonomous standard that bears examination independently, when raised 
by the claimant� Its relationship to the other standards found in Article 10(1) greatly varies 
depending on the given tribunal, however� Some awards we have studied connected the 
fair and equitable treatment standard to the obligation of creating and encouraging stable, 
equitable, favorable, and transparent conditions� Whether the fair and equitable treatment 
standard is part of this obligation, or other way around, or if the two are independent of each 
other, but the obligation regardless forms the content of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard, seems to greatly vary, depending on the case examined� Another interesting facet 
is whether constant protection and security (third sentence of Article 10(1)) falls under the 
fair and equitable treatment� Many tribunals seemingly treated this obligation as a separate 
standard from fair and equitable treatment, but a handful categorized it under the purview 
of fair and equitable treatment� We can observe similar diversity of opinions when it comes 
to transparency, impairment by unreasonable or discriminatory measure�
In general, we could observe, that host states very typically try to argue that fair and 
equitable treatment is synonymous with the minimum standard of treatment as found in 
customary international law� By contrast, claimants almost always attempt to argue that 
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fair and equitable treatment goes beyond this original standard with its scope� From our 
point of view, it seems that tribunals often agree with claimants in this context, and very 
often reject the argument that the fair and equitable treatment standard exhausts itself in 
the minimum standard of treatment� Though, of course, this does not seem to be a universal 
rule when it comes to tribunals�
So, if we accept that the fair and equitable treatment standard moves beyond the 
minimum standard of treatment, then the next question that arises is: in what respects 
is it more than the minimum standard� As noted with regards to categorization, several 
tribunals have attempted to determine a list or just a general group of elements that serve 
as constituent parts of the fair and equitable treatment standard, typically based on their 
reading of Article 10(1): reasonableness, stability, transparency, due process compliant host 
state conduct, and so on� However, out of all the tribunals we examined, the vast majority 
seemingly accepted the proposition that the central part of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard is the protection of the investors’ legitimate expectations�
Thus, it stands to reason that we too should focus on this standard, or rather sub-
standard of fair and equitable treatment, when it comes to drawing conclusions from 
the available case law� There are some general observations we can make here� Without 
fail, the vast majority of the tribunals agreed upon a number of core concepts relating to 
legitimate expectations. The first of these is that the protection of legitimate expectations 
is an objective standard, meaning that the focus is not on the subjective perspective of 
the investor, but rather what objective expectations could be established, based on the 
consideration of all the circumstances of the given case� Furthermore, another important 
point that was established by most tribunals, was that legitimate expectations can exist only 
at the time when the investment is made� Most tribunals agreed that this time was when 
the investor made the final decision to realize the investment, and at which point there 
was no return without cost from making the investment� However, we have to note, that in 
some cases, this point of time was under question, or there were attempts by the claimants 
to present legitimate expectations that arose later than when the investment was made� 
Furthermore, most tribunals agreed that any legitimate expectation must be reasonable and 
proportionate. And finally, most tribunals were in accord that a level of necessary legal 
due diligence was required on the part of the investor, though different standards of due 
diligence were established by different tribunals. However, most seemed to concur that 
perfect due diligence was not a requirement here�
Through a succession of tribunals, various tests were devised regarding legitimate 
expectations� In the Antaris v Czech Republic case, for instance, the tribunal established 
that the claimant should prove that the clear and explicit (or implicit) representation 
was attributable to the host state, that it was reasonably relied upon by the claimant, 
but subsequently repudiated by the host state� By contrast in PV Investors v Spain, the 
arbitral tribunal utilized a similar, but still different three-pronged test, or rather, method: 
(i) there must have been specific commitment given to the investor by the host state, (ii) 
this reliance must have been considered reasonable, based on the given circumstances, 
and (iii) legitimate expectations must be balanced with the host state’s right to regulate 
in the tribunal’s consideration of said expectations� The tribunal in the Voltaic v Czech 
Republic case also devised a legitimate expectations test (consisting of four steps in this 
case): (i) whether the host state committed to regulatory stability or otherwise assured 
the investor of it, (ii) whether the investor relied on this assurance or commitment in an 
effective manner, (iii) whether this reliance can be considered reasonable, based on the given 
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circumstances, (iv) whether there was a violation of the investor’s legitimate expectations 
by the host state� As we can observe, these tests are largely similar to each other, though 
there are certain differences. Namely, while in the case of Antaris and PV Investors, the 
test only mentions a specific commitment without further qualification, the Voltaic test 
stresses the importance of the host state committing to regulatory stability (we return to 
this subject later in the conclusions)� Similarly, PV Investors stands out for mentioning 
the host state’s right to regulate directly, while the other two do not do so� However, they 
all seem to concur on the necessity of the investor relying on the commitment/assurance, 
and that this reliance was reasonable�
As already mentioned regarding the tests, the origin of the legitimate expectation must 
be a commitment or representation� But the view of the tribunals on what constitutes a 
commitment seems to be different. In general, we can differentiate between two bigger 
“schools of thought” (which can be further divided up into sub-schools): that a so-called 
specific commitment from the host state is necessary, and an alternative approach which 
holds that general commitments and representations, or even the regulatory framework 
itself, can also serve as a foundation for legitimate expectations. In the first case, tribunals 
following this view generally tended to agree that a specific and explicit commitment from 
the host state to the foreign investor was sufficient to establish legitimate expectation. 
However, there were severe divergences regarding what can be considered a specific 
commitment: some tribunals rejected treating assurances given by Government officials as 
specific commitments for example. A similar divergence of views can be observed when it 
comes to interpreting Government communications made to a group of investors, instead 
of one specific investor. However, tribunals following this “school of thought” seemed to 
generally agree that the only case where laws or regulations could serve as a foundation for 
legitimate expectations is when they included explicit stabilization clauses, or otherwise, it 
was possible to pinpoint a single provision (or provisions) of the legislation that could be 
clearly interpreted as a commitment by the host state� The other “school of thought” also 
accepts the first “school’s” instances regarding the origination of legitimate expectations, 
but adds the view that general and implied commitments can also potentially serve as 
sources of legitimate expectations on the part of investors. This view chiefly focuses on 
establishing legitimate expectations based on the regulatory framework, even in the absence 
of a specific stabilization clause, or in general, provisions that could be clearly interpreted 
as commitments� However, there are some interesting issues present here, such as the 
question of whether for example a preamble stating the host state’s desire to encourage 
and protect foreign investment can be read as a general commitment, or whether it was 
possible to read out an implied commitment from the whole of the regulatory framework 
and the general conduct of the host state when dealing with foreign investors� The arbitral 
tribunals gave differing answers to these conundrums.
The scope and content of legitimate expectations also raised some interesting questions� 
As we already mentioned earlier in the conclusions regarding fair and equitable treatment 
in general, host states usually attempt to argue that the scope and content of legitimate 
expectations end at the minimum standard of treatment� Another common argument (we had 
seen examples of both Spain and Hungary using the argument, for instance) is that foreign 
investors could only legitimately expect a reasonable rate of return on their investment� In 
contrast, most investors seem to push forward the notion that legitimate expectations are 
expectations towards the regulatory stability of the host state’s framework, typically for 
the duration of the operating life of the investor’s investment� Tribunals seemed to vary 
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in their interpretation, though most seemed to accept the base notion that a legitimate 
expectation could be angled towards regulatory stability� However, they also usually stressed 
simultaneously that even a legitimate expectation towards regulatory stability cannot mean 
the crystallization of regulation, as the evolution of the regulatory framework is always 
a given�426
Related to this, tribunals frequently emphasized that host states have a sovereign right 
to regulate, and this right cannot be superseded by international obligations, like the Energy 
Charter Treaty� The main reason for this is the evolutionary character of economic life (EDF 
(Services) Limited v Romania)� Conversely, foreign investors are also entitled to protection 
by the Energy Charter Treaty� Therefore, tribunals often stressed that there must be a balance 
exercised between the right to regulate in the interest of some public policy objective, and 
the interests of foreign investors� In connection with this exercise, the requirements of 
reasonableness and proportionality are often mentioned by the tribunals (reasonableness is 
also referred to with regards to the investors’ reliance on expectations as mentioned earlier)� 
Perhaps the RREEF v Spain case summarizes these aspects best: proportionality means that 
the host state’s measures are not random, arbitrary or unnecessary, and they do not modify 
the framework in a way that is unnecessarily harmful to the investors, while reasonableness 
means in the tribunal’s reading that the following requirements are fulfilled: legitimacy of 
purpose (ergo, it represents the interests of society as a while, and it does not change the 
substance of relevant rights), necessity (there is a pressing social need that has to be met, this 
is a higher standard than usefulness or desirability), suitability (the regulatory exercise must 
be suitable to achieve the legitimate purpose)� Other tribunals followed similar logic when 
analyzing reasonableness and proportionality (or their negative counterparts, arbitrariness, 
discriminatory character of measures, etc�)� In the case of some tribunals, their reasoning 
focused on the question of whether the host state modified the essential characteristics of 
the original regulatory framework on which the investor’s legitimate expectations were 
based� Furthermore, it is important to note, that while some tribunals focused on these issues 
from the perspective of legitimate expectations, others also examined the reasonableness 
and proportionality of the host state’s conduct in the general context of fair and equitable 
treatment� Transparency is also sometimes added to this, though it is also some other times 
separated from fair and equitable treatment (as already mentioned earlier)�
And finally, some general observations. First, it seems clear that tribunals do not rely 
exclusively on Energy Charter Treaty related arbitral practice (though it plays a rather 
prominent role in many awards), but also refer to general investment arbitral practice in 
order to advance their interpretation of fair and equitable treatment� The parties to the 
disputes also seem to follow this approach in their argumentations� Second, the case law 
related to green (renewable) energy, with respect to Spain, the Czech Republic and Italy, 
shows a developmental path, how the reasonings of the tribunals evolved, and how the 
afore-mentioned divergent positions came to being� This is evidenced by how frequently 
tribunals invoked earlier cases related to the same regulatory conduct, either to build 
upon them their own arguments, or to reject them due to differing circumstances or legal 
interpretation on the part of the tribunal�
426 Regarding the potential for the crystallization or chilling of host state regulations, see in general: Gábor Hajdu, 
‘Regulatory Chill: The Hidden Dangers of Investment Arbitration for EU Countries’ in Renáta Kocúrová, 
Róbert Frimmel (eds), Sociálne vedy z perspektívy mladých vedeckých pracovníkov II: Zborník príspevkov 
z konferencie mladých vedeckých pracovníkov (Univerzita sv� Cyrila a Metoda v Trnave 2018) 37�
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All in all, we can conclude that the question of fair and equitable treatment in the context 
of the Energy Charter Treaty is still the most important issue� The arbitral practice, though 
showing common patterns and positions in some respects, is still very colorful� However, 
we can at least note, that with regards to several aspects of fair and equitable treatment, 
tribunals now have clearer (if differing) positions to base their own positions on. The issue 
of legitimate expectations seems to have completely subsumed fair and equitable treatment 
in the majority of cases, either being the sole object of examination within the standard’s 
context, or being central element to which the tribunal devoted most of its attention� Further 
developments will likely make this trend clearer, and we can conjecture that predominance 
of legitimate expectations within this context will continue, though whether a more unified 
reading can emerge is a different question: the fact that common and nearly universally 
accepted elements have already come into being is promising, but we still cannot truly 
pinpoint any sort of real convergence in a number of key issues�
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